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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers, which contribute to the de-
bates surrounding global imbalances and financial globalization. The papers 
are unified by their featuring of foreign assets and real exchange rates (RERs) 
as the central themes. 
Following the introductory chapter, the first paper revisits the growth im-
pact of RER distortions. The Washington Consensus emphasizes the eco-
nomic costs of RER misalignment. However, a sizable recent empirical lit-
erature finds that undervalued RERs help countries achieve faster economic 
growth. The study shows that these findings are driven by inappropriate ho-
mogeneity assumptions imposed on long-run RER behavior across countries 
and/ or misspecification of the gro,,vth equation. When these problems are 
redressed, the empirical results for a sample of 63 developing countries over 
the period 1970-2007 suggest that misalignment of the RER, in either direction 
from the level consistent with external and internal equilibrium reduces eco-
nomic growth. However, deviations from Balassa-Samuelson adjusted pur-
chasing power parity do not seem to affect growth. The RER should thus be 
consistent with external and internal balance, irrespective of the purchasing 
power parity benchmark. 
The second paper is motivated by the popular view that the surge in 
China's foreign exchange reserves is due to a distortionary exchange rate 
policy ain1ed at keeping the RER w1dervalued in order to support export-
led growth. It undertakes an in-depth empirical investigation to quantify 
how 1nuch "mercantilist" and "precautionary'' 1notives have contributed to 
the reserve build-up in China during the period 1998Q4-2011Q4. A substan-
tial problem is that theory is consistent with employing two vastly differing 
approaches to defining and estimating the role of mercantilist reserve accu-
mulation. A priori, either method could generate misleading results. The 
study -shows, however, that the distinction between the two approaches is im-_ 
material in China's case. The results suggest that mercantilism accounts for 
less than 10 percent of the reserye accunTulation. Precautionary motives and 
other factors seem to be the dominant determinants of the surge in China's 
international reserves. 
The third paper studies the macroeconomic impact of valuation effects 
( chap.ges in net external assets of a country arising fro:n::t movements in ex-
chan.ge rates or asset retur~s). In theory, valuation effects are an important 
. 
lX 
X 
channel of international risk sharing through their facilitation of external ad-
justment. However, the effects can also be economically destabilizing in the 
presence of frictions in the international financial system. Despite the grow-
ing significance of valuation effects in an era of financial globalization, the 
nature and extent of their macroeconon1ic effect has not yet been systemati-
cally examined1 especially in relation to emerging market economies (EMEs). 
The study examines the 1nacroeconomic impact of valuation effects for 53 
countries over 1980-2010. Valuation effects seem to operate as a risk sharing 
channel in high income countries. For EMEs the results depend on how val-
uation effects correlate with domestic consumption growth. There is weak 
evidence that valuation effects act as a risk sharing channel only if the cor-
relation is negative1 and are destabilizing otherwise. In the latter case, the 
welfare loss may well exceed one percent of permanent consumption. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1..1. Context 
The international economic landscape has changed substantially following 
the string of financial crises in emerging market economies (EMEs) in the 
1990s. Many EMEs, in particular China and the East Asian countries af-
fected by the 1997-98 financial crisis, have been building up foreign exchange 
reserves at unprecedented levels by running sizable and persistent current ac-
count surpluses.1 This has been mirrored in widening cu;rent account deficits 
in the US. There is an ongoing debate about the causes of these 11 global im-
balances" and their implications for structural adjustment policies in both 
surplus and deficit countries. · 
The influential 11Bretton Woods II-view11 holds that global imbalances 
are due to government policy interventions in emerging cow1tries, especially 
. . 
in East Asia, in that they follow mercantilist policies to support a development 
1 For instance, China's reserves (US$ 3.2 trillion) amounted to a staggering 44 percent of 
annual gross domestic product (GDP) in 201L 
1. 
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strategy based on export-led growth (Dooley et al., 2004, 2005). According to 
this view, the key ingredient to fostering economic development is real ex-
change rate (RER) undervaluation. To maintain real undervaluation, the au-
thorities engage in distortionary exchange rate policies by hoarding foreign 
exchange reserves in order to resist the equilibrating forces that would appre-
ciate the nominal exchange rate. The underlying logic of the Bretton Woods II 
model is that real undervaluation is good for economic growth since positive 
externalities such as learning-by-doing effects or technology spillovers are 
more pronounced in export-linked industries than in the nontradable sector. 
Rodrik (2008) and a number of other studies such as Aguirre and Calderon 
(200St Bereau et al. (2009), and MacDonald and Vieira (2010) provide empir-
ical evidence that RER undervaluation does indeed foster economic growth 
in developing countries. The proponents of Bretton Woods II thus highlight 
how the system benefits en1erging countries through export-led growth, and 
the US through high domestic absorption. 
There are, however, concerns about the sustainability of global im-
balances. The intertemporal budget constraint determines that net exter-
nal indebtedness cannot exceed the present value of future trade balances. 
Therefore, the US' s persistent current account deficits cannot continue forever. 
Eventually some adjustment will be needed. Under conventional theory, this 
adjustment needs to be in the form of a reversal in the trade balance. How-
§1.1 Context 3 
ever, a sizable recent literature shows that it is not only the current account 
driving the change in the net foreign asset position but also "valuation effects" 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Gourinchas and Rey, 2007; Gourinchas, 2008). 
The latter arise from market value variations in the stock of foreign assets or 
liabilities due to movements in exchange rates or asset prices. 
Theoretically, valuation effects play an important role in international 
consumption risk sharing by opening up a channel of external adjustment 
(Devereux and Sutherland, 2010). Valuation effects can be decomposed into 
"unpredictable" and "predictable" components (Devereux and Sutherland, 2010; 
Gourinchas, 2008). The unpredictable part reflects the flow payment associ-
ated with the sharing of consumption risk across countries. The predictable 
component arises from the excess return of a country's international portfolio 
due to differences in country risk premiums. Excess returns thus allow a "safe 
haven-country" to operate under a persistent current account deficit. 
Gourinchas et al. (2010) and Forbes (2010) show that the US indeed 
is a beneficiary of predicable valuation effects in the sense that foreign assets 
generate substantial excess .returns over recorded gross liabilities. This phe-
nomenon underpins the curious situation of the US earning positive returns 
even though its net foreign as?et posi_tion is negative. In addition, the US bal-
ance sheet is unique because the bulk of its liabilities is denominated in dol-
lars. Dollar depreciation could therefore help external adjustment through: 
4 Introduction 
(1) a positive wealth transfer and (2) an improvement in the trade balance. 
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) show that up to 27 percent of the cyclical external 
adjustment is due to valuation effects. Thus the valuation channel may allow 
global imbalances to continue over a long time horizon. 
However, the empirical relevance of valuation effects is not confined 
to the US. The magnitude of valuation effects is proportional to gross asset 
and liability positions. The importance of valuation effects as a driver of the 
net external asset position has therefore also increased substantially due to fi-
nancial integration in other developed and emerging economies. In emerging 
countries, however, the valuation channel need not necessarily be a facilitator 
of external adjustment. It may ,-vell be that valuation effects are economically 
destabilizing in these countries, vvhich would be the case if they are pro-
cyclical vvith output shocks. A well-knovvn example for this is "original sin" 
in the sense of Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999): the inability of emerging 
countries to borrow in their own currencies. Under original sin, a currency 
depreciation, triggered by a negative demand shock for example, generates 
a capital loss in the net external asset position, which, despite the shock, re-
quires a surplus in future trade balances to reduce net debt to its long-run 
value. 
There is some empirical evidence that valuation effects have indeed 
become an. important channel of risk sharing for countries that are part of the 
§1.2 Purpose and previez.u 5 
European Monetary Union (EMUt EU, and the OECD (Balli et al., 2012). So 
far, less is known about their nature in emerging economies. The only sh1dy 
that empirically investigates the valuation channel in emerging countries is 
that of Bracke and Schmitz (2011). They examine the risk sharing properties 
of valuation adjustments that emanate fron1 portfolio equity, which, ho,,vever, 
only represents a small share of a typical emerging country's international 
portfolio. 
1.2 Purpose and preview 
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers, which contribute to the 
debates surrounding global in1balances and financial globalization. Foreign 
assets and real exchange rates are the two key themes running though the 
three chapters. The first paper (Chapter 2) revisits the claim that RER un-
dervaluation fosters economic growth. The second study (Chapter 3) ana-
lyzes whether mercantilist policies explain the surge in foreign exchange rate 
reserves in China. The third paper (Chapter 4) aims at broadening our un-
derstanding of the nature of valuation effects through an in-depth en1pirical 
investigation. 
The purpose of the first paper (Chapter 2) is to shed light on the 
contemporary debate on the impact of real exchange rate misaligiunent on 
6 Introduction 
economic growth. The cornerstone of the Bretton Woods II school of thought 
is the notion that undervalued RERs help developing countries to achieve 
faster economic growth (Rodrik, 2008; Aguirre and Calderon, 2005; Bereau 
et al., 2009; MacDonald and Vieira, 2010). This view, however, runs counter 
to the "Washington Consensus" (Williamson, 1990) which postulates that real-
exchange rate misalignment (both overvaluation and undervaluation) hinders 
economic growth. A RER that is depreciated relative to its equilibrium level 
(that is, the value that is consistent with the simultaneous attainment of in-
ternal and external balances) would fuel inflation and reduce investment 
thereby hampering growth. On the other hand RER overvaluation hinders 
efficient resource allocation between tradable and non-tradable production in 
the economy. 
The paper identifies two sources of inconsistencies in the recent em-
pirical evidence in support of the view that RER undervaluation spurs growth. 
The first source is the homogeneity assumption imposed across all countries 
on long-run RER behavior, which is not in accordance with the theory of RER 
misalignment. The second is the failure in model specification. The models 
used in these studies represent both RER overvaluation and undervaluation 
by a single variable ('1RER misalignment"t thereby ignoring the possible dif-
ferential impact of real overvaluation and undervaluation. 
To redress these issues, the study estimates RER 1nisalignments on a 
§1.2 Purpose and previezu 7 
country-by-country basis over the period 1970-2007 using the single-equation 
methodology as developed by Edwards (1989), Elbadawi (1994), and Baffes 
et al. (1999). This approach allows for heterogeneity in long-run RER behav-
ior across countries as suggested by economic theory. In the second stage, 
the paper empirically investigates how real over- and undervaluation in1pact 
on growth. Robust inference is achieved by using various measures of RER 
misalignment. 
The empirical results suggest that any deviation of the RER from the 
equilibrium real exchange rate (i.e. both RER undervaluation and overval-
uation) impedes economic growth. The RER should thus be consistent with 
external and internal balances. This finding is consistent with the Washington 
Consensus. 
The second paper (Chapter 3) is a case study of _the role of exchange 
rate management in China's surge in foreign exchange reserves. It revisits the 
claim that Chinese reserve hoarding is a by-product of mercantilist policies 
that seek to maintain the RER undervalued in order to support export-led 
growt~. Following the string of financial crises in the 1990s it is now widely 
acknowledged that stockpiling reserves as self-insurance against volatile cap-
ital flows is prudential policy (Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Aizenman and 
Lee, 2007; Obstfeld et al., 2010; IMF, 2011). However, the general perception 
is that China's reserve holdings are too large to be justified by precautionary 
8 In trod·uction 
motives. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the extent to which mercan-
tilist policies account for the accumulation of China's foreign exchange re-
serves. A substantial problem in assessing the role of 1nercantilism in China's 
reserve build-up is that, theoretically, reserve accumulation in conjunction 
with real tmdervaluation is consistent with both precautionary and mercan-
tilist motives. There are two ways to deal with this problem. The first defines 
any reserve accumulation in the context of RER undervaluation as mercan-
tilist. Previous studies unanimously use this approach (Aizenman and Lee, 
2007; Delatte and Fouquau, 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012, 2014). The problem with 
this method is that it is arbitrary and tends to overemphasize the mercan-
tilist motive relative to the precautionary one by entirely ruling out the latter, 
especially in light of the widely-held view that China has undergone a long 
period of sustained real undervaluation. 
The second uses a two-stage procedure, which, first, determines the 
level of reserves needed for precautionary purposes and then calculates the 
cumulative contribution of mercantilism to the hoarding of reserves. To this 
end reserve accumulation in relation to RER w1dervaluation is considered 
as mercantilist only if reserve holdings are in excess of precautionary needs. 
The shortcoming of this approach is the imposed assumption that the precau-
tionary and 1nercantilist motives are never simultaneously at play, which may 
§1.2 Purpose and previezv 9 
overstate the relevance of the former over the latter. There is no obvious ad-
vantage between the two approaches. Therefore, I adopt both methods with 
the objective of testing the sensitivity of the estimation results in favoring one 
definition of mercantilist reserve accumulation over the other. The empirical 
results suggest that in China's case, both of the above discussed approaches 
yield similar estimates of the importance of mercantilist motives as a determi-
nant of China's surge in foreign exchange reserves. In particular, the central 
message of the paper is that mercantilist motives cai1not account for China's 
extraordinary demand for foreign exchange reserves. The mercantilist motive 
accounts for only US$ 200-500 billion (or 3-7 percent of GDP) of total reserve 
accumulation in China during 1998Q4-2011Q4, depending on the alternative 
versions of model specification. Precautionary motive and other factors yet 
to be explored, such as China's emerging role as the premier assembly centre 
within global production netvvorks, seem to be the domi!_lant determinants of 
the surge in China's foreign excp.ange reserves. 
Despite the growing significance of valuation effects in an era of fi-
nancial globalization, the nature and extent of their macroeconomic effect has 
not yet been systematically examined, especially in relation to EMEs. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) examines ·vvhether valuation effects ( changes 
in net external assets of a country arising from movements in exchange rates 
or asset returns) are an operative channel of international consumption risk 
10 Introduction 
sharing or1 instead1 whether they are are economically destabilizing. If the 
forn1er is the case then1 all else equaL an increase in the magnitude of valua-
tion adjustments should be associated v\rith improved risk sharing outcomes 
across countries (Gourinchas1 2008). For the purpose of this analysis1 risk 
sharing is 1neasured as the extent of co-movement betvveen idiosyncratic con-
sumption and output grovvth rates (Lev\71.S1 1996; S0rensen et al. 1 2007; Kose 
et al. 1 2009). The smaller the covariance behveen the latter variables1 the 
higher is the degree of risk sharing. 
The study tests the abo,e hypothesis using a newly constructed panel 
data set covering 18 high incon1e and 35 emerging economies o . er the period 
1980-2010. The results suggest that an increase in the size of valuation effects 
is associated with better risk sharing in high income countries I but there is no 
significant evidence that this relationship holds for the group of EMEs. 
In order to explore the nature of valuation effects further, the study 
then subdi ides emerging economies into two groups on the basis of the 
sign of the correlation beh• een , aluation effects and domestic consumption 
growth". Theor.. suggests that the sign of ilii · correlation indicates whether 
aluation effects are a channel of external adjustment (negative correlation) or 
are economicaU~ destabilizing (positi,, e correlation). The correlation is ne,ga-
tive f:or 21 of the oS emerging coitmlrie , but not t:atisticall r significant in most 
cases, providing at best -V\ eak e \ idence of a f1.1nctioning; valuation channel in 
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these countries. For the remaining 14 countries, an increase in the magnitude 
of the valuation channel is significantly associated with lo,,ver risk sharing. 
For this group of countries, the extent of risk sharing has substantially dete-
riorated during the era of financial globalization. 
Based on these findings, the study then proceeds to examine if val-
uation effects inflict welfare costs through volatility in consumption in those 
emerging countries where the correlation between valuation effects and con-
sumption growth is positive. The econometric results suggest that a dou-
bling of the magnitude of valuation effects amplifies consumption volatility 
by about 10 percent in those economies. The last section of the paper under-
takes a welfare analysis in the spirit of Lucas (1987), Obstfeld (1994b ), and 
Pallage and Robe (2003) to quantify the welfare loss due to the additional 
consumption uncertainty brought about by valuation-effect volatility. The re-
sults suggest that the welfare cost may well exceed one p-ercent of permanent 
consumption. In some countries, the cost estimates are much higher, ranging 
up to 92 percent of pern1anent consumption. 
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Chapter 2 
Should developing countries 
undervalue their currencies? 
Summary 
This chapter revisits the growth impact of real exchange rate distortions. The Wash-
ington Consensus emphasizes the economic costs of real exchange rate misalignment. How-
ever, a sizable recent empirical literature finds that undervalued real exchange rates help 
countries to achieve faster economic grmvth. The study shows that these findings are driven 
by inappropriate homogeneity assumptions imposed on long-run real exchange rate behav-
ior across countries and/ or misspecification of the growth equation. When these problems 
are redressed, the empirical results for a sample of 63 developing countries over the period 
1970-20.07 suggest that misalignment of the real exchange rate in either direction from the 
level consistent with external and internal equilibrium reduces economic growth. However, 
deviations from Balassa-Samuelson adjusted purchasing power parity do not seem to affect 
growth. The real exchange rate should thus be consistent with external and internal balance, 
irrespective of the purchasing power parity benchmark. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The real exchange rate (RER) does not play a central role in traditional growth 
theory. Both the canonical Solow-Swan growth model and endogenous growth 
models feature closed economies. However, Ricardo's and Lewis's theories 
of economic growth suggest a more important role for the RER. As nations 
develop, the "modern" manufacturing sector absorbs 11surplus labor", which 
directly translates into higher national output. The RER, which creates an in-
centive to allocate resources to the n1.odern manufacturing sector, is therefore 
of first-order importance to economic growth. The question of what is the 
optimal relative price of traded goods arises. There are two opposing views 
on the answer to that question. The aim of this paper is to shed more light on 
this debate. 
The "Washington Consensus'\ articulated by Williamson (1990), ac-
knowledges a crucial role of the RER in the growth process. According to this 
view,, an appropriate real exchange rate should be consistent with macroeco-
nomic objectives in the medium run and "sufficiently competitive" such that 
exports grow at a rate consistent with external balance. However, an overly 
competitive RER is not appropriate because it would fuel inflation and curb 
resources available for investment. Underlying this view is the notion that 
there exists an equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) that satisfies external 
and internal balance (Nurkse, 1945). Seen in this light,, any deviation from 
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the ERER will hamper economic growth. 
The opposing view, with Rodrik (2008) at the forefront, maintains 
that RER overvaluation harms growth and undervaluation promotes it. This 
stance is in part due to the success story of export-led growth in conjunction 
with apparently undervalued currencies in East-Asian countries. But there 
are also other plausible explanations for why real undervaluation is good for 
growth. In the export-oriented growth literature it is often argued that the 
manufacturing sector is special because positive externalities (learning-by-
doing effects, technology spillovers) are more pronounced for export-linked 
activities than other sectors of the econo1ny. Another explanation is that an 
undervalued RER encourages higher savings · and investment (Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger, 2007). Finally, Rodrik's (2008) conjecture is that the man-
ufacturing sector in developing countries is disproportionately subject to dis-
tortions and hence below its optimal size in equilibrium. Because removing 
those distortions proves difficult in practice, an undervalued RER serves as 
a ''more practical" second-best n1echanis1n to optimally reallocate resources 
toward the manufacturing sector (Rodrik, 2008). 
However, there is little systematic evidence supporting any of these 
views. The nature and prevaience of those positive externalities associated 
with exporting remain obscured (Eichengreen, 2008; Harrison and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2009). Rodrik (2008) was unable to empirically verify that the n1anu-
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facturing sector is disproportionately subjected to distortions in developing 
countries. In addition, all of these propositions seen1 to ignore the distortion 
cost associated with real undervaluation in the form of reduced aggregate de-
mand (Corden, 1981). It is therefore not clear if the gain in exports outweighs 
the loss in absorption, especially over longer tin1e horizons. Fi11ally, accordh1g 
to Edwards (1989), RER distortions can lead to resource misallocation across 
sectors as economic agents base their investment decisions on a relative price 
in disequilibrium. Because the RER tends to adjust to equilibrium over time, 
real undervaluation may induce investments in short-lived projects. 
The early empirical literature identifies a negative impact of RER 
overvaluation on growth but does not address RER undervaluation (Cottani 
et al., 1990; Ghura and Grennes, 1993).1 However, recent empirical studies 
unanimously reject the Washington Consensus view in the sense ·that they 
find a positive effect ofRER undervaluation on economic growth.2 The most 
prominent example is Rodrik (2008), whose empirical findings suggest that 
higher medium-term gro,,vth is systematically associated with undervalued 
exchange rates in developing countries. While Rodrik (2008) defines pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) adjusted for the Balassa-Sa1nuelson effect as the 
ERER, there is also a sizable number of empirical studies estimating ER:E:Rs 
1The term undervaluation only appears once in a footnote in Cottani et al. (1990) and not 
at all in Ghura and Grennes (1993). 
2The only exception is Nouira and Sekkat (2012) ,-vhose empirical results are inconclusive 
regarding the impact of real undervaluation on growth. 
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consistent with internal and external balance that broadly reach the same 
conclusion (Aguirre and Calderon, 2005; Bereau et al., 2009; Berg and Miao, 
2010; MacDonald and Vieira, 2010; Razin and Collins, 1997).3 Since these two 
concepts vastly differ from one another and are not directly comparable, this 
paper considers both ERER definitions, but ,vith the prune focus being on 
RER misalignment in the sense of Nurkse (1945). 
There are two important sources of inconsistencies driving previous 
results and the bulk of the literature suffers from at least one of these. First, 
relying on conventional panel data techniques to estimate ERERs imposes 
strong homogeneity assumptions on cross-country long-run RER behavior. 
This approach does not confor1n to the economic theory underlying the ERER 
and therefore generates misleading results. Second, the objective to infer the 
effect on growth of two variables (real over- and undervaluation) from a sin-
gle continuous variable (RER misalignment) ii1troduces a number of pitfalls, 
which can lead to growth regression misspecification. 
This paper explicitly takes into account heterogeneity in long-run 
RER b~havior-across countries by individually estimating RER misalignments 
for 63 developing countries over the period 1970-2007. It then empirically an-
alyzes how RER over- and up.dervaluation affect economic gro,vth. To this 
end, the study employs the system generalized method of moments (SGMM) 
3See Table 2A.1 in the Appendix for a list of previous empirical studies. 
18 Should developing countries undervalue their currencies? 
estimator developed by Arellano and Baver (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). To ensure robust inference, various measures of RER misalignment 
are used. 
The empirical results provide evidence in favor of the Washington 
Consensus view and reject the notion that RER undervaluation is an expedi-
ent development policy tool. This means that the optimal growth promoting 
relative price of traded goods is the value of the equilibrium real exchange 
rate. The study also shows that the identified inconsistencies rather than dif-
ferences in estimation n1ethods or data sets drive previous results. 
As for deviations from adjusted PPP, using the sa1ne data set and es-
timation methods as Rodrik (2008), but redressing the above problems, gen-
erates results which suggest that adjusted PPP misalignment does not matter 
for the growth performance of developing countries. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines 
the Nurksian ERER and estimates RER misalignments. Section 2.3 empiri-
cally analyzes the effects of RER distortions and adjusted PPP deviations on 
growth. Section 2.4 concludes. 
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2.2 Estimation of real exchange rate misalignment 
Before the relationship between RER distortions and economic growth can be 
analyzed, deviations of the actual RER from its equilibrium value need to be 
estimated. The problem any empirical study on this subject faces is that the 
ERER is not directly observable. The starting point to resolve this issue is to 
define the RER and the ERER. 
2.2.1. The equilibrium real exchange rate 
The real exchange rate is defined as the domestic relative price of traded to 
nontraded goods. That is, RER = EPr I PN, where E denotes the nominal 
exchange rate (measured as domestic currency per foreign currency). Pr and 
PN refer to the price of tradables and nontradables, respectively. Note that an 
increase in RER indicates depreciation. 
The equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) in the sense of Nurkse 
(1945) · is defined as that value of the RER that results in the simultaneous 
attain11:ent of both internal and external equilibrium, given sustainable values 
of relevant variables .achieving this objective.4 
. Nurkse' s definition directly implies that the ERER is determined by 
4Internal equilibrium implie$ that the nontraded goods market clears and that the unem-
ployment rate is at its ''natural" level. External equilibrium means that the current account 
deficit can be financed through "sustainable" levels of capital"inflows. 
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a set of macroeconomic fundamentals. Based on Edwards (1989), Montiel 
(1999b ), and Faruqee (1995), the ERER is a fun.ction of the following variables: 
Terms of trade The external terms of trade of a country (the relative price of 
exportables to importables) is among the key fundamentals explaining long-
rim RER behavior. The general argument is that an improvement in the terms 
of trade increases real income thus resulting in excess demand for nontrad-
ables. To restore equilibriu1n, the price of nontraded goods would have to 
rise, meaning ERER appreciation. However, Edwards (1989) shows that this 
income effect can be more than offset by substitution effects such that im-
proved terms of trade ,t\Tould lead to depreciation. It is therefore not possible 
to determine a priori which of these two effects dominates (Edwards, 1989). 
Trade policy Under the assumption that nontradables and importable goods 
are substitutes, a reduction in tariffs on imported goods decreases (increases) 
the demand for nontradables (importables), causing the ERER to depreciate.5 
Productivity of tradable production According to the Balassa-Samuelson 
theorem (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964), productivity gains in traded goods 
production are positively related to the growth rate and tend to be higher 
5See Edwards (1989) for 1nore details. Montiel (1999b) considers the case of export subsi-
dies. ERER depreciation associated with a decline in export subsidies is then brought about 
through resource reallocation from the exportable to the nontradable sector/ resulting in ex-
cess supply for nontradable goods. 
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in the tradable sector than in the nontradable sector. Since tradable goods 
prices tend to be uniform across countries (law-of-one price), productivity 
improvements relative to trading partners result ERER appreciation. Under 
the assumption of full employment and perfect labor mobility, the price ad-
justment is brought about by higher real wages in both sectors (income effect) 
and labor absorption in the traded goods sector away from the nontradable 
sector (supply effect). 
Government consumption Altering government spending patterns on traded 
or nontraded goods will have an immediate impact on the ERER. The ratio-
nale behind this intuition is straightforward. Increased or shifted government 
spending towards traded goods results in an increase of the trade deficit re-
quiring real depreciation such that the external balance continues to hold 
(Montiel, 1999b). In the case where government spendipg increases or tilts 
towards nontradables, the effect on the ERER is the opposite as it results in 
excess demand for nontradables. The relative price of nontradables then has 
to rise ·to restore internal equilibrium (Montiel, 1999b). 
Investment An increase in the 1.11vestment level has an ambiguous effect on 
· the ERER (Edwards, 1989). Whether the ERER appreciates or depreciates 
depends on whether it takes place in the tradable or nontradable sector and 
on factor intensities (Edward_s, 1989). 
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Net foreign asset position Intuitively, an increase in a country's net interna-
tional indebtedness should result in a larger trade surplus in order to service 
the debt, hence requiring real depreciation (and vice versa). Alternatively, 
it is possible for the "target levelll of the net foreign asset position to rise 
"permanently" during the adjustn1ent process towards equilibrium, implying 
current account surpluses and ERER depreciation (Faruqee, 1995). The ob-
verse of this is that it may be desirable for a country to move to a net debtor 
position thus leading to current accow1t deficits accompanied by an ERER 
appreciation (Egert et al., 2005). However, based on previous empirical re-
sults, an improvement in the net creditor position tends to be associated with 
ERER appreciation (Aguirre and Calderon, 2005; MacDonald and Ricct 2003; 
Montiel, 2007). 
The following equation summarizes the long-rw1 relationship between 
the ERER and the fundamentals: 
ERER = ERER (TOT, </>, s, GN, Cy, I , NFA ), (2.1) (+ / - ) (+ ) (-) (- ) (+) (+/-) (+/ -) 
where TOT refers to the terms of trade, rp is a measure of trade policy, s 
captures productivity differentials (Balassa-Samuelson effect), GN and Gr are 
government consumption on nontradables and tradables, I refers to invest-
ment, and NFA to the net foreign asset position. Importantly, theoretical 
priors point to an a1nbiguous effect of some fw1damentals on the ERER, as 
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shown by the signs of the partial derivatives below.6,7 
In case a country faces a binding credit constraint, the trade surplus 
will depend on exogenous foreign aid flows (Baffes et al., 1999). Therefore, 
Eq. 2.1 takes a modified form: 
ERER = ERER (TOTI cp I 'I GN, Gy, I I TS), 
(+ / - ) (+ ) (- ) (- ) (+) (+ / -) (+) 
(2.la) 
where the net foreign asset position has been replaced with the trade surplus, 
TS. 8 
These two specifications differ fundamentally with regard to the un-
derlying assumption of how the stock of net international indebtedness feeds 
back on net capital inflows and the ERER. The former conditions the ERER 
on given (sustainable) values of the stock of net international indebtedness, 
which also affects the non-exogenous component of net capital inflows (Mon-
tiel, 1999a). The latter, on the other hand, specifies the ERER as a function 
6For details on the relationship between the ERER and its fundamentals, see the Appendix. 
7In theory, international real interest rate differentials and the extent of capital controls 
also form part of the ERER fundamentals as permanent changes in both variables affect for-
eign borrowing decisions and ther:efore the path of the ERER (Edwards, 1989). Unfortunately, 
severe data limitations prevent including these variables in the ERER equation. This caveat 
should not ,vorry us, however, since the stock of international indebtedness ,vill capture any 
adjustment in foreign borro,ving and lending that is brought about by capital account liber-
alizations or changes in real interest rates. Additionally, as pointed out below, misalignment 
estiinates are similar across alternative specifications. Finally, note that the ERER depends 
on real.variables only (Edwards, 1989). 
8Notice that this ERER specification may be among the sources that introduce endogene-
ity in the estimation of the gro1vth model since the level of development may affect credit 
constraints. As will be shown, however, the data favor the inclusion of.binding credit ceilings 
for only four countries. 
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of exogenous (sustainable) net capital inflows only, with no feedback from 
the accumulated stock of net foreign assets. Therefore, the concept of ex-
ternal balance is a "stock-flow" approach in Eq. 2.1 (Faruqee, 1995), and a 
"flow" approach in Eq. 2.la (Montiel, 1999a).9 Which of the two specifications 
is relevant for a given country will depend on its economic structure. In-
tuitively, the flow approach is suitable in foreign aid-receiving low income 
countries, whereas the stock-flow approach fits better for middle income 
countries. However, rather than imposing possibly restrictive assumptions, 
in what follows, the approach will be to let the data "choose" the appropriate 
specification. 
The approach adopted to empirically estimate ERERs in this paper is 
the single-equation approach developed by Edwards (1989), Elbadawi (1994), 
and Baffes et al. (1999). It comprises three steps. The first involves estimating 
the long-run equilibrium relationship between the ERER and its fundamen-
tals. The second is to derive ·sustainable values of those fundan1entals that 
explain long-run RER behavior. The ERER and the degree of misalignment 
are calculated in the final step. 
According to this approach, the empirical equivalent of Eq. 2.1 or 2. la 
9 Another possibility would be a pure "stock" approach. The net foreign asset position 
would then be required to have fully adjusted to steady state such that net capital inflows 
equal the amount needed to sustain the steady state value of the net creditor position. NFA 
and TS would then not be part of the ERER function. However, the stock approach is unlikely 
to be appropriate in the context of developing countries, where the adjustment process of the 
net foreign asset position may be a matter of several decades - a horizon too long to be of 
exchange rate policy relevance. See Montiel (1999a) for more details. 
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under the assumption of linearity in the theorized long-run relationship takes 
the following f orn1: 
(2.2) 
where subscript i refers to the country in question, F5 is the vector of the set of 
fundamentals at sustainable values, and vector f3 contains the to-be-estimated 
long-run parameters. Uncovering f3 thus involves estimating some form of 
the empirical model in Eq. 3.5, except that ERER and F5 have to be replaced 
with their observable counterparts, that is the actual RER and actual values 
of the fundamentals: 
(2.3) 
The error term vu is assumed to be stationary ,vith zero mean.10 
Once f3 and F 5 are derived, the degree of misali~unent (mis it) can be 
calculated with the following formula: 
. ERERit - RERit 
mzsit = RERit ' (2.4) 
where positive (negative) values of misit indicate overvaluation (undervalua-
tion). 
10Eq. 3.5 follovvs from Eq. 2.3 under the assumption that the ERER and sustainable fun-
damentals are the long-run conditional expected values of their actual counterparts (Baffes 
et al., 1997). 
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2.2.2 Data 
The absence of readily available indices for the actual RER and some of the 
fundamentals imposes a considerable obstacle to the empirical estimation of 
ERERs. The fundamentals for which reliable time series are available are in-
vestment, the terms of trade, the net foreign asset position, and the trade 
balance. Proxies have to be used for the actual RER and the other fundamen-
tals. 
The RER is an incentive measure for both producing and consum-
ing tradable and nontradable goods. Constructing corresponding indexes is 
unfeasible due to conceptual problems and data constraints in low income 
countries (Hinkle and Nsengiyumva, 1999). Therefore, the RER is measured 
as the ratio of trade-weighted foreign consumer price indexes (CPI) converted 
at official exchange rates relative to the domestic CPI.11 
There is also no direct measure for trade· policy. The bulk of the 
empirical literature proxies this variable through the ratio of total exports 
plus ilnports to GDP, under the assumption that countries with more liberal 
trade regimes have higher trade volumes, ceteris paribus. Three proxies are 
considered: the ratio of total exports plus imports to GDP at current (OPEN) 
and constant (OPENl) prices, as well as the ratio of current imports relative to 
11 An alternative proxy for tradable goods wuuld be the wholesale price index (WPI). How-
ever, for many countries' main trading partners, WPis are either unavailable or only cover a 
few years. 
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current GDP (OPEN2). To capture the Balassa-Samuelson-effect, the variable 
PROD is constructed, which equals the ratio of the home cow1try' s GDP per 
capita to the OECD average GDP per capita. This proxy directly incorporates 
Balassa' s (1964) assumption that productivity gains are associated with higher 
growth rates. 
Finally, there are no data on the composition of government con-
sun1ption. Data are, ho,,vever, available on total government consumption as 
a share of GDP (GEXP). Empirically, government consumption tends to dis-
proportionately fall on nontraded goods (Edwards, 1989). Therefore, GEXP 
serves as a proxy for GN. However, this need not be true for all countries 
(Elbadawi and Soto, 1997). Thus, to avoid imposing more restrictions than 
necessary, the approach will be to let the data decide whether GEXP proxies 
Under the criterion of at least 20 consecutive yearly observations 
within the time span 1970-2007, the final sample consists of 63 develop-
ing countries, excluding outliers. Table 2A.2 provides a description and the 
sources of the data. 
· 
12While this is the least restrictive approach, the downside is an implicit equality restriction 
on the parameters of Gr and GN. 
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2.2.3 Method 
Previous studies that estimate RER misalignment for a large set of countries 
commonly employ panel data techniques to estimate a single cointegrating 
vector, which is then used to calculate RER misalignment for the countries in 
question. There are four major problems with imposing such strong homo-
geneity assumptions on cross-country long-run RER behavior. 
First, assuming homogenous j3 is inconsistent with the theoretical 
models used to derive the empirical equation of the ERER. On theoretical 
grounds it is not possible to determine a priori the effect of changes in the 
ter1ns of trade, the investment rate, or the net foreign asset position oi1 the 
ERER. This implies non-trivial cross-country heterogeneity something which 
panel estimators that derive a single cointegrating vector do not account for 
because they in1pose the same long-run relationship across groups.13 Second, 
even if one is willing to assume that the relationship between the ERER and 
its fundamentals is the same across countries in the (ultra) long run, the ques-
tion then becomes what time horizon this constitutes.14 Results of empirical 
studies that estimate ERER long-run relationships over several decades for 
many countries individually suggest considerable parameter heterogen~ity 
13In their concluding remarks Baffes et al. (1999) also appear to be skeptical about /3 ho-
mogeneity. 
14This is the common assumption in empirical studies employing the panel approach as 
outlined. 
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across countries over many decades.15 However, this adjustment process is 
too long for these ERERs to be of interest for policymakers or analysts (Mon-
tiel, 1999a). Third, another (more serious) problem associated with such long 
time-horizons over multiple decades is that the ERER should then be condi-
tioned on steady state values of the predetermined variables such as sectoral 
capital stocks. But this would represent a violation of the Nurksian defini-
tion of the ERER, as it rules out this scenario (Montiel, 2007). Finally, while 
theoretical models of the ERER provide a guideline as to which variables 
determine long-run RER behavior, empirical regularity tells us that, when es-
timated individually, not all of these fundamentals turn out to be statistically 
significant drivers of long-run RER movements, although they usually are for 
the pooled sample. Thus, using the homogeneity assumption may inappro-
priately condition the ERER on one or more fundamentals that are not part 
' 
of the true data generating process (DGP) for individual countries. 
The risk of ignoring these concerns can be illustrated using some of 
the estimation results in Mongardini and Rayner (2009). They use the pooled 
mean group (PMG) estimator to derive RER misalignments for Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Their results show considerably undervalued RERs in 
Senegal and Togo, both members of the CPA-franc zone, before the deval-
' 
uation in 1994. However, during that period, the RER was in fact overvalued 
15For example, see the estimation results in Aguirre and Calderon (2005). 
. . 
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in these countries according to almost every observer or empirical study.16 
Another illu1ninatirtg example is the study of Roudet et al. (2007) ,,vho esti-
mate RER misalignments for a number of African countries both individually 
and through panel data. Their panel estimates often suggest real underval-
uation, whereas their country-by-country estimates indicate overvaluation. 
In addition, their panel RER misalignment measures tend to be significantly 
greater in magnitude which is consistent with the view that panel data tech-
niques estilnate ultra-long-run ERERs at best. Roudet et al. (2007) conclude 
that panel data estimators often do not yield accurate ERER estimates and 
should therefore be supplemented with single-country estimates. 
Estimation The approach in this study is to estimate ERERs for each country 
individually, although panel data imposing the homogeneity assumption will 
also be employed for comparison purposes. 
The first step is to determine the order of integration of the variables 
using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) as well as Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. 
In case the unit root null is rejected, the RER follows a stationary process, 
providing evidence that relative PPP holds. The ERER can then be set at the 
sample mean.17 
16See for instance Devarajan (1997) and Coleman (2008) . 
17RER.s for all countries hrrn out to be I(l) at the five p ercent level except for Mozambique. The tests for Korea, Malawi, and South Africa are somewhat inconclusive but point towards 
nonstationarity. Argentina's RER is marginally stationary but treated as nonstationary since RER misalignment estimates are not plausible if the ERER is set at the sample mean. The 
results are not reported for brevity but a, ailable upon request. 
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The second step is to estimate the long-rtm parameters (/3i). Esti-
mating the full joint distribution of the RER and its fundamentals would be 
desirable, but small samples with at most 38 observations and 6 possible fun-
damentals render system estimation practically unfeasible (Baffes et al., 1999). 
This motivates a single-equation setting. In principle, the static OLS estin1ator 
(SOLS) can be used to estimate f3 in Eq. 2.3. While SOLS is superconsistent 
(the rate of convergence is proportional to the sample size) and there is no 
asymptotic bias from simultaneous equations or measurement error (Phillips 
and Durlauf, 1986), SOLS performs poorly for small samples (Banerjee et al., 
1993) and the non-standard distribution of the t-statistics prevents valid in-
ference. Phillips and Loretan (1991), Saikkonen (1991), and Stock and Watson 
(1993) independently propose a dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator which can 
handle these issues.18 The DOLS estimator is asymptotically equivalent to 
the Johansen (1988) vector error-correction method (SaiJ<konen, 1991), per-
forms ,,vell in small samples (Stock and Watson, 1993; Montalvo, 1995), and 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors allow for statistical inference. The 
DOLS method adds first differenced leads and lags of the I(l) regressors to 
the static cointegrating regression. Lead and lag lengths can be selected such 
18Other options would be the hilly modified OLS estimator (FMOLS) proposed by Phillips 
and Hansen (1990) or a single-equation error correction model approach (SEECM). The issue 
with SEECM is that weakly exogenous regressors for the pa1~an1eters of interest are essen-
tial for valid inference on the long-r_un parameters. If this condition is satisfied, SEECM is 
superior to FMOLS (Phillips and Loretan, 1991). However, the assumption that all of the 
fundamentals are weakly exogenous for the ERER paran1eters in all 63 co1.u1tries is unlikely 
to hold. Furthermore, testing for weak exogeneity requires system estimation. Finally, the 
Monte- Carlo experiments in Stock and Watson (1993) suggest that DOES tends to outperform 
F11OLS. 
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that information criteria (IC) are minimized (Kejriwal and Perron, 2008).19 
The augmented version of Eq. 2.3 with 1n1 leads and m2 lags takes the 
fallowing form: 
s= m1 
Zn RERit = 13;1 Fit+ /3~2Zit + L r~5 ~Fit+s + Vft, (2.5) 
s=-m2 
where the vectors F and Z contain the fundamentals that are I(l) and I(0) 
respectively. 20 
To test for cointegration, I employ the ADF-cointegration test and the 
Johansen (1988, 1992) method.21 Since shocks such as trade or capital account 
liberalizations may shift the equilibrium relationship between the ERER and 
its fundan1entals, I also test for parameter stability relying on Hansen's (1992) 
Le and Andrews's (1993) parameter stability tests.22 
It is sometimes possible to find multiple subsets of the fundamentals 
that form a long-run relationship with the RER. There is no well-established 
approach to deal with this issue (Montiel, 2007). 
19This encompasses the inclusion of a constant and a trend if it is statistically significant 
and reduces the ICs. 
20In a panel setting, the following variant of Eq. 2.3 is estimated: Zn RERit = µi + f/ F;t + L!:~11? , ,;5 llfit+s + Vi t, where r'- i is a country-specific constant. This is the (fixed effects) panel DOLS estimator due to Mark and Sul (2003). 
21 The latter allovvs testing for uniqueness of the estimated cointegrating vector. I restrict 
the lag length of the underlying VAR system to two. Due to the small sample problem, 
however, the Johansen (1988, 1992) method is perhaps best viewed as complementary. 22Test results are available upon request. Le can also be viewed as testing for cointegration 
over the sample period under the null that the variables are cointegrated (Hansen, 1992). 
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Since one of the possibilities has to be chosen, I use the following se-
lection algorithm, which is similar to Montiel (2007). Strict preference is given 
to the most inclusive specification provided there is evidence for cointegra-
tion, and that the estimated parameters are stable, statistically significant, arid 
bear signs consistent with economic theory (see Eqs. 2.1 and 2. la). Otherwise 
the specification is disregarded. If there are multiple long-run relationships 
fulfilling these requirements, choice is given to the one that minimizes the 
information criteria.23 
The results of the estimated long-run equilibrium relationships are 
encouraging: there are cointegrating relationships consistent with econo1nic 
theory for 63 countries.24 This outcome is not predetermined by the described 
selection process.25 In some cases, the coefficient attached to government 
consumption turns out to be positive, corroborating the previously stated 
concern that total government consumption is not necessarily tilted towards 
nontraded goods in all countries. In addition, somewhat surprisingly, the em-
pirical specification incorporating binding credit ceilings performed poorly, 
in that it is not the appropriate model specification to explain long-run RER 
behavior in all but four countries. 
23This selection.process does not affect the main results as the RER misalign1nent estimates 
tend to pe similar across possible cointegrating equations. 
24Table 2A.3 in the Appendix reports the results. 
25The cases of Egypt and the I)emocratic Republic of the Congo underline this notion as it 
is not possible to obtain plausible estimates for these countries. They are thus dropped from 
the sample. 
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Sustainable fundamentals The next step in estimating ERERs involves de-
riving sustainable values of the funda1nentals that form a long-rw1 equilib-
rium relationship with the RER. The conventional approach is to decompose 
the relevant time series into cyclical and trend components using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).26 Movements in the trend 
component are permanent and therefore interpreted as sustainable in the 
Nurksian sense. 27 
Results The RER misalignment estimates in this study are similar to pre- · 
vious ones (Ades et al., 1999; Montiel, 2007; Kinkyo, 2008; MacDonald and 
Ricci, 2003; Coleman, 2008; Roudet et al., 2007).28 Figure 2.1 sho,,vs country-
by-country and panel RER misalignment estimates for China, Korea, and In-
donesia. It underlines how the homogeneity assumption can lead to very 
misleading results. In the case of Korea and Indonesia, the panel estimates 
suggest significant undervaluation on the eve of the Asian Financial Crisis, 
whereas any other previous study identifies significant overvaluation. More-
261 follow previous studies and set the smoothing parameter at the conventional value of 
A= 100. 
27Such decomposition teclu1.iques are not ,vithout caveats. In many developing co1u1tries, 
particularly in Sub-Sahara.1.1.-Africa and Latin Ainerica, fundamentals such as government 
consumption or the net foreign asset position are likely to have been persistent but unsus-
tainable (Baffes et al., 1999). In these cases, unsustainable changes w-ould be passed through 
to the trend component. Unfortunately, there are no better alternatives. Baffes et al. (1999) 
advocate using counterfactual simulations but point out that this requires the unlikely condi-
tion that the ERER fundamentals are super-exogeneous for the ERER parameters. In addition, 
co1u1terfactual simulations are not feasible in this study as detailed knowledge about all 63 
countries would be needed. I also considered five-year moving averages but this resulted 
in some implausible estimates. In summary, the trend component is best thought of as an 
imperfect approximation for the sustainable values of underlying ERER fundamentals. 28They are available in Figure 2A. l in the Appendix. 
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over1 China1s RER was apparently overvalued by about 10 percent in 2007. 
This is not consistent with the general consensus that the renminbi has be-
come undervalued in recent years. My econometric results use the country-
by-country estimates. 
Figure 2.1: RER misalignment estimates for China/ Indonesia/ and South Korea/ by year. 
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2.3 Growth regressions 
This section examines the impact of RER over- and undervaluation on eco-
nomic growth. To control for cyclical ariations1 I split the sample period 
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1970-2007 into non-overlapping five-year periods.29 
The en1pirical growth equation is derived from the Solow-Swan growth 
model: 
git = Yit - YiJ - l = tt + f3 Yi,t - l + ,' Xit + 1/J m1t + µi +At+ €it· (2.6) 
In this equation1 git reflects the real GDP per capita growth rate for the 5-year 
period and Yi,t - l refers to the logarithm of real GDP per capita at beginning of 
the period. Vector Xif contains the logarithm of the investment ratio and other 
growth determinants1 each averaged over the 5-year period. It also includes 
1n (nit+ g + 6) 1 where nit is the average 5-year population growth rate, g 
represents technological progress, and b is the depreciation rate. The latter 
two are assumed to be constant across countries.30 The term 1nft represents 
the variable used to investigate the relationship between RER under- and 
overvaluation on growth. Th~ last three components on the right-hand side 
represent unobserved country fixed effects (µit time specific effects (Att and 
the idiosyncratic error term (€it), respectively. 3-1 
It is vvorth pausing here to discuss model specification in more detail 
29This results in eight non-overlapping five-year periods except for the last one which 
comprises only three years. 
_ 301 follow Mankiw et al. (1992) and assume that g equals two percent. As for the deprecia-
tion rate, Whelan and McQuinn (2006) convincingly argue that b should be set to six percent. The reason is that capital comprises structures and equipment, each depreciating at a differ-
ent rate. They base the six percent figure on the empirical weight of each type of capital in 
the production function. See their paper for more details. 
31See Table 2A.2 for details on data sources. 
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as there are hidden pitfalls. At first, it seems straightforward to include misit 
(Eq. 2.4) in the model. This is the approach the bulk of the literature follows . 
However, this makes it difficult to infer the respective impact of over- and 
undervaluation on growth. Given that misit is negative (positive) when the 
RER is w1dervalued ( overvaluedt a negative sign of the coefficient attached 
to mis it commonly leads to the inference that undervaluation ( overvaluation) 
is associated with higher (lower) growth. But this is only valid under the 
condition that RER undervaluation and overvaluation have equal and oppos-
ing effects on growth. In the absence of this restrictive assumption, another 
interpretation is that growth is maximized if RER misalignment is as low as 
possible (misit = 0).32 
A further issue arises when it comes to regression specification over 
five-year periods. It is tempting to average the variables across years. How-
ever, averaging 1nisit with the intent to obtain the five-year average degree of 
misalignment generates a misleading time series. For illustration, consider 
the following example. Say the RER was overvalued by 50 percent in the first 
year and undervalued by 25, 10, 10, and 5 percent in subsequent years. Av-
eraging vvould produce 1nisit = 0, or perfect alig1unent when (in accordance 
with the definition of RER misalignment) the average RER misalignment is 
20 percent in this case. Averaging is valid only if there are no fluctuations be-
32This interpretation follows directly from applying the definition of RER misalignment as 
any deviation of the RER from its equilibrium level. 
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tween undervaluation and overvaluation during the time interval of interest, 
or if their effects on growth are equal but of opposite sign. 
To deal with these problems, the approach is to split misit into two 
variables: one taking negative values when the RER is undervalued, zero 
other,vise, and another taking positive values when the RER is overvalued, 
and zero otherwise. I then average these two variables over the five-year 
periods. A negative signed coefficient on both variables supports the hypoth-
esis that RER undervaluation (RER overvaluation) fosters (harms) economic 
growth. In an additional analysis, I also identify RER over.., and undervalua-
tion episodes to test their impact on growth. 
The last consideration relates to the inclusion of other variables in the 
model. Importantly, since each ERER fundamental may directly or indirectly 
affect growth, the model includes each of the ERER fundamentals to prop-
erly channel out the impact of RER distortions on growth. I also consider 
human capital (average years of schooling) and the "rule of law", which prox-
ies institutional quality. Unfortunately, these variables are not available for 
all countries in the sample. In addition, the rule of law index only starts in 
. 1984. In order to avoid losing too 1nany observations, a number of regression 
specifications will be reported.33 
33 Admittedly, there is a whole host of other variables that may be included. So far the 
empirical growth literature has identified more than 145 growth determinants, but there is no 
consensus on which of these variables should be included in growth models (Durlauf et al., 
2005). Given the humble objective of this paper,, which is to investigate the hypothesis that 
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2.3.1 Estimation 
While the model is initially estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), this 
procedure does not address the issue of endogeneity. Nickell (1981) shows 
that the standard fixed-effects estimator of a dynamic panel data model is 
inconsistent when T (the number of time-series observations) is fixed, even 
as N--+ oo (the number of cross-sectional units). In addition, growth is likely 
to affect the independent variables, which gives rise to inconsistent estimates. 
To address these problems, I resort to system generalized method of moments 
(SGMM).34 SGMM involves estimating the growth model both in levels and 
first differences through as a system of equations. This estimation technique 
uses internal lagged first differences as instruments for the endogenous vari-
ables in the level equation. The differences equation is instrumented with 
lagged levels. The validity of the SGM~ moment conditions requires that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the latter do not 
display_ serial correlation. 
RER undervaluation promotes growth, attempting the latest state of the art model averaging 
techniques to account for model, uncertainty would be beyond the scope of this study. 
34See Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and -Roodman (2009a) for 
details. 
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2.3.2 Results 
Table 2.1 reports OLS and SGMM results of the impact of RER under- and 
overvaluation on growth.35 While OLS and SGMM estimates differ in magni-
tude, they are qualitatively the same, regardless of model specification. They 
suggest that the effect of RER undervaluation on growth is negative and sta-
tistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. For instance, according 
to the SGMM results for the baseline growth model (Column lbt an RER 
that is on average undervalued by five percentage points (about one sta~dard 
deviation) would lead to a lower average annual growth rate of 1.3 percent-
age points. An augmentation with hu1nan capital and/ or institutional quality 
leads to virtually the same result (Columns 2b, 3, and 4). Variation in the size 
of coefficients and standard errors appears to be mainly driven by changes 
in the sample. The results also corroborate the notion of an adverse ilnpact 
35The baseline SGMM results use all available lags as "collapsed" instruments to con-
tain ''instrtunent proliferation" (Roodman, 2009b ). Standard errors incorporate Windmeijer' s (2005) finite-sample correction for two-step SGMM. The second order test for autocorrelation 
and the Hansen tes t for overidentifying restrictions suggest that the validity of the SGMM 
moment conditions cannot be rejected at conventional levels. Furthermore, SGMM assumes 
that the idiosyncratic disturbances are independent across countries. The cross-sectional in-dependence test of Pesaran (2004) reveals that the null of cross-section independence cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. 
§2. 3 Growth regressions 
of RER overvaluation on growth.36137 However, the negative relationship be-
h,veen RER undervaluation and growth is in contrast to Rodrik (2008) and 
other recent studies such as Abida (2011) and MacDonald and Vieira (2010). 
36 Aguirre and Calderon (2005) and Razin and Collir1s (1997) find that RER distortions im-
pact on growth in a nonlinear fashion. I have also included squared terms of RER under-and 
overvaluation in _the model but there is no evidence of a nonlinear relationship1 implying 
that the optimal level of misalignment is zero. The result for this regression is available 
in Table 2A.4 in the Appendix. For comparison purposes1 the table also reports results for 
the baseline model (Table 2.1 1 Column 1), but using the same samples as in Columns 2-4 
(Table ·2.1) and for models that only include either the ERER· fundamentals or RER distor-
tions. Overall1 these do not add much, except the result for the latter specification where the 
coefficient on RER undervaluation shrinks to· half of its previous size which U11.derlines the 
ilnportance of controlling for all ERER fU11.damentals in order to properly channel out the 
growth effect of RER distortions. 
371 have also tried using crude RER over- and undervaluation five-year dU11l.IDies which 
are the sum of their yearly values. However, this approach does not yield plausible results. 
Table 2.1: Growth regressions - Main results. 
(la) (lb) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) 
Independent variable OLS SGMM OLS SGMM SGMM SGMM 
Initial Income 
-0.25 (8.4) *** -0.01 (0.1) -0.24 (7.4) *** -0.02 (0.4) -0.02 (0.6) -0.02 (0.6) Investment 0.22 (3.2)*** 0.19 (2.7)*** 0.15 (5.7)*** 0.13 (2.0)** 0.07 (1.1) 0.08 (1.3) ln (n + g + J) 
-0.09 (0.7) -0.50 (1.4) -0.11 (0.9) -0.32 (0.9) -0.67 (1.7) * -0.48 (1.8)* Tern1s of Trade 0.002 (0.1) 0.01 (0.4) -0.01 (0.6) -0.02 (0.7) 0.02 (0.3) 0.08 (1.2) Trade Openness 0.02 (0.7) 0.1 (1.4) 0.004 (0.1) 0.01 (0.3) -0.02 (0.5) -0.06 (1.6) Govermnent Consumption -0.14 (2.0) ** 
-0.09 (0.9) -0.05 (1.3) -0.05 (0.7) -0.03 (0.5) 0.01 (0.1) Net Foreign Asset Position 0.04 (1.6) -0.13 (2.4)** 0.04 (1.7)* -0.03 (0.7) -0.02 (0.5) 0.01 (0.4) Human Capital 
-0.07 (1.6) 0.06 (0.9) 0.01 (0.2) Rule of Law 0.12 (2.9)*** 0.12 (3.0)*** RER Undervaluation 0.27 (1.8)* 1.29 (3.3) *** 0.32 (2.2) ** 1.16 (2.6)** 0.82 (1 .8)* 1.08 (2.2)** RER Overvaluation -0.65 (3.6) *** -2.01 (4.7)*** -0.60 (3.2)*** -1.06 (1.5) -0.80 (1.8)* -1.18 (3.0) *** Observations 469 469 430 430 216 210 N 63 63 57 57 55 53 AR(2) (p-value) 0.71 0.21 0.72 0.92 Hansen test (p-value) 0.81 0.83 0.68 0.88 Instruments 69 77 67 74 
Notes: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. ***, **, * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. t-ratios in parentheses (calculated on the basis of robust clustered standard errors for OLS and the Windmeijer (2005) correction for two-step SGMM standard errors). Each regression includes cow1.try and time fixed effects . SGMM results use all available lags as ··collapsed" instrwnents in Columns lb and 2b. In Colmm1.s 3 and 4, the instrument set is restricted to lag 1. The terms of trade is treated as strictly exogenous; initial income, the rule of law, and human capital as predetermined; and the rest as endogenous. Observations are averages over five-year period s. The value of the variable RER Undervaluation (Overvaluation) is less (greater) than or equal to zero. Initial income, investment, population growth, government consumption, the terms of trade, the rule of law, and human capital (average years of schooling) are measured in natural logarithms. 
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2.3.3 Robustness 
There may be concerns relating to consistency. In particular, RER misalign-
ment estimates may be subject to measurement error, thus introducing at-
tenuation bias. Notice that while first-stage estimates of the long-run RER 
parameters are superconsistent, the problem is that each method used to 
derive the sustainable values of the ERER fundamentals has its caveats ( cf. 
Eq. 3.5) and that the actual RER is a proxy. It is thus likely that RER mis-
alignment estimates are measured with error. Even so, SGMM estimates are 
consistent provided there is no correlation between the instruments and the 
measurement errors, for example if the latter are serially uncorrelated (Bond 
et al., 2001; Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009). Where this is not the case, consistent 
estimates can be obtained by excluding recent lags from the instrument set 
(Bond et al., 2001). Doing so, however, does not significantly change the re-
sults (see Table 2.2, Columns 3-5). Furthermore, basing RER misalignment 
estimates on alternative values of "sustainable 11 variables derived with the 
Butterworth-filter (Pollock, 2000) does not make a marked difference (see Ta-
ble 2.2, Columns 1 and 2). 
Table 2.2: Growth regressions - Robustness. 
(la) (lb) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent variable OLS SGMM OLS SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM -
Initial Income 
-0.25 (8.3) *** -0.001 (0.0) -0.25 (7.5)*** 0.01 (0.1) 0.04 (0.6) -0.05 (0.5) -0.02 (0.2) Investment 0.23 (3.3)*** 0.22 (2.4) ** 0.16 (5.6)*** 0.18 (3.4)*** 0.28 (2.6)*** 0.26 (2.3) ** 0.27 (2.5)** ln (n + g + J) 
-0.05 (0.4) -0.29 (1.0) -0.08 (0.6) -0.15 (0.4) -0.64 (1.6) -0.46 (1.1) -0.52 (1.3) Tern1s of Trade 0.01 (0.4) 0.01 (0.3) -0.01 (0.5) -0.03 (1.0) 0.00 (0.1) 0.02 (0.6) 0.01 (0.1) Trade Openness 0.03 (0.9) 0.08 (1.0) 0.01 (0.3) -0.01 (0.2) 0.07 (0.7) 0.15 (1.1) 0.05 (0.6) Goverrnnent Consumption -0.15 (2.0)** . 
-0.09 (1.1) -0.06 (1.4) 0.04 (0.4) -0.02 (0.1) -0.09 (0.9) -0.09 (0.5) Net Foreign Asset Position 0.05 (1.7)* -0.10 (1.8)* 0.05 (1.9)* -0.02 (0.5) -0.23 (2.8) *** -0.19 (2.4) ** -0.15 (1.2) Human Capital 
-0.07 (1.4) 0.04 (0.7) RER Undervaluation 0.25 (1.9)* 0.97 (2.9)*** 0.29 (2.1)** 0.74 (2.5)** 1.26 (2.2)** 0.91 (1.8)* 1.26 (2.2) ** RER Overvaluation -0.54 (3.2)*** -1:42 (3.1)*** -0.49 (3.0)*** -0.73 (1.6) -1.63 (2.6) *** -2.09 (3.8)*** -1.85 (2.8) *** Observations 456 456 422 422 469 469 469 N 61 61 56 56 63 63 63 AR(2) test 0.99 0.11 0.65 0.63 0.69 Hansen test (p-value) . 0.72 0.89 0.44 0.43 0.29 Instruments 69 77 61 53 45 
Notes: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. *** , **, * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. t-ratios in parentheses (calculated on the basis of robust clustered standard errors for OLS and the Wind1neijer (2005) correction for two-step SGMM standard errors). Each regression includes country and time fixed effects. In Columns 1a-2b RER misalignment estimates are based on alternative values of ''sustainable'' variables derived with the Butterworth-filter. Tanzania and Nigeria are dropped from the sainple as both are classed as outliers. In Colu1nns la and 2b SGMM results use all available lags as ''collapsed'' instrw11ents. Colunu1s 3-5 exlude instru1nents up to lag 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The tenns of trade is treated as strictly exogenous; initial inc01ne and hw11ai1 capital as predetern1ined; and the rest as endogenous. The value of the variable RER Undervaluation (Overvaluation) is less (greater) than or equal to zero. 
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Table 2.3: Gro\,vth regressions - Robustness: Bootstrapped standard errors. 
(la) (lb) (2a) (2b) 
Independent variable OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Initial Income -0.25 (0.03)*** -0.25 (0.031)*** -0.24 (0 .033)*** -0.24 (0.035) *** 
I:nvestm.ent 0.22 (0.068)*** 0.22 (0.066)*** 0.15 (0.027)'"** 0.15 (0.03)*** 
ln (n + g+5) -0.09 (0.128) -0.09 (0.131) -0.11 (0.135) -0.11 (0.136) 
Term.s of Trade 0.002 (0.028) 0.002 (0.03) -0.01 (0.026) -0.01 (0.026) 
liade Openness 0.02 (0.032) 0.02 (0.034) 0.004 (0.031) 0.004 (0 .032) 
Government Consumption -0.14 (0.068)*"' -0.14 (0.068)** -0.05 (0.038) -0.05 (0.041) 
Net Foreign Asset Position 0.04 (0.024) 0.04 (0.025) 0.04 (0.024)* 0.04 (0.026) 
Human Capital -0.07 (0.046) -0.07 (0 .053) 
RER Undervaluation 0.27 (0.147)* 0.27 (0.150)* 0.32 (0.147)** 0.32 (0.149)** 
RER Overvaluation -0.65 (0.183)*** -0.65 (0.180)*** -0.60 (0.189) *** -0.65 (0 .188)*** 
Observations 469 469 430 430 
63 63 57 57 
Notes: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita grm,vth. *** , **, * denote the level of statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses in Columns la and 
2a. Bootstrapped standard errors (1000 replications) are in parentheses in Columns lb and 2b. 
Another issue is that statistical inference might be misleading due to 
a \!generated regressor proble1n11 (Pagan, 1984). \Nhile RER over- and under-
valuation are not classical generated regressors in the sense of Pagan (1984) 
(they are neither the first stage prediction nor the error term) the possibility 
that startdard errors are downward biased here ca1u1_ot be ruled out due to 
the lack of a theoretical treatment of the present case. Therefore, to adjust 
for the potential extra variation stemming from RER over- and undervalua-
tion/ I re-estimate th e OLS results with bootstrapped standard errors. As it 
turns out, the latter remam virtually unchanged, thus alleviating the concern 
that inference based on the main :results is misleading (bootstrapped standard 
errors are at most 2 percent higher for the variables of interest (see Table 2.3)). 
Bootstrapping for SGMM/ on the other hand,, is problematic smce 
the population moment conditions do not hold m the bootstrap samples 
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(Bond and Windmeijer, 2005) . Hall and Horowitz (1996) and Brown and 
Newey (2002) develop methods to deal with this issue but Bond and Wind-
meijer (2005) show that bootstrapped two-step standard errors are similar to 
asymptotic two-step standard errors in terms of unreliability, and that (boot-
strapped) Wald tests based on the inefficient one-step GMM estin1ator have 
less power relative to the Windmeijer (2005) corrected tvvo-step test. In light of 
this and the fact that bootstrapped OLS standard errors provide no evidence 
of misleading inference, I abstain from attempting the Hall and Horowitz 
(1996) or Brown and Ne,tVey (2002) bootstrapping procedure for SGMM. In 
view of this discussion, the remainder of the paper leaves both issues un-
treated. 
2.3.4 Episodes 
This section identifies over- and undervaluation episodes to better understand 
the impact of RER misalignment on growth. To this end, I define two types of 
episodes. The first occurs if the RER is over-/undervalued during the major-
ity of years over the five-year period. The resulting measure takes the value 
of the average degree of RER over- or undervaluation during the five-year 
interval, and zero otherwise. The second type is defined as taking place if 
there is real over- or undervaluation in each of the five years. As before, the 
value of these variables equals the five-year average degree of misalignment, 
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and zero otherwise. A third variable measures non-episodic RER distortions 
as the average degree of absolute misalignn1ent. Given this procedure, a coef-
ficient vvith a positive (negative) sign on RER undervaluation (overvaluation) 
episodes 'W-ould corroborate the main results. 
Figure 2.2 plots the full sample average gro,,vth rate together vvith 
the n1aximun1. value of RER over- and undervaluation episodes. There is 
an unambiguous negative relationship between growth and episodes of RER 
distortions. Regardless of episode type, the plots suggest that grovvth is, on 
average, higher the closer the RER is to equilibrium. 
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Table 2.4 presents growth regression results. Irrespective of the type 
of RER undervaluation episode and model specification, there is strong ev-
idence against the hypothesis that RER undervaluation promotes growth. 
The point estimates of real undervaluation episodes are unanimously posi-
tive. They are also statistically sigrlificant at conventional levels in all but one 
model specification (Column 4). However, this result should not be overem-
phasized. The best outcome that RER undervaluation may achieve is having 
a zero effect on growth if and only if real undervaluation persists for a suffi-
ciently long period. Also notice that the coefficient in that regression is still 
positive and statistically significant at the 20 percent level. In addition, merg-
ing RER overvaluation episodes and absolute misalign1nent to one regressor 
generates estimates which suggests that undervaluation episodes do have a 
statistically negative impact on growth (Column 3). However, the estimated 
detrimental effect of 5-year undervaluation episodes on growth seems to be 
smaller compared to the othe_r estimates. Finally, the coefficients attached to 
RER overvaluation episodes enter the regressions negatively and ,,vith statis-
tical significance. Therefore, it is sensible to conclude that RER distortions of 
any kind do have a negative effect on growth. In addition, the results o_f this 
section and the last one suggest that absolute ERER deviations are the best 
measure to analyze the growth effect of RER distortions (Column 6).38 
38For all specifications in Tables 2.1 and 2.4, the hypothesis that under- and overvaluation 
affect growth equally cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. 
Table 2.4: Growth regressions - Misalignment episodes. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent variable SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM 
Initial Income -0.02 (0.5) -0.03 (0.6) -0.002 (0.0) -0.02 (0.4) -0.03 (0.7) 
Investn1ent 0.22 (3.0)*** 0.14 (1.8) * 0.20 (2.9)*** 0.20 (3.1)*** 0.13 (2.0) ** 
ln(n+g +J) -0.53 (1.5) -0.24 (0.7) -0.42 (1.4) -0.44 (1.5) -0.45 (1.5) 
Tenns of Trade 0.004 (0.1) -0.01 (0.4) -0.01 (0.2) 0.001 (0.1) -0.01 (0.4) 
Trade Openness 0.11 (1..1) 0.02 (0.5) 0.08 (1..1) 0.1 (1..2) 0.03 (0.6) 
Governm.ent Consumption ..:Q.12 (1.2) -0.07 (0.8) -0.06 (0.7) -0.11 (1.3) -0.08 (1.1) 
Net Foreign Asset Position -0.09 (1.7)* -0.02 (0.4) -0.12 (1.9)* -0.10 (1.6) -0.03 (0.6) 
Hu1nan Capital 0.07 (0.9) 0.05 (0.9) 
Absolute RER Misalign1nent -1.80 (2.7)*** -1.52 (2.6)*** -1.37 (2.6)*** 
RER Undervaluation Episodes 1.35 (2.7)*** 1.04 (2.5)** 0.84 (1.9)* 0.58 (1.4) 0.66 (2.0)** 
RER Overvaluation Episodes -1.75 (2.7)*** -1 .04 (1.9)* -1.97 (3.3)*** -1.44 (2.2)** 
Observations 466 427 469 469 430 
N- 63 57 63 63 57 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.83 0.15 0.69 0.69 0.21 
Hansen test (p-va.lue) 0.68 0.90 0.79 0.92 0.99 
Instrun1ents 69 77 69 76 84 
(6) 
SGMM 
0.002 (0.1) 
0.20 (2.7)*** 
-0.48 (1.4) 
-0.01 (0.3) 
0.09 (1.3) 
-0.06 (0.8) 
-0.13 (1.9)* 
-1.68 (3.2) *** 
469-
63 
0.58 
0.44 
62 
Notes: The dependent variable :is real GDP per capita growth. ***, **, * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. t-ratios in 
parentheses (calculated on the basis of the Wind1neijer (2005) correction for two-step SGMM standard errors). Each regression includes country and time 
fixed effects. SGMM results use all available lags as ''collapsed" instruments. The terms of trade is treated as strictly exogenous; initial income and human 
capital as predetermined; and the rest as endogenous. The value of the variable RER Undervaluation (Overvaluation) Episodes is less (greater) than 
or equal to zero. 1n Columns 3-5, absolute RER misalignment equals zero during RER over- and undervaluation episodes. Initial income, investment, 
population growth, govenunent consumption, the terms of trade, and human capital (average years of schooling) are measured in natural logarithms. 
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To conclude this section, it is illustrative to provide the narrative be-
hind the experiences of some countries during undervaluation episodes. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows the evolution of RER distortions and growth over five-year 
periods for South Africa and Chile. There is a negative relationship between 
real undervaluation and growth for South Africa, where economic difficulties 
began to emerge in the 1970s following the oil price crisis and the Soweto up-
rising. The continued deterioration of South Africa's net international credi-
tor position essentially put in place a credit ceiling in the early 1980s (Hirsch, 
1989). The required current account surplus to service the debt stifled eco-
nomic expansion, a common situation for developing countries dependent 
on capital goods imports. Because of the adoption of a floating exchange rate 
system, further loss in confidence in the economy, falling gold prices, and 
high inflation in industrialized countries coming to an end, the rand depre-
ciated continuously (Hirsch, 1989). This resulted in an RER undervaluation 
episode ending only in 1991. Que to excessive short-term debt, the rand's de-
preciation required higher repayments (in domestic currency termst which 
in turn exacerbated South Africa's economic woes. 39 
39South Africa was not the only country with such an experience. A si1nilar situation took 
place in Algeria in the early 1990s. After a decade of sluggish growth and high international 
indebtedness, in part due to falling oil prices, the Algerian dinar was significantly overval-
ued. In 1991, a more than 100 percent depreciation vis-a-vis the US dollar generated a real 
undervaluation episode that lasted until 1997. Economic performance improved from the 
Inid 1990s onwards after debt restructuring and a series of reforms that aimed for macroeco-
nolnic stability and greater trade openness. 
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Figure 2.3: RER distortions-gro,,vth nexus for selected countries. 
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An interestin_g coU11terexample is the case of Chile. Following the 
debt crisis in 1982, Chile underwent trade liberalization-reforms between 1985 
and 1992, which included an average tariff reduction from 36 to 12 percent (Lt 
2004). Since tariff removals cause the ERER to depreciate (Edwards, 1989), the 
actual RER needs to depreciate as well in order to restore equilibrium. The 
trade policy reforms were therefore accompanied by a (large) nominal deval-
uation which caused the RER to becon1e U11dervalued in 1985. The RER did 
not appreciate back to equil~brium for 10 consecutive years (the longest un-
dervaluation episode in the sample). Real undervaluation was sustained for 
such a long period because the crawling band exchange rate system leveled 
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off the impact of inflation on the RER (Edwards, 1995). Nonetheless, Chile 
experienced rapid economic growth during that period. Whether this growth 
expansion occurred because o( or despite, real undervaluation requires an 
analysis of the counterfactual. Either way, this exchange rate protection came 
at the cost of fueled inflation (Edwards, 1995) .40 
The econometric results in this section suggest that the average expe-
rience of developing countries during undervaluation episodes is much closer 
to Sou th Africa's than to Chile's. 
2.3.5 PPP misalignment 
So far this study has examined the growth effect of deviations of RER from 
the level consistent with internal and external balance. Thus the results are 
not comparable with those of studies by· Rodrik (2008) and others that have 
measured RER misalignment following the (Balassa-Samuelson adjusted) PPP 
approach. It could well be that RER undervaluation from the point of view 
of internal and external equilibrium retards growth, whereas undervaluation 
relative to PPP is growth promoting. Rather than further discussing the rel-
ative merits of the two approaches to measuring RER misalignment, in this 
sub-section I probe whether the Rodrik (2008) results stand up to scrutiny. 
40The narrative behind the first RER undervaluation episode (1975-1980) is very similar. 
Tariff removals accompanied by a large nominal devaluation resulted in a significant real 
undervaluation. 
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Rodrik (2008) uses Penn World Table 6.2 (PWT) data on the exchange 
rate (XRAT) and PPP conversion factors to compute the RER as h1 RERit = 
1n (XRAT I PPP)u, with t indexing five-year averages covering the period 
1950-2004.41 ,42 To adjust for the Balassa-Samuelson effect, Rodrik (2008) re-
gresses the RER on GDP per capita (RGDPCH): 
ln RERit = a+~ 1n RGDPCHit + f t + Ui t, (2.7) 
where f t is a time fixed effect and uit the error term. The latter is also the esti-
mate of adjusted PPP misalignment (MJSPPP).43 Note that this specification 
implicitly assesses that the magnitude of the impact of productivity gains 
on RER (operating via wages) is uniform across countries. Thus it ignores 
differences in labor market distortions or "surplus labor" situations across 
countries. 
To exanune the sensitivity of the Rodrik (2008) results to this re-
strictive assumption, I first follow his approach to estimate MISPPP and 
re-estimate Eq. 2.7 by adding country slope dummies to obtain MISPPP mea-
sures that account for parameter heterogeneity.44 I then compare the growth 
effects of the two alternative nusalignment indicators by estimating Rodrik's 
41To avoid confusion, I use the same notation as Rodrik (2008) whenever it is suitable. 
42 A-ratio greater than one me~ that the RER is further depreciated relative to the PPP 
benchmark. It follows that an increase in ln RERit refers to depreciation. 
43Under this approach, M ISPPP is positive (negative) when the RER is undervalued (over-
valued) . Rodrik (2008) names this variable U N DERVA L. 
44Indeed, the homogeneity restriction on f3 is rejected at the 1 p ercent level. 
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(2008) baseline growth specification: 
git= a+ f3 ln RGDPCHi,t- 1 + b MISPPPit +Ji+ Jt + uit, (2.8) 
where git is aru1ual growth and Ji are country specific effects. · 
Table 2.5 reports the results. They match Rodrik' s (2008) for the full 
and developing country sample (Columns 1 and 2).45 In particular, the point 
estimate of J = 0.026 for the developing country subsample implies that a 10 
percent undervaluation spurs gro,vth by 0.26 percentage points in these coun-
tries. Splitting MISPPP into positive and negative values still yields estimates 
that suggest a significantly positive impact of undervaluation on growth (Col-
un1n 3). Including my measure of RER misalign1nent in the growth model 
also leads at first to the conclusion that PPP undervaluation promotes growth 
(Column 4). However, distinguishing between undervaluation and overvalu-
ation changes the results. The coefficient of RER undervaluation is close to 
zero and fails to achieve statistical significance. This suggests that countries 
do not gain from RERs that are undervalued relative to Balassa-Samuelson 
adjusted PPP. Interestingly, the point estilnate of PPP overvaluations is the 
same across MISPPP measures (0.022) and this implies a negative and statis-
tically significant impact on growth. But this negative effect also disappears 
when employing SGMM to control for endogeneity (Column 6).46 There-
450nly the t-stats are trivially different. 
46The instrument set contains all available lags resulting in 172 instruments. Initial income 
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fore, in contrast to Nurksian ERER deviations, adjusted PPP misalignment 
does not seem to affect growth.47 This is, in fact, good news for develop-
ing countries, as otherwise a terms of trade boom leading to a long-lasting 
Nurksian ERER appreciation above the PPP benchmark (assuming the actual 
RER follows suit) would stifle growth, even though the appreciation is an 
equilibrium phenomenon. In summary, my alternative estimates suggest that 
Rodrik' s (2008) inference that RER undervaluation promotes growth is driven 
by the questionable parameter homogeneity restriction in the first stage. 
is treated as predetermined and under-and overvaluation as endogenous. The AR(2) test is 
rejected at the 5 percent levet suggesting a violation of the SGI\tllv1 moment conditions, but 
this is not an issue since no causal claim is being made here. 
471 have also used annual observations in the first stage and then -five-year averages in the 
second. This procedure yields very similar results. 
Table 2.5: Growth regressions - Adjusted PPP misalignment. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variable All countries Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing (SGMM) 
Initial Income -0.030 (5.4)*** -0.039 (4.8) *** -0.039 ( 4.9)*** -0.033 (3.8) *** -0.033*** 0.014 (4.6)*** RER Misalignment 0.017 (3.4) *** 0.026 (4.1) ~** 0.015 (2.5) ** -
RER Undervaluation 0.031 (3.4)*** 0.006 (0.6) 0.010 (0.7) RER Overvaluation 0.022 (2.3) ** 0.022 (2.9) *** 0.005 (0.4) Observations 1303 790 790 790 790 790 
Notes:The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. *** , ** , * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, an.d 10 percent. t-ratios in parentheses (calculated on the basis of robust clustered standard errors for OLS and the Windmeijer (2005) correction for two-step SGMM standard errors). Each regression includes cotmtry and time fixed effects. Developing counfry observations are those with real GDP per capita below $6,000. Iraq, Laos, and North Korea have been excluded from the sample. 
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2.3.6 Reconciliation with previous results 
This section demonstrates that the driving force behind the finding in this 
study that Nurksian undervaluation reduces growth is the co1nbination of 
estimating RER misalignments on a country-by-country basis and the way 
the study distinguishes between RER over- and undervaluation in the second 
stage. 
To this end, let's see what happens when I use annual and 5-year 
panels in the first stage to estimate "panel misalignment" measures (misa, 
Eq. 2.4).48 Using as regressor 1nisit that is estimated through the annual 
panel and then averaged over five years generates a coefficient on this vari-
able which is equal to -0.11 and significant at the 5 percent level (Table 2.6, 
Column 1). This suggests that a 10 percent undervaluation increases an-
nual growth by 0.22 percentage points. Interestingly this effect is similar to 
--
Rodrik' s (2008) baseline result for the developing country subsample. Even 
when a distinction is made between positive and negative values of misit us-
ing the same approach as in this paper, the coefficient attached to RER under-
valuation is insignificant (Column 2). The results are virtually the same when 
I use a five-year panel in the first stage to estimate misu (Columns 3 and 4) . 
. ' 
In summary, panel measures as opposed to the country-by-country misalign-
ment estimates only identify a negative growth impact of RER overvaluation 
48For simplicity, I continue to use Rodrik' s (2008) above specification. Including more 
regressors does not significantly affect the results. 
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but not undervaluation. 
However, it is still possible to obtain results suggesting a positive 
instead of a negative effect of RER undervaluation on growth using country-
by-country RER misalignment measures. This happens when the previously 
mentioned pitfalls associated ,,vith model specification are ignored. For in-
stance, using five-year averaged misit as a covariate yields a negative coeffi-
cient that is statistically and economically significant (Column 5). In addition, 
splitting five-year averaged misit (as opposed to first splitting, then averaging) 
and then including RER over- and undervaluation along with their squares 
in the model, generates results that suggest a positive impact of RER under-
valuation of up to 21 percent on growth, before it turns negative (Column 5). 
This is similar to Aguirre and Calderon's (2005) finding. 
Table 2.6: Growth regressions - Panel RER misalignment. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variable A1u1ual Annual 5-year panel 5-year panel Country-by-country Country-by-country 
Initial Income -0.22 (7.5)*** -0.22 (6.7) *** -0.19 (6.6)*** -0.20 (6.7)*** -0.19 ( 6.4)*** -0.19 (6.5)*** 
. RER Misalignn1ent -0.11 (2.5) ** -0.09 (2.2) ** -0.31 (2.5)** 
RER Undervaluation 0.05 (0.3) -0.01 (0.2) -0.84 (2.5) ** 
RER Undervaluation Squared -4.00 (2.7)*** 
RER Overvaluation -0.19 (2.6)** -0.16 (2.1)** 0.37 (1.5) 
RER Overvaluation Squared -3.16 (4.2)*** 
Observations 463 463 473 473 471 471 
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 
Notes: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. *** , ** , * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. t-ratios in parentheses (calculated on 
the basis of robust clustered standard errors). Each regression il)cludes country and time fixed effects. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to contribute to the debate on the im-
pact of real exchange rate nusalignment on economic growth, with particular 
emphasis on the inference of some recent studies that real undervaluation 
promotes growth. While the traditional position on this issue (the "Washing-
ton Consensus 11 ) advocates for the RER being close to its equilibrium levet the 
recent theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the economic benefits 
of real undervaluation. This study has estimated RER misalignments for 63 
developing countries and analyzed the impact of RER over- and undervalua-
tion on economic growth. In accordance with the Washington Consensus, the 
results suggest that any deviation of the RER from the level that is consistent 
with external and internal equilibrium lowers economic growth. Previous re-
sults appear to be driven by two inconsistencies. First, the strong homogene-
ity assumption on long-run RER behavior across countries produces mislead-
ing results and is inconsistent with economic theory. Second, the objective 
to infer the effect on growth of two variables (real over- and undervaluation) 
from a single continuous variable (RER misalignment) can lead to model mis-
specification. The paper has also revisited the claim that PPP w1dervalu.ation 
promotes growth in developing countries. Again, when the two problems are 
taken into account, the results suggest that deviations from adjusted PPP do 
not impact on developing countries' growth performance. 
§2.4 Conclusion 
Thus, despite recent criticisms, the Washington Consensus still has 
valuable policy guidelines to offer. Developing countries should aim to keep 
the RER close to its equilibrium level in the sense of Nurkse (194St which 
reinforces another policy guideline of the Washington Consensus: sound 
macroeconomic policies. In addition, countries with fixed but adjustable 
exchange rate regimes should closely review their current pegs if there are 
movements in anchor currencies. However, while it is true that the fastest-
growing cow1tries tend to have avoided excessive RER distortions in either 
direction, it is not a sufficient condition for growth take-off. For example, the 
RER rarely diverged from equilibrium in the Central African Republic but the 
country did ·not experience fast grovvth. Therefore, "the real exchange rate is 
best thought of as a facilitating condition" (Eichengreen, 2008, p. 20). 
Should developing countries undervalue their currencies? 
Appendix 
Table 2A.l: Empirical studies on the RER m1.dervaluation-growth nexus. 
Author Countries & Period Econometric Methodology1 Finding 
Razin and Collins (1997) 93 countries SEA, panel data, FE ( +) (nonlinear) 
1975-1992 
Aguirre and Calderon (2005) 60 countries SEA, DOLS (+) (nonlinear) 
1965-2003 and panel DOLS 
Gala and Lucinda (2006) 58 developing countries PPP adjusted (+) 
1960-1999 
Rodrik (2008) 188 countries PPP adjusted (+) 
1950-2004 
Bereau et al. (2009) 31 countries + EU SEA, panel data, (+) 
1980-2007 PMG & FM-OLS 
Berg and Miao (2010) 181 countries SEA, panel d ata, FE (+) 
1950-2004 
MacDonald and Vieira (2010) 90 countries SEA, panel data, (+) 
1980-2004 FE&RE 
Abida (2011) 3 MENA cOlmtries SEA,panel data, (+) 
1980-2008 FM-OLS 
Nouira and Sekkat (2012) 52 develop~g countries SEA, panel DOLS inconclusive, mostly 0 
1980-2005 
Notes: Contains information about the ERER definition and the econometric metl1odology to derive RER misalign-
ment. SEA refers to the single-equation-approach developed by Edwards (1989), Elbadawi (1994), and Baffes et al. 
(1999), implying an ERER definition consistent with internal and external balance. PPP adjusted means the ERER in 
these studies is defined as absolute PPP adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
Table 2A.2: Data Appendix Table Data sources and definitions. 
Variable 
RER misalignment estimation 
Real exchange rate (RER) 
Terms of trade (TOT) 
Trade policy (OPEN) 
Balassa-Samuelson-effect (PROD) 
Government consumption (GEXP) 
Net foreign asset position (NFA) 
Investment (INV) 
Trade surplus (TS) 
Description 
Constructed with the formula: RER = (NER · CP]y)/CPio. 
NER, CP[y, and CPTD are the multilateral official nominal exchange rate, 
the m.ultilateral foreign consun,er price index, and the domestic consumer 
price index respectively. NER and CPh are calculated as geometric averages 
weighted by total official trade shares of the largest trading partners. 
The total trade shares are calculated for the time period under consideration. 
The rado of the export price index to the import price index. 
Constructed as the ratio of the sum of the total value of exports (X) 
plus the total value of imports (M) relative to GDP at current prices. 
OPENl=(X+M)/GDP at constant prices . 
OPEN2=M/ GDP at current prices. 
Proxied with the ratio of GDP per capita (home country) to the OECD average 
of GDP per capita income at current (PROD) and constant (PRODl) prices. 
GDP share of total government consumption expenditure at current 
prices (GEXP). GEXPl: Government consumption share of PPP converted 
GDP per capita at current prices. 
' The ratio of net foreign assets relative to GDP at current prices. Net foreign 
assets are defined as the sum of net holdings of portfolio equity assets, 
foreign direct investment assets, debt assets, financial derivatives assets, 
and foreign exchange reserves minus gold. 
The investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita at current prices. 
Net exports relative to GDP: TS=(X-M)/GDP. 
Source 
Compiled from: 
WDI, UN Comtrade, 
DOT (IMF), and WDI 
Compiled from: WDI and WT 
PWT 7.0 (OPEN & OPENl) 
vVDI (OPEN2) 
WDI 
WDI (GEXP) 
PWT 7.0 (GEXPl) 
lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
PWT 7.0 
WDI 
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Table 2A.2: Data Appendix Table Data sources and definitions (ctd.). 
Variable Description Source 
General 
Sample size and outliers The data set for estimating RER misalignment in the sense of Nurkse (1945) 
is constr ucted with the objective of maximizing sample size. 
Growth regressions 
Any couritry is included for which the above d ata is available for at least 
20 consecutive years within the period 1970-2007. This study defines each 
cow1try as ''developing" except Japan, European cow1tries, and Western 
Offshoots. Observations with RER misalignment in excess of 100 percent 
are excluded, as well as their adjacents provided a time-series of at least 
20 consecutive observations is retained. Otherwise the coLmtry's 
observations are dropped altogether. In addition, civil war-torn countries 
are excluded from the sample as well as those cow1tries for which it was 
not possible to estimate p lausible ERERs. 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita at constant prices (chain series) PWT 7.0 
ln (n + g + o) Average growth of the population (n). PWT 7.0 
Technological progress (g = 0.02) and depreciation rate (c5 = 0.06). 
Investment Log of the investment share of GDP at constant prices. PWT 7.0 
ERER fundamentals See above. 
Human capital Average years of schooling of population over age 15. Barro and Lee (2010) 
Rule of law The strength and impartiality of the legal system. 
Measured from O (lowest) to 6 (highest). 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
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Table 2A.3: Long-run equilibrium relationships. 
COUNTRY l.n TOT OPEN PROD GEXP NFA INV TS [leads,lags] 
Algeria 0.55 (33.0)*** -0.08 (45.1)*** [1,0] 
Argentina -1.19 (2.5) ** 0.04 (6.5)*** [1,0] 
Bangladesh 0.02 (9.6)*** -0 .016 (6.3)*** [1,2] 
Bolivia -0.51 (2.5)** 0.01 (3.0)*** -0.05 (3.2)*** [2,2] 
Botswana , 0.007 (6.5)*** 0.006 (2.3)** 0.003 (11.2)** [1,0] 
Brazil -0.24 (3.5)*** -0 .02 (6.4)*** -0.01 (4.8)*** [2,1] 
Burkina Faso 0.02 (6 .4)*** -0 .39 (12.7)*** -0.01 (2.4)** -0.02 (5.7)*** [2,0] 
Cabo Verde -0.111 (8.6)*** 0.004 (4.2)*** [1,0] 
Cam~roon -0.32 (3.5)*** 0.042 (6 .9)*** -0 .11 (9.2) *** -0 .05 (3.9)*** [3,0] 
Central African Republic -0.12 (3.0)*** -0.031 (5.8)*** 0.04 (6.8)*** [2,0] 
Chile -0.46 (8.1)*** 0.01 (11.3)*** -0.02 (7.6)*** [1,0] 
China 0.02 (8.3)*** -0.03 (7.6)*** [3,1] 
Colombia 0.02 (8.5)*** -0.05 (17.1)*** -0 .01 (3.1)*** -0.004 (2.3)** [3,0] vn 
Costa Rica -0.04 (8.2)*** 0.081 (4.9)*** 0.01 (3.4)*** 0.02 (7.4)*** [1,2] ► 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.02 (7.5)*** -0.02 (3.5)"' ** -0.07 (16.6) 1·'>* -0.005 (6.S)*H· [2,0] ~ ~ 
. Dominican Republic -0.14 (2.2)** 0.012 (1.8)** -0.05 (3.8)*** [1,2] (t) 
Ecuador 0.007 (4.2)*** -0.03 (4.3)*** -0.02 (2.3)** -0.003 (3.9)*** [1,0] ~ 
El Salvador -0.07 (2.9) *** -0.121 (5.0)*** [2,2] 0.. >-'. 
Equatorial Guinea 0.42 (4.2)*** 0.003 (13.6)*** -0.004 (4.8)*** [1,0] >< 
Gabon -0.02 (13.5)*** 0.03 (10.8)*** 0.02 (17.0)*** [2,0] 
The Gambia -0.041 (4.9)*** -0.001 (3.7)*** 0.01 (2.6)** [O,l] 
Guatemala -0.40 (5.4t ;'* 0.009 (4.0)*** -0.261 (15.2) "'** [2,2] 
Haiti 0.01 (3 .9)**'' -0.005 (2.9)** -0.06 (2.5)** [2,2] 
Honduras -0.06 (6.7)*** -0.03 (4.3)*** 0.01 (4.3)*** [1,1] 
Hong Kong 0.005 (5 .2)*** -0.021 (7.8)*** -0 .17 (6.3)*** [1,1] 
India 0.01 (9 .6)*** -,0.30 (29.2)*** -0.003 (2.8)** [1,0] 
Indonesia 0.007 (3.8)*** -0.19 (16.2) *** 0.009 (3.2)*** [ 1,0] 
Israel 0.006 (13.5)*** -0.007 cs:o) *** -0.006 (3.7)*** [1,1] 
Jordan 0.33(3.3)*** 0.0032 (2.7)** -0.02 (13.5)*** 0.003 (3.4)*** [1,0] 
Kenya -0 .10 (3.2)*** -0.003 (2.8)*** [1,0] 
Madagascar 0.02 (8 .3)*** -0 .27 (4.6)*** -0.003 (1.8)* [2,2] 
Malawi -0.42 (5.2)*** 0.01 (6 .8)'"** -0.041 (4.1)*** -0.01 (2.5)** [0,2] 
Continued on next page 
Notes: The dependent variable is log RER. *** , ** , * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute 
values of the t-ratio. The last column reports the number of leads and lags that minimized the infonnation criteria. 1 or 2 on top of the coefficients refer to the 
alternative proxies (OPENl, OPEN2, PRODl, GEXPl) as set out in Table 2A.2. I O", 
V1 
O", 
O", 
I Table 2A.3: Long-run equilibrium relationships (ctd.). 
COUNTRY In TOT OPEN PROD GEXP NFA INV TS [leads,lags] 
Malaysia 0.28 (4.3)*** 0.003 (11.9)*** -0.01 (3.5)*** [3,1] Cf) Mali 
-0 .98 (21.0)*** 0.006 (8 .5)*** [2,0] ~ C) Mauritania 
-0.33 (8.9)*** -0.007 (3.2)*** [1,0] ~ ,,____ Mauritius 0.002 (2.3)** -0.04 (3.1)*" 0.004 (3.2)**" [2,2] ~ Mexico 0.14 (9.6)*** 
-0.02 (10.3)*** -0.04 (7.5)* ** -0.008 (15.3)*** [1,0] ~ 
~ Morocco 0.003 (3.0)*** -0.08 (10.5)*** [1,0] (j Niger -1.0 (5.9)*** 
-0 .11 (3.1)*** -0.06 (4.5)*** [2,0] ~ ..._. 
C) Nigeria -0.47 (7.9)*** 0.02 (10.5)*** 
-0.001 (2.8)** -0.06 (5.5)*** [0,1] \'.:$ Pakistan 0.03 (5.3)*** 0.06 (5 .3)*** 
-0.10 (8.3)*** [0,2] ~. ~ Panama -0.01 ( 4.4)*** 0.001 (4.8)*** 0.002 (4.5)*** [3,0] Paraguay 0.74 (14.6) *** 
·-0 .05 (4.9)*** 0 .06 (3 .6)*** 0.03 (4.6)*** [1,0] \) C) Peru 0.03 (8.3)*** 
-0.06 (10.6)*** 0.13 (8.5)*** 0.02 (4 .5)*** [2,2] ~ 
~ Philippines 0.004 (5 .8)*** -0.11 (12.7)* '1-''' -0.04 (5.0)*H 0 .01 (4.0)* '''* [1,1] ~ 
~ Senegal -0.88 (5.5)*** -0.12 (2.3)** -0.04 (3.4)*** [2,2] 
~. ~ Seychelles 0.0042 (3.0)*** 
-0.011 (4.2)*** [2,0] CJ) Singapore -0.79 (6.1)*** 0.001 (10.5)*** -0 .003 (7.5)*** 
-0.002 (7.4)*** [2,0] ~ 
~ South Africa -0.36 (5.0)*** 0.01 (8.7)*** -0.02 (18.0)*** [1,3] ~ $outh Korea 
-0 .003 (1.8)* 0.03 (2.3)** 0.004 (2.1)** [2,2] ~ ..... 
' 
Sri Lanka 0.004 (2.3)** -0.30 (16.0)*** [2,2] (j ~ Swaziland 
-0.01 (2.4)** 0.0005 (2.8)*** 0.06 (2.2)** [2,0] ..._. ~ Tanzania -0.34 (4.0)*** 0.03 (9.8)'"** 0.002 (3.2) ''** 0.02 (2.2)** [2,2] ~ Thailand 0.004 (15. l)*u -0.03 (3.2)*** -0.02 (2.6)** -0.004 (7.3)*** [1,1] ~ ~ Togo 0.064 (2.3)** 
-0.02( 6.2)*** -0.002( 6.5)*** [1,1] ~ 
~· 
Trinidad & Tobago -0.48 (3.5)*** 0.01 (5.5)*** 
-0.01 (2.3) ** 0 .002 (2.2)** [1,0]  
\) Tunisia 0.23 (5.4)*** 0.01 (9.0)*** -0 .04 (3.5)*** 
-0.01 (2.7)*** [1,0] ~ Turkey 
-0.04 (7.8)*** -0.04 (2.2)** 0.02 (3.0)*** [2,1] ~ ..... Uruguay 0.23 (2.3)** 
-0.004 (2 .0)** [1,0] ~ ~ Venezuela 0.01 (4.2)*** -0 .008 (6.8)*** -0.07 (4.3)*** [2,0] \) 
~· 
Zambia 0.35 (4.1)*** 
-0.04 (2.5)** 
-0.002 (3.6)*** [2,1]  er, Zimbabwe 0.01 (2.7)** -0 .06 (8.3)*''* -0.01 (3.6) **"' [0,1] ·--v Panel 
-0.13 (2.5)** 0.004 (5.9)*** -0.01 (7.3) *** 
-0.001 (2.9)*** -0.003 (1.9)* [1,1] 
Notes: TI1e dependent variable is log RER. *** , **, * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the t-ratio. The last colunm reports the number of leads and lags that minimized the information criteria. 1 or 2 on top of the coefficients refer to the alternative proxies (OPENl, OPEN2, PRODl, GEXPl) as set out in Table 2.A..2. 
Table 2A.4: Growth regressions - Additional results. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent variable SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM 
Initial ll.1con1e -0.05 (1.0) 0.01 (0.2) 0.02 (0.6) -0.05 (0.9) -0.02 (0.4) 
ll.1vestment 0.21 (2.8)*** 0.11 (1.8)* 0.12 (2.2)** 0.19 (3.2)*** 0.21 (2.4)** 
ln (n +·g + b) -0.54 (1.9)* -0.42 (1.2) -0.53 (1.7)* -0.83 (2.6)*** -0.50 (1.4) 
Tern1s of Trade -0.01 (0.1) -0.02 (0.7) 0.07 (1.7)* -0.04 (1.1) 
Trade Openness 0.11 (1.5) 0.02 (0.6) -0.06 (1.8)* 0.11 (1.2) 
Govern1nent Consumption -0.15 (1.9)* -0.06 (0.8) 0.00 (0.0) -0.10 (1.1) 
Net Foreign Asset Position -0.07 (1.2) -0.04 (0.8) -0.02 (0.5) -0.09 (1.5) 
RER Undervaluation 1.35 (1.3) 1.00 (1.5) 1.29 (2.2)** 0.76 (1.7)* 
RER Undervaluation Squared 4.25 (0.9) 
RER Overvaluation -0.86 (0.7) -1.35 (1.7)* -1.43 (3.2)*** -2.19 (6.3)*** 
RER Overvaluation Squared -2.46 (1.3) 
Observations. 469 430 210 469 469 
N 63 57 53 63 63 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.97 0.13 0.26 0.74 0.85 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.93 0.65 0.87 0.43 0.21 
' Instrun1ents ' 83 69 70 45 55 
Notes: The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. ***, **, * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent. t-ratios in parentheses (calculated on the basis of the Windm.eijer (2005) correction for two-step SGMM standard errors). 
Each regression includes country and time fixed effects. SGMM results use all available lags as ''collapsed'' instruments, except 
in Colunu1 3 where the first lag is used. The terms of trade is treated as strictly exogenous; initial income as predetermined; 
and the rest as endogenous. Observations are averages over five-year periods. The value of the variable RER Undervaluation 
(Overvaluation) is less (greater) than or equal to zero. Initial income, investment, population growth, government consumption, 
the terms of h·ade, are measured in natural logarithms. 
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Figure 2A.1: Estimated RER misalignments (ctd.). 
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Chapter 3 
Mercantilism and China's hunger 
for international reserves 
Summary 
This chapter is motivated by the popular view· that the surge in China's foreign 
exchange reserves is due to a distortionary exchange rate policy aimed at keeping the real 
exchange rate undervalued to support export-led growth. It undertakes an in-depth em-
pirical investigation to quantify how much ''mercantilist'' and "precautionary" motives have 
contributed to the reserve build-up in China during 1998Q4-2011Q4. A substantiat problem 
is that theory is consistent with employing two vastly differing approaches to defining and 
estimating the role of mercantilist reserve accumulation. A priori1 either method could gen-
erate misleading results. The study shows, however, that the distinction between the twu 
approaches is immaterial in China's case. The results suggest that mercantilism accounts for 
less than 10 percent of reserve accumulation. Precautionary motives and other factors seem 
'' 
to be_the dominant determinants of th~ surge in C~a's international reserves. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, China has accumulated foreign exchange reserves 
at an unprecedented rate and is now by far the world's largest holder of in-
ternational reserves. While still moderate at 8 percent of GDP (about US$ 
30 billion) in 19901 reserve holdings since then have almost sextupled to 44 
percent of GDP (about US$ 3.2 trillion) in 2011 (see Figure 3.1). In an in-
creasingly integrated world characterized by volatile capital flows, it is pru-
dent for emerging economies to stockpile reserves as self-insurance against 
Sudden Stops (Aizenman and Marion, 2003).1 Yet the general perception is 
that China's reserve holdings are too large to be justified by precautionary 
motives. In light of the record trade surpluses and a fixed exchange rate 
regime, an often stated suspicion is that China accun1tllates reserves as part 
of mercantilist policies, which aim at keeping the real exchange rate (RER) 
undervalued in order to suppqrt export-led growth (Dooley et al., 2004). Paul 
Krugman (2010), for instance, accused China of "the n1ost distortionary ex-
change rate policy any major nation has ever followed". 2 
The purpose of this study is to exanune whether this view about 
China's exchange rate policy has any merit. A number of empirical papers 
estimate a reserve demand model for a large group of emerging economies 
1Sudden Stop refers to the situation of a sudden downturn in capital inflows (Calvo, 1998). 2Paul Krugman (14 March, 2010), ''Taking on China'', N ew York Times, http: / j ww,;,v.nytimes.com/2010 /03 / 15 / opinion/15krugman.html, April 29. 
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Figure 3.1: Stock of foreign exchange reserves, 1990-2011. 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Source: IMF IFS statistics. 
in order to analyze the relative significance of precautionary and mercantilist 
motives in explaining the reserve build-up in those cou12_tries (Aizenman and 
Lee, 2007; Delatte and Fouqua\l, 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012, 2014). Such cross-
country studies are useful for testing the determinants of the surge in average 
reserve levels in emerging countries or assessing reserve adequacy of an in-
divid ~al economy relative .to the average country experience. Hawver, this 
approach is of dubious value for investigating how a particular factor such as 
mercantilism .explains reserv~ hoarding in a peculiar country such as China, 
whi~h substantially differs from the average emerging economy in terms of 
economic size, export performance, and the extent of reserve accu1nulation. 
76 Mercantilism and China's hunger for international reserves 
This motivates an in-depth case study of China's surge in reserves. 
Analyzing the importance of mercantilist motives as a determinant 
of reserve hoarding is greatly complicated by the fact that, theoretically, re-
serve accumulation in con1bination with RER undervaluation is consistent 
with both precautionary and mercantilist motives. There are hvo ,vays to 
deal with this problem. The first is to define arbitrarily any reserve accumu-
lation associated with RER undervaluation as mercantilist. Previous studies 
unanimously use this approach. However, entirely ruling out precautionary 
motives of reserve accumulation in the context of real undervaluation would 
naturally tend to substantially overstate the relevance of mercantilism as a 
determinant of the surge in China's foreign exchange reserves, especially in 
light of the general perception that China has undergone a long period of 
sustained real undervaluation. 
The second option is .to follow a two-stage approach: the first step 
assesses China's level of reserves needed for precautionary purposes. The 
second calculates the cumulative contribution of mercantilism to the hoard-
ing of reserves by defining reserve accumulation in relation to RER underval-
uation as mercantilist only if reserve holdings are in excess of precautionary 
needs. A caveat of this method is the implicit assumption that precautionary 
and mercantilist motives do not overlap, which could lead to overemphasiz-
ing the former over the latter. Since there is no obvious advantage between 
§3.1 Introduction 77 
the two approaches I adopt both with the objective of testing the sensitiv-
ity of the estimation results of favoring one definition of mercantilist reserve 
accumulation over the other. 
I initially follow the two-stage procedure. I determine China's level of 
reserves needed for precautionary purposes on the basis of the IMF's (2011) 
new reserve adequacy measure, which specifies optimal reserve holdings to 
depend on the stocks of external short-term debt (12 months n1aturity or less), 
portfolio equity liabilities, broad money (M2), and exports of goods and ser-
vices. Since it is broader in scope the, IMF (2011) measure is preferable to the 
existing "traditional" ones such as the 3-months import cover rule, 5-20 per-
cent of broad money (M2), or the "Guidotti-Greenspan" rule.3 The IMF con-
siders reserve holdings in the range of 100-150 percent of its reserve adequacy 
measure to be adequate. In this paper, I use both bounds as cut-off points in 
determining reserve excessiveness for two reasons. The first is to take into ac-
count the uncertainty in assessing optimal precautionary reserve levels. The 
second and more important one is to minimize the danger of underestimating 
the mercantilist motive as a determinant of China's reserve build-up by se-
. . 
lecting too generous a threshold of precautionary reserve needs. The analysis 
focuses on the period after the A$ian Financial Crisis using quarterly data cov-
ering.1998Q4-2011Q4. The IMF (2011) measure suggests that reserves crossed 
3The Guidotti-Greenspan rule recommends that reserve holdings should be the equivalent 
to the stock of external short-term debt, ,vhere short-term refers to a maturity of 12 months 
or less. 
78 Mercantilisn1. and China's hunger for international reserves 
the 100 and 150 percent limit in 2002Q4 and 2005Ql, respectively. 
This study uses two approaches to calculate the cumulative contribu-
tion of RER undervaluation to reserve hoarding: (1) "Back-of-the-envelope" 
calculations based on the available estimates of the price elasticity of import 
and export demand and (2) estimating a reserve demand model which explic-
itly takes into account the effect of real undervaluation on reserve accumu-
lation. Both methods yield virtually the same results. To estimate RER mis-
alignment I use the single-equation methodology (Edwards, 1989; Elbadawi, 
1994; Baffes et al., 1999t 'w·hich, after carefully ,rVeighing the relative merits of 
various approaches to measuring equilibrium real exchange rates (ERERst I 
argue to be the most preferable one. My estimates suggest that China's RER 
1,mderwent an undervaluation episode from 2002Q2-2008Q2, which almost 
perfectly coincides with the period during which reserve accumulation was 
the fastest (see Figure 3.1). In addition, the start date of the real undervalu-
ation episode is only two quarters before reserves cross the IMF (2011) mea-
sure's 100 percent benchmark in 2002Q4. This suggests that the distinction 
between the two above approaches to measuring the quantitative importance 
of mercantilist policies is inunaterial in the particular case of China. Finally, 
my RER misalignment estimates are similar to previous ones such as those of 
Qin and He (2011) or Gan et al. (2013) and more generally consistent with the 
broad consensus that the renminbi has been w1dervalued during most of the 
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2000s (Cline and Williamson1 2007). 
The 1nain results suggest that mercantilist motives contributed be-
tween US$ 200-300 billion (or less than 10 percent) to reserve accumulation 
in China. The exact number depends on whether reserves are deemed ex-
cessive fro1n 2002Q4 or 2005Ql onwards. Even when taking into account the 
uncertainty surrounding the estimation of the reserve demand modet the 
upper bound estimate still does not significantly exceed US$ 500 billion. My 
estimates translate into 3-7 percent of GDP and are therefore similar to the 
4.5 percent of GDP figure of Ghosh et al. (2014t which further corroborates 
that for China1 both approaches to estimating mercantilism's contribution to 
reserve accun1ulation generate similar results.4 Nonetheless, while the above 
numbers are large, the central message of this paper is that they are too small 
to fully account for China's hoarding of reserves. The IMF's (2011) reserve 
adequacy measure would still indicate excessiveness, even in the absence of 
mercantilist motives. This means that precautionary motives and other fac-
tors seem to be the dominant determinants of the surge in China's foreign 
exchange reserves. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews 
the precautionary and mercantillst motives for reserve demand and how both 
. 
are related to the real exchange rate. Section 3.3 assesses China's reserve 
4The study of Ghosh et al. (2014) is the only preivous one that provides a China-specific 
estimate of mercantilism1 s importance in the surge in foreign exchange reserves. 
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adequacy levels for precautionary purposes, estimates RER misalignment, 
and then proceeds to undertake the "back-of-the-envelope" calculations. Sec-
tion 3.4 estimates a reserve demand model for Chlna on the basis of ,t\Thich 
I compute the cumulative contribution of mercantilism to reserve accumula-
tion. The last section concludes. 
3.2 Reserve accumulation and the real exchange rate 
This section discusses the interplay between the current account, the real ex-
change rate (RER), and international reserves accumulation. It reviews the 
mercantilist and the precautionary motive of reserve hoarding and sp.ows 
that both are consistent with RER undervaluation. 
In a series of influential papers, Dooley et al. (2004, 2005) argue that 
the governments of East Asian countries, and China in particular, have the 
objective of absorbing unskilled surplus labor in the modern manufacturing 
sector, while simultaneously building the domestic capital stock along the 
way. To achieve those goals these cow1tries follow mercantilist policies in that 
they deliberately undervalue their RERs to support export-led growth. 
In this international system, which Dooley et al. (2004) refer to as 
"Bretton Woods II11 , the authorities fix the nominal exchange rate to the US 
dollar such that the RER is undervalued relative to its equilibrium value. 
/ 
§3.2 Reserve accunzulation and the real exchange rate 
In the absence of intervention, the usual adjustment process would be that 
the excess supply of foreign exchange, (triggered not only by the increase 
in exports but potentially also by additional net capital inflows), generates 
appreciation pressure on the nominal exchange rate. Yet the authorities can 
interfere with the latter process through reserve accumulation and by hnpos-
ing capital controls, thereby resisting appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate. In addition, since international reserves add to the monetary base, the 
resulting inflationary effect needs to be sterilized by selling bonds domesti-
cally. Therefore, another important ingredient of the policy mix is financial 
repression, which keeps the fiscal costs of sterilization manageable. As a 
result, China displays large current account surpluses, rapid international re-
serve accumulation, and an undervalued RER. 
However, reserve accumulation need not necess.?rily be the outcome 
of mercantilist policies. A country may increase the stock of international re-
serves as a precautionary measure to face a sudden exodus of volatile capital 
triggered by various external shocks such as a currency crisis. Indeed, the 
string _of financial crises in the 1990s has brought the issue of costly sudden 
exodus into the spotlight (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Calvo, 1998). Indonesia's 
output for instance contracteq by 15 percent of GDP during the Asian Finan-
cial ~risis of 1997 /98. There is empirical evidence that emerging countries, 
especially those h1 East Asia, have begun to stockpile international reserves 
82 Mercantilism and China/s hunger for international reserves 
based on the bitter lessons of the 1997 /98 financial crisis to insure themselves 
against both current and capital account shocks (Aizen1nan and Marion/ 2003_; 
Aizenman and Lee/ 2007; Obstfeld et al./ 2010; Ghosh et al., 2012, 2014). 
If a country decides to accu1nulate international reserves for precau-
tionary purposes, undervaluation in the RER could well be an unintended 
side effect. In theory, an improvement in the net foreign asset position, 
brought about by foreign reserve purchases, usually appreciates the equi-
librium real exchange rate (ERER). Reserve accumulation is thus associated 
with real undervaluation. Durdu et al. (2009) formalize the latter notion in 
their n1odel in which emerging economies go through sustained episodes of 
reserve accumulation in the face of financial globalization and Sudden_ Stop 
risk. In their framework, these periods are characterized by persistent current 
account surpluses and real w1dervaluation. The authors note that: 
11 [T]he current account surplus and undervalued real exchange rate are by-
products of the buildup of precautionary savings in the aftermath of Sudden Stops, 
or following financial globalization. They do not require intentional exchange rate 
rnanagement by central banks. 11 (Durdu et al., 2009, p.207). 
Reserve accumulation in combination with RER undervaluation is not 
mercarltilist in this case since the authorities' w1derlying objective is not to 
boost exports via the RER.5 In addition, mercantilist policies are defined as 
5Ghosh et al. (2014) note that this might be a possibility but they do not further investigate 
the issue. 
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the deliberate undervaluing of the RER. In contrast, real undervaluation in the 
context of precautionary reserve accumulation is an unintended consequence 
of which the authorities may or may not be aware. 
A number of studies attempt to analyze empirically whether reserve 
accumulation in emerging economies is dominated by the precautionary or 
mercantilist motive (Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Delatte and Fouquau1 2012; 
Ghosh et al., 2012, 2014). The approach of these papers is to estimate reserve 
demand for a large number of countries as a function of indicators of current 
and capital account shocks. The demand function also includes some esti-
mate of RER undervaluation as a measure for mercantilist motives. If there 
is a positive association between reserve accumulation and the extent of real 
undervaluation1 then this is taken as suggestive evidence of deliberate for-
eign exchange market intervention to keep the RER und~rvalued as part of a 
mercantilist growth strategy (Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Delatte and Fouquau, 
2012; Ghosh et al., 20121 2014). Yet the latter inference is only correct if we are 
willing to assume that reserve accumulation in .combination with an under-
value~ RER is always mercantilist and never precautionary. This is an overly 
restrictive assu1nption, which may bias the results towards giving mercantil-
ism as a determinant of the ~urge in China's foreign exchange reserves too 
muc);-t importance. This concern is especially relevant in China's case, given 
the widespread view that t~e cow1try~s RER has been persistently w1derval-
Mercantilism and China's hunger for international reserves 
ued. 
Another approach to analyzing the role of mercantilism in China's 
reserve build-up is to follow a two-stage procedure: the first step assesses 
China's level of reserves needed for precautionary purposes. The second 
calculates the cumulative contribution of mercantilist motives by defining .re-
serve accumulation in relation to RER undervaluation as mercantilist only if 
reserve holdings are in excess of precautionary needs. A major problem with 
this method is the implicit assumption that precautionary and mercantilist 
motives are never simultaneously at play. This does not seem to be realistic 
and may result in overemphasizing the precautionary motive. 
Without knowing the Chinese authorities' true motivations for accu-
mulating reserves, neither of the two approaches dominates the other.6 For 
lack of a better choice1 in this paper I use both approaches \vith the intention 
to exanune the sensitivity of the estimation results to choosing one definition 
of mercantilism over the other. I first follow the two-stage procedure. 
6Frorn a Chinese point of vieV\r, the concerns associated with nominal exchange rate reval-
uation are a significant loss in employment in export-linked industries and an increase in 
speculative capital flows (Gang, 2008). Totice that these concerns do not directly imply a 
m ercantilist motive of resenTe accumulation . Pursuing export-led gro'"vth and employment 
creation in the tradable sector does not require an undervaluation in the RER, as highlighted 
bv vVilliamson (1990). 
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3.3 Reserve adequacy 
This section assesses China's level of reserves needed for precautionary mo-
tives. There are several measures of reserve adequacy. A widely used rule-of-
thumb for optimal reserve holdings says that the latter should be equivalent 
to the value of three months of imports. However, this metric does not in-
corporate a country's exposure to volatile capital flows and seems therefore 
inappropriate for assessing reserve adequacy during an era of financial glob-
alization (Athukorala and Warr, 2002).7 
The 11Guidotti-Greenspan" rule (GGR) recommends that reserves should 
not fall below the amount of external short-term debt, where short-term debt 
is defined as all obligations maturing within 12 months. The idea behind this 
is that emerging countries should hold enough reserve coverage to withstand 
--
a Sudden Stop of short-term capital. In light of its focus on Sudden Stop risk, 
GGR seems a n1ore appropriate measure of reserve adequacy than the three-
months import cover rule. Nonetheless, since China is becoming ever more 
financially integrated with the rest of the world, an important caveat of GGR 
is that in its assessment it leaves out other "mobile capital" such as portfolio 
equity liabilities (Athukorala and Warr, 2002). 8 Finally, the IMF (2011) notes 
7The) import coverage rule dat~s back to the time of Bretton Woods when a loss of 
trade credit for three-months was perceived to be the worst possible current account shock 
(Athukorala1 2014). 
8Similarly ,,vhen it comes to the rule-of-thumb that reserve holdings should be equivalent 
to three months worth of imports. 
86 Mercantilism and China's hunger for international reserves 
that the 12 month benchmark of GGR is ad hoc since the duration of a crisis or 
a Sudden Stop of short-term capital may both last significantly longer or less 
than 12 months. In any case, notice that reserves in China have historically 
surpassed the short-term debt stock several-fold, even in the 1980s (Figure 
not shown). This suggests that Chinese authorities have not given short-term 
debt holdings much emphasis in assessing reserve adequacy. 
The reserve adequacy measures discussed so far ignore the possibility 
that during a crisis foreigners who had invested in financial assets in the 
country along with domestic deposit holders who look for a !lsafe haven", 
are putting pressure on foreign exchange reserves (Obstfeld et al., 2010). The 
third conventional measure builds on this latter idea by recommending to 
central banks that they should hold reserves to the equivalent of 5-20 percent 
of broad money (M2). 
The major shortcomings of the reserve adequacy measures is that they 
are arbitrary and based on only one particular source of balance of payment 
pressure. This motivated the IMF (2011) to develop a new measure of reserve 
adequacy that is based on previous experiences of emerging countries during 
crisis episodes. It identifes four factors that capture various sources of risk for 
balance of payments pressures, vvhich are a combination of the ones discussed 
above: (1) a loss in export earnings due to an adverse terms of trade shock, 
(2) short-ter1n debt (12 months maturity), (3) medium and long-term debt 
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and portfolio equity liabilities, and ( 4) broad money (M2). For countries with 
a fixed exchange rate regin1e such as China, the IMF (2011) proposes the 
following rule-of-thumb metric for adequate international reserve holdings 
at time t: 
Rt = 0.3 STDt + O.lSPDLt + 0.1M2t + O.lXt. (3.1) 
In this equation, the weights are based on the 10th percentile of respective 
outflows during balance of payment pressure events (IMF, 2011). The defini-
tions of the variables are as follows: 
• R*: adequate stock of foreign exchange reserves by the precautionary 
ntotive, 
• STD: the stock of short-term debt (12 months maturity or less), 
• PDL: gross portfolio equity liabilities, and 
• X: exports of goods and services (over 12 months). 
Based on the above measure, I construct a reserve adequacy index 
(RAI). The RAI is d~fined as as the ratio of actual reserves (R) to the adequate 
stock of reserves needed for :precautionary reasons (R*): 
RAI1 = ; : 100%. 
t 
(3.2) 
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To assess the level of reserves needed for precautionary purposes, my analysis 
relies solely on the RAI rather than the other discussed reserve adequacy 
measures. 
Since R* is a "round number 11 there is considerable scope when assess-
ing reserve adequacy. The IMF (2011) considers values for the RAit within 
the range 100-150 percent as optimal. In this paper I consider both bounds as 
reserve adequacy thresholds, to take into account the w1certainty in determin-
ing the optimal level of reserve holdings needed for precautionary purposes. 
More importantly, the practice of also using the lower limit of 100 percent 
substantially reduces the probability of underestimating mercantilism's con-
tribution to reserve accumulation. This will therefore result in an upper and 
lower bound estimate of mercantilism's contribution to reserve accumulation. 
3.3.1 Data 
The data on international reserve holdings, broad money (M2), and the value 
of both imports and exports come from the IMF's International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) data base. Each of these time series is measured at quar-
terly frequency. I source the data on portfolio equity liability from the Ex-
ternal Wealth of Nations mark II (EvVNII) database developed by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Observations on the stock of short-term external debt 
(12 months maturity or less) come from the World Bank's International Debt 
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Statistics databank. To transform the data series of short-term debt and port-
folio equity liabilities from a1u1ual to quarterly frequency I use the cubic 
spline interpolation method. 
Each of the above series are measured in current US dollars, except 
M2, which is expressed in renminbi (RMB). Therefore, M2 is converted into 
US dollars using the period-average (at quarterly frequency) nominal ex-
change rate (RMB per US dollart which is also sourced from the IFS. Finally, 
all the time series are nonnalized by GDP. The latter is also sourced from the 
IFS and only available at annual frequency, and therefore the GDP series also 
needed to be interpolated before normalizing. 
The sample period is dictated by data availability of M2 at quarterly 
frequency, which only starts in 1998Q4. This is not a caveat, hovvever, since 
the focus of this paper is on China's reserve build-up post the Asian Financial 
--
Crisis in 1997. Since the EWNII database ends in 2011 the end of the sanlple 
period is 2011 Q4. 
3.3.2 · Evolution of the reserve adequacy index 
Figure 3.2 plots the RAI over the sample period (1998Q4-2011Q4). An RAI 
of below 100 percent indicates a reserve inadequacy based on precautionary 
needs, adequacy within the ~ange 100-150 percent, and excessiveness beyond 
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Figure 3.2: Reserve adequacy index (RAJ), 1998Q4-2011Q4. 
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Source: Compiled from IMF IFS statistics and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
this range (IMF, 2011). To better highlight these cut-off points, Figure 3.2 adds 
horizontal lines at 100, 150, and 200 percent. 
In the period after the Asian Financial Crisis, the index has never 
been significantly below 100 percent, with the sole exception of when it was 
85 percent in 2001Q2. From then, the RAJ increased sharply between 2002 
and 2008, the years when Chinese reserve accumulation was the fastest (see 
Figure 3.1). Reserve levels exceeded the 100 percent mark in 2002Q4 and 
the 150 percent threshold in the first quarter of 2005. Between 2008Ql and 
2011Q4 the index stabilized at around 200 percent, despite the accumulation 
of a staggering US$ 1.5 trillion i11 reserves during that period. Thus, solely 
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using the RAI conceals the astounding magnitudes involved in this analysis. 
For instance, in 2011Q4, the RAI at 100 and 150 percent translates into US$ 
1.7 and US$ 2.6 trillion, respectively. 
In terms of assessing reserve adequacy, the RAI suggests that China's 
reserves were slightly below the level needed for precautionary purposes up 
until the end of 2002. Reserves were then within the "adequacy range" be-
tween 2002Q4 and 2004Q4. They became excessive by 2005Ql at the latest.9 
Consequently, the cut-off dates for indicating reserve excessiveness are both 
2002Q4 and 2005Ql. 
3.3.3 Estimating RER misalignment 
The next step in assessing the importance of the mercantilist motive is to 
quantify how much real undervaluation has contributed to reserve accumula-
tion during the quarters in. which reserves are judged excessive by the RAI.10 
9Figure 3A.1 in the Appendix plots the Guidotti-Greenspan rule and 20 percent of M2 
(20M2) together with the stock of international reserves (each expressed as GDP ratios). From 
the figure it is immediately noticeable that Chinese reserve holdings grossly exceed the stock 
of short-term external debt by s~veral 1nultiples1 as mentioned earlier. 20M2 consistently 
exceeded the stock of international reserves up until the end of 2004. Reserve holdings 
surpass 20M2 in 2005Ql, ,vhich is the same date ,vhen RAI exceeds the 150 percent mark. 
This thus suggests that the chosen cut-off dates are not sensitive to using the RAI. 
10Notice that it would not be appropriate to define the quantity of foreign exchange 1nar-
ket intervention .as the difference bet,veen actual and adequate reserve holdings (R-R*) and 
interpret the resulting number as indicative of the mercantilist motive. Even though the 
authorities keep the RMB-value to the US dollar fixed through foreign exchange 1narket in-
terventions, this does not nece$sarily imply that the RER is undervalued (cf. Carden (2009) 
in a different but similar context). There are other factors1 mostly exogenous to the policy 
makers' influence, ,vhich contribute to reserve accumulation. 
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Since RER undervaluation is unobserved it needs to be estimated. However, 
obtaining reliable RER misalignment estilnates is a nontrivial task in the pro-
cess. 
There is a large variety of methods -for estimating RER distortions: 
purchasing power parity adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect (PPP-A); 
the single equation approach (SEA) using individual-country or panel data; 
and the macroeconomic balance (MB) methodology. Cline and Williamson 
(2007) review 18 recent papers that estimate the ERER for China and conclude 
that the RER misalignment results are highly sensitive to the method used. 
None of the approaches is strictly preferable over the other. Each 
method has its advantages and disadvantages, but for some the latter domi-
nate. The problem with the PPP-A and MB approaches is that they often do 
not generate consistent misalignment estimates across different papers. Che-
ung (2012), for instance, shows that PPP-A distortion estimates are sensitive 
to revisions in China's output and national price level data to the extent that, 
when also controlling for serial correlation, the previously 2004 undervalua-
tion estimate of 53 percent turns into a 13 percent overvaluation. 
In addition,the misalignment literature typically follows Nurkse (1945) 
and defines the ERER as the value of the RER, which leads to external and 
internal balances, given all relevant variables at their sustainable values. Con-
sequently, Cline and Williamson (2007) question the usefulness of the PPP-A 
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approach as an equilibrium exchange rate concept since a number of histor-
ical examples show that RER deviations from the PPP-A equilibrium may 
coincide with external and internal balances. 
The greatest strength of the MB methodology is how well it incorpo-
rates the concepts of internal and external equilibriums. But on balance, the 
MB framework is very limited due to its sensitivity.11 The MB approach uses 
a two step procedure to determine the ERER. The first step specifies a cur-
rent accow1t "norn1", either in an ad hoc fashion, or empirically estimated as a 
function of a set of macroeconomic fundamentals. The second step uses trade 
elasticities to calculate RER misalignment as the depreciation or revaluation 
required to close the gap between the actual and 11norm" current account. The 
fundamental problem of the MB approach, especially in the context of China, 
is that there is no consensus on either the current account norm or the trade 
elasticities. Schnatz (2011) shows that even small changes in either the current 
account norm or trade elasticities can substantially affect the RER distortion 
estimates . 
. The single-equation methodology also includes the cornerstones of 
external and internal balances but, unlike the MB approach, does not require 
intermediate estimation steps, and this decreases the sensitivity of the mis-
alignment results substant~ally. Indeed, Qin and He (2011), Peng et al. (2008), 
11 For a detailed discussion about the limitations of the MB approach1 see Schnatz (2011). 
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and Gan et al. (2013) estimate RER misalignment for China and their results 
are similar, despite differences in data sources, estimation methods, and san1-
ple periods. However, the single-equation approach is flawed when pooled 
panel regressions are used to estimate ERERs because by doing so the implicit 
assumption is ho1nogeneity in cross-country long-run RER behavior, and this 
is incompatible with the theory of RER misalignment (see Chapter 2 for more 
details). Therefore, in what follows, I estimate the ERER for China individ-
ually. I use the same estiination procedure as in Chapter 2, which I briefly 
summarize here again. I discuss potential caveats along the way. 
The starting point of the single-equation approach is Nurkse' s (1945) 
definition, which suggests that the ERER is determined by a set of macroeco-
nomic fundan1entals . Following Edwards (1989t Montiel (1999b t and Faruqee 
(1995) the ERER depends on the following variables: 
ERER = ERER (TOT, cp, s, GN, Cy, I , NFA t (3.3) (+ / - ) (+ ) (_ - ) (- ) (+) (+ / -) (+/-) 
where TOT refers to the terms of trade, cp is a measure of trade policy, s 
captures productivity differentials (Balassa-Samuelson effect), CN and Cy are 
government consumption on nontradables and tradables, I refers to invest-
ment, and NFA to the net foreign asset position. The signs of the partial 
derivatives appear below. 
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According to the single equation approach, in a first step, the long-
run equilibrium relationship between the ERER and its fundamentals is esti-
mated using the empirical equivalent of the equation above: 
(3.4) 
where F is the vector of the set of fundamentals, f3 describes the long-run 
relationship between RER and the fundamentals, and Vt is a stationary mean. 
zero error term. 
The second step requires the computation of sustainable values of 
those fundamentals that form a long-run relationship with the actual RER in 
order to calculate the ERER: 
(3.5) 
where superscript S indicate the fundan1entals at their sustainable values. 
In a third and final step the degree of misalignment (mist) is calcu-
lated: 
. RERt - ERERt 
. mlSt = ------, 
RERt 
(3.6) 
where positive values of 1nist indicates- overvaluation in RER. 
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Data The data sources and definitions are exactly the same as in Chapter 2, 
with the only difference being that the IFS is the source of the observations 
on RER. Furthermore, the IMF measures the RER as RER = PN IE Py, where 
PN, Py, and E refer to the price of nontradables, tradables, and the nominal 
exchange rate, respectively. This n1eans that appreciation is associated with 
an increase in RER. Due to data constraints, the ERER needs to be estimated 
using annual data so that cubic spline interpolation methods are required to 
obtain observations of the ERER at quarterly frequency. Quarterly data on 
RER are, ho,vever, available in the IFS database. The sample period is entirely 
determined by the EWNII database. In the case of China, observations on the 
net foreign asset position are available over the thirty year period 1981-2011. 
Estimation method Most macroeconomic series are nonstationary in levels 
and require at least one differencing operation to produce a stationary pro-
cess, i.e. they are integrated of order d (I(dt d > 0). The possible presence of 
I(d) variables on both sides n1ay introduce the problem of a spurious regres-
sion (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Therefore, I first determine the order of 
integration of the RER and the fundamentals using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests. The test results for the variables in levels and first difference are 
reported in Table 3.1. For each of the fundamentals, the null hypothesis that 
the series contains a unit root can never be rejected at conventional levels. 
The RER is also treated as nonstationary, even though the null can. be rejected 
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Table 3.1: RER fundamentals: Unit root tests. 
Panel A : Variables in levels 
Real Exchange Rate (RER) 
Terms of Trade (TOT) 
Trade Openness (OPEN) 
Productivity of Tradable Production (PROD) 
Government Consumption (GEXP) 
Net Foreign Asset Position (NFA) 
Investment (INV) 
Test Eq. Includes 
Constant 
None 
Constant & Trend 
Constant 
Constant 
Constant 
None 
Panel B: Variables in first differences 
Test Eq. Includes 
Real Exchange Rate (RER) None 
Terms of Trade (TOT) None 
Trade Openness (OPEN) None 
Productivity of Tradable Production (PROD) None 
Government Consumption (GEXP) None 
Net Foreign Asset Position (NFA) None 
Investment (INV) None 
Test Statistic 
-2.8 
-1.6 
-3.1 
5.7 
-2.2 
0.0 
1.2 
Test Statistic 
-4.1 
-5.1 
-4.0 
2.6 
-4.6 
-3.8 
-4.6 
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P-Value 
0.07 
0.10 
0.13 
1.00 
0.22 
0.68 
0.94 
P-Value 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Notes: This table reports the ADP-test statistic under the null hypothesis that the series is 
nonstationary. Sample period: 1981-2011. 
at the 10 percent level. The first differences of all variables are stationary, 
except for the proxy for productivity growth of tradable production (PROD, 
measured as the ratio of China's GDP per capita to the OECD average GDP 
per capita). Therefore, PROD is treated as 1(2). I use first differences of this 
proxy in a regression setting. 
The next task is to estimate /3, the parameters describing the long-
run relationship between the RER and fundamentals. My preferred estima-
tion method is the dynamic _OLS (POLS) estimator (Phillips and Loretan, 
1991; Saikkonen, 1991; Stock and Watson, 1993t which is an augmentation of 
the static OLS estimator wit]:,. leads and lags of first differenced independent 
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nonstationary variables. The optimal number of leads and lags are best cho-
sen such that the information criteria are minimized (Kejriwal and Perron, 
2008). In the estimation of the cointegrating regression there is no asymptotic 
bias arising from simultaneous equations or measurement error (Phillips and 
Durlauf, 1986). Another important feature is that DOLS perforn1.s well in 
small samples (Stock and Watson, 1993; Montalvo, 1995). 
Augmenting Eq. 3.4 with m1 leads and 1n2 yields: 
s=m1 
ln RE Rt == /3 1 Ft + L r'~~Ft+s + VtJ (3.7) 
S=- m2 
where vector F contains the fundamentals. 
Finally, I test for cointegration and stability of the estimated long-run 
parameters using the ADF-cointegration test for the former and the Le-test 
as developed by Hansen (1992) for the latter. A substantial problem when it 
comes to estimating the ERER is that it is not unusual to find various subsets 
of fundamentals explaining long-run RER behavior. Since theory offers little 
guidance on this issue, for lack of better alternatives, I use the same selection 
algorithm as in Chapter 2. In particular, I choose the specification which 
includes the largest number of fundamentals. Additional requirements ·are 
that the variables are cointegrated1 the estimated parameters stable/ and the 
signs of the coefficients attached to the fundamentals should be consistent 
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with theory as shown in Eq. 3.3. 
Following this procedure, the estimated long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship is: 
Zn RERt = 0.05 NFA + 0.40 GEXP - 0.03 OPEN, 
(0.005) (0.01 ) (0.003) 
(3.8) 
Observations: 30 ADP (p-value): 0.00 Le : 0.55. 
An improvement in the NFA is associated with ERER appreciation, consistent 
with Eq. 3.3 and the discussion in Section 3.2. The other fundamentals that 
matter for ERER determination over the long run in the Chinese case are 
government consumption and trade openness. An increase in government 
consumption appreciates the ERER, whereas greater trade openness (proxied 
as total trade over GDP) leads to ERER depreciation; this is consistent with the 
underlying theory of ERER determination. Finally, ADF and Le tests suggest 
that the requirements of cointegration and parameter stability are satisfied. 
To derive sustainable values of the fundamentals I use the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997), setting the smoothing pa-
rameter at A = 100. The HP-filter decomposes a series into trend and cyclical 
components. Since the t~ree fundamentals (NFA, GEXP, and OPEN) that 
describe China's long-run RER movements are noi1stationary, movements in 
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their respective trend components are permanent and therefore used to cal-
culate the ERER given by t' Fl. 
Results Figure 3.3 plots the RER misalignment estimates over the sample 
period 1998Q4-2011Q4. In the late 1990s the RER ,tVas overvalued by about 10 
percent, and subsequently hovered around its equilibrium value until the be-
gilu1ing of 2002, before entering· a long episode of w1dervaluation in 2002Q2. 
The degree of undervaluation was increasing at first and culminated in the 
first quarter of 2005 at 16.5 percent. From then onwards the RER slowly 
reverted back to equilibriun1. 2008Q2 marks the end of the undervaluation 
episode, ,tVhich suggests that mercantilist motives of reserve hoarding only 
played a role until then. Interestingly, my estimates suggest that the start 
and end dates of the RER w1dervaluation and reserve accun1ulation episodes 
coincide almost perfectly (cf. Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
Of great importance for this study is the finding that the real un-
dervaluation episode only starts two quarters before the RAI crosses the 100 
percent threshold in 2002Q4. This suggests that the two earlier discussed 
approaches to measuring the contribution of mercantilist motives to reserve 
accumulation generate very similar results in China's particular case.12 This 
finding therefore alleviates the concern that favoril1g one approach over 'the 
12For convenience, in the following analysis I disregard any effect on reserve accumulation 
that stems from RER undervaluation during the two quarters before 2002Q4. This decision 
does, however, not affect any of the results in this paper since the RER was only marginally 
undervalued at the beginning of the episode. 
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Figure 3.3: RER misalignn1ent, 1998Q4-2011Q4. 
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other may result in misleading inferences regarding the relative importance 
of mercantilist versus precautionary motives of reserve accumulation. 
It is worthwhile investigating the driving forces behind the misalign-
ment estimates. Figure 3.4 plots the ERER together with the actual RER at 
quarterly frequency over 1990-2011. The ERER appreciated slowly from the 
mid 1~90s until 2000, but has remained virtually unchanged since then. Fig-
ure 3.5 plots the ERER fundamentals: NFA, government consumption, and 
trade openness at sustainable. values '. Since the mid 1990s there has been a 
steady improvement in the NFA. Since 2000, the associated ERER apprecia-
tion with the latter develop~ent is, however, entirely counteracted by China's 
1.02 Mercantilisn1, and China's hunger for international reserves 
Figure 3.4: RER and ERER, 1990Ql-2011Q4. 
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move towards greater trade openness and the decline in government con-
sumption. It is thus highly misleading to infer a large RMB undervaluation 
on the basis of China's rapid accumulation of foreign assets alone. The un-
dervaluation episode was thus the result of the RER depreciation between 
2002 and 2005, which ·was due to the US dollar losing its value relative to 
the currencies of China's trading partners, in particular the Euro. Between 
2005 and 2009, China's RER appreciated by 28 percent due to a combination 
of RMB appreciation vis-a-vis the US dollar and a surge in the i11flatiort rate, 
which eventually brought the real undervaluation episode to an end. 
Finally, interestingly, these estilnates of RER misalignment are similar 
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Figure 3.5: ERER fundamentals (sustainable values), 1990-2011 . 
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to the ones obtained in Chapter 2, despite differences in the measurement of 
the RER and the estimated long-run equilibrium relationship. These estimates 
are also similar to those reported in a number of other studies based on the 
single-equation approach (Qin and He, 2011; Peng et al., 2008; Gan et al., 
2013).13 
Discussion The ERER estilnates reported here are open to criticism. For in-
stance, Cline and Williamson (2007) raise the important point that continuous 
policy interventions might bias the single-country misalignment estimates. 
If there is foreign exchange market intervention to prevent the nominal ex-
change rate from appreciating, as suspected in China's case, the theorized 
effect of the resulting accumulation in reserves is RER undervaluation. How-
ever, a regression of the actual RER on the net foreign asset position would not 
properly pick up the latter described mechanism. The concern thus is that the 
RER misalignment estimates ~re biased towards the equilibrium level during 
undervaluation episodes. 
How serious is this problem in the present case? Notice that the co-
efficient attached to the net foreign asset position is significant, and of the 
expected sign in the sense that an improvement in China's external position 
appreciates the ERER (cf. Eq. 3.8). This suggests that China has not il'lter-
vened over the entire sample period. But the question remains whether the 
13The sample periods of those studies do not go beyond 2007. 
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coefficient on the net foreign asset position is significantly smaller in magni-
tude than it should be. Even though knowin.g the counterfactual is impossi-
ble, vve can still compare the reaction of China's RER to an improvement in 
the net external position to the average cross-country experience. 
In Chapter 2, I estimate RER distortions for 63 developing countries 
on a country-by-country basis. Surprisingly, my results suggest that the ap-
preciating effect of an improvement in net external indebtedness is strongest 
in China.14 Finally, the misalignment estimates of Gan et al. (2013) are similar 
to those in the present study even though the authors exclude the net external 
position from the set of ERER fundamentals. 15 In conclusion, the impact of 
the net foreign asset position on China's RER does not appear to be system-
atically underestin1ated here. Of course, the possibility of biased estimates 
cannot be ruled out entirely. 
3.3.4 Back-of-the-envelope calculations 
To examine the role of mercantilism in China's reserve build-up, as a first ap-
proximation, I undertake some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations. To 
14The estimated RER appreciation associated -vvith a reduction in net external debt is even 
larger in this chapter. The change is presumably due to differences in the san1ple period and 
measurement of the actual RER. 
15That is, Gan et al. (2013) condition on the steady-state value of the net external position. 
Thus their ERER estimate is for a longer time horizon than the one in this study (Montiel, 
2007) . -This makes the similarity betv1een the hvo misalignment estimates even more remark-
able. 
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keep the exercise as tractable as possible I impose the simplifying assumption 
that the RER influences reserve accumulation through the trade balance but 
not the capital account. As mentioned, there is no consensus on the exact 
trade elasticites for China. For this reason, I experiment with a variety of 
different export and import elasticities. In particular I consider the values in 
the set {0.3,0.5,0.711.0L which are "conventional" ones for China (Cline and 
' 
Williamson, 2007; Schnatz, 2011; Thorbecke, 2013; Xing, 2012). For conve-
nience1 I set the same value for the elasticity of exports and imports1 respec-
tively.16 In addition1 I follow Cline and Williamson (2007) and assume that 
half of China1 s imports are composed of re-exportable parts and components. 
For instance1 assuming elasticities of 0.7, a 1 percent real appreciation reduces 
exports by 0.7 percent. The US dollar-value of final good imports increases by 
0.7 percent1 which is offset by a 0.7 percent reduction in the US dollar value 
of parts and components imports. Thus the net effect on the trade balance is 
the loss in exports. 
As an example consider the first quarter of 2005, when total exports 
amounted to 7.8 percent of GDP1 or US$ 156 billion. The RER at that time was 
undervalued by 16.5 percent.17 Assuming a revaluation of the same magni-
tude and trade elasticities of 0.7, exports in this case would fall by 0.9 per~ent 
16Considering non-overlapping trade elasticities would generate little additional insight. 
Generall~ the estimates are increasing in the magnitude of the export and import elasticities. 
17Since an increase in. RER denotes appreciation, "percent of undervaluation'' equals ''per-
cent of revaluation'' required to close the gap to the ERER. 
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of GDP. This translates into a reduction of about US$ 22 billion in the trade 
balance or the accu1nulation of reserves. In the follo,ving, I consider trade 
elasticities in the set {0.3,0.5,0.7,1.0} and redo the illustrated calculation for 
every quarter during the RER undervaluation episode in which reserve hold-
ings are deemed excessive on the basis of the RAI. Sumn1.ing the obtained 
estimates then yields first approximations of how much mercantilism con-
tributed to the reserve build-up in China. 
Starting with the lower bound estimates, the first quarter for which 
the RAI suggests that reserves are excessive is Ql in 2005. The last quarter 
of the undervaluation episode is Q2 in 2008, so 14 quarters in total. The esti-
mate of mercantilism's contribution to reserve accumulation (as per the above 
calculations) is increasing in the value of the trade elasticities. For instance, 
for export and import elasticities of 0.3, the stock of reserves would be US$ 
119 billion lower in the hypothetical case of no RER unaervaluation during 
2005Q1-2008Q2. The estimate increases substantially to about US$ 400 billion 
if, instead, we assume unitary trade elasticities. The results for the upper 
bound estimate are similar, even though in this case reserve excessiveness 
already began in 2002Q4. The cumulative trade surplus over the 23-quarter 
period that is attributable to RER undervaluation sums up to US$ 156 billion 
and al)out US$ 500 billion for trade elasticities of 0.3 and 1.0, respectively.18 
18 As mentioned earlier, disregarding RER undervaluation's contribution to reserve accu-
mulation during the tvvo quarters before 2002Q4 does not significantly affect the above re-
sults. At most, only about US$ 2 billion would -be added to the US$ 500 billion figure. 
108 Mercantilism and China's hunger for international reserves 
These are big numbers by any standard, yet too small to account for 
Chin.a' s rapid reserve accu1nulation. In fact, reserve holdings would still be 
deemed excessive by a large margin according to the RAt even in the absence 
of mercantilist policies. To illustrate this point, Figure 3.6 plots the actual RAI 
and the respective hypothetical RAI in the absence of RER undervaluation 
since 2005Q1 for the various export and import elasticities. The dashed verti-
cal line indicates the end of the real undervaluation episode in 2008Q2. Over-
alt Figure 3.6 suggests that mercantilism alone appears to be a poor candidate 
to explain China's rapid reserve accumulation during the 2000s. Irrespective 
of the particular trade elasticities assumed, the gap between the hypothetical 
RAis and the reserve adequacy bench1nark of 150 percent remains substantiat 
both in 2008Q2 and at the end of the sample period. 
Figure 3.7 plots the actual RAI and the indexes that would prevail in 
the hypothetical case of no RER undervaluation since 2002Q4. The hypothet-
ical RAis never stay close to the 100 percent benchmark and also surpass the 
reserve adequacy threshold of 150 percent by the end of the sample period in 
2011Q4, although reserves are not far off the adequacy range when assuming 
unitary export and import elasticities. Therefore, even in the extreme c<:1se of 
regarding all reserve accumulation in combination with real undervaluation 
as mercantilist, the point still stands that the surge in China's foreign ex-
change reserves cannot be explained by distortionary foreign exchange mar-
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Figure 3.6: Back-of-the-envelope calculations, RAI and hypothetical RAis, 
2005Q1. 
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ket interventions alone, unless the elasticities of exports and imports are well 
above 1.0. 
While suggestive, there are a 1:umber of caveats associated with the 
back-of-the-envelope calculations in this section . . It may well be that real un-
derval~ation spurs reserve accumulation through the capital account and not 
just the current account. Indeed, Prasad and Wei (2007), for example, argue 
that much of China's reserve hoarding in the early 2000s can be traced back 
to "h9t money" inflows, as opposed to improvements in the trade balance. 
In addition, the results are also sensitive with respect to the assu1nption that 
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Figure 3.7: Back-of-the-envelope calculations, RAI and hypothetical RAis, 
2002Q4. 
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the price elasticities do not exceed w1ity. 19 The next section attempts to ad-
dress these issues by estimating China's reserve demand as a function of real 
tmdervaluation and other factors, precautionary ones in particular. 
3.4 Determinants of reserve demand 
In this section I estimate China's demand function for international reserves. 
The main purpose is to obtain an estimate of the impact of RER undervalu-
ation on reserve accumulation while controlling for other factors driving re-
19 Ahmed (2009), for example, reports export price elasticities that are greater than unity. 
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serve demand. The advantage of this approach is that it is free of imposing ad 
hoc assumptions, as has been done for the back-of-the-envelope calculations 
in the last section. In addition, estimating a reserve demand function also 
allows an analysis of the role played by precautionary and other "traditional" 
factors in China's reserve hoarding. 
The reserve demand model takes the form: 
Zri(reserves/GDP) t = {3 1Xt + Et, (3.9) 
where the dependent variable, Zn (reserves / GDP) t, is the logarithm of the 
reserves to GDP ratio .Vector Xt contains the determinants of reserve demand 
discussed below. The error term Et is stationary and 1nean-zero. 
I follo,tV Aizenman and Marion (2003), Aizenman and Lee (2007); 
Ghosh et al. (2012), Ghosh et al. (2014), and Obstfeld et al: (2010) by including 
the follo,tVing explanatory variables, ,tVhere, unless indicated otherwise, the 
same data sources and definitions apply as laid out in Section 3.3.1: 
• the logarithm of the total trade (exports plus imports) to GDP ratio [ + ], 
• the log of the ratio M2 to GDP [ +] 1 
• fhe logarithm of the fraction of portfolio equity liabilities over GDP [ +], 
• the log of the ratio of short-term debt over GDP [ +], 
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• the logarithm of GDP per capita (WDt interpolated) [ + ], and 
• RER misalignment as defined in Eq. 3.6 [ + / - ] . 
The signs in square brackets represent the partial derivatives. Most of 
these variables represent precautionary reserve demand to insure against not 
only a wide range of potential capital account shocks (M2, portfolio equity 
liabilities, and short-term debt) but also against current account shocks. To 
proxy the latter, I use total trade to capture both the extent of loss in export 
earnings and the propensity to import. Other options to control for current 
account shocks would be to use the log ratio of imports or exports to GDP. 
Either way, the particular choice of proxy has no material impact on the re-
sults. 
Since reserve holdings should increase with the exposure to current 
and capital accotmt shocks, the association between the former and the vari-
ables that capture the latter should be positive. The model also includes GDP 
per capita as a "scale" variable to capture that reserve demand is potentially 
"non-homogenous" in the size of the economy (Ghosh et al., 2012). 
Finally, the model includes RER misalignment in order to estimate the 
impact of real tmdervaluation on reserve accumulation. Since undervaluation 
(overvaluation) in the RER boosts (discourages) exports and may attract (dis-
tract) capital inflows, the sign attached to the coefficient on RER misalignment 
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is expected to be negative. Recall1 however1 that additional reserve accumula-
tion induced by real undervaluation is not necessarily due to the mercantilist 
motive. As discussed in Section 3.21 RER undervaluation is also fully consis-
tent with precautionary reserve hoarding. Nonetheless1 notice that it is also 
possible for a country to accu1nulate foreign exchange reserves at times of 
RER overvaluation, in which case the association between RER misalignment 
and reserve accumulation would be positive (Aizenman and Lee1 2007). Yet 
in China's case this is not an expected outcome since there is a strong overlap 
between both RER undervaluation and fast reserve accumulation episodes. 
Nonetheless1 a priori the sign of the coefficient on RER misalignment is am-
biguous. 
3.4.1 Method 
Before turning to the estimation of the reserve demand modet I examine the 
tilne series properties of the variables. To this end1 I e1nploy ADF tests. The 
test results are reported in Table 3.2. They suggest that all variables are I(l), 
except GDP per capita and RER misalignment. The former is I(2) and the 
latter I(O) by construction. I then difference the GDP per capita variable so 
that it enters the reserve demand equation as an I(l) variable. 
For estimafu1g the re.serve demand equation I use the DOLS estima-
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Table 3.2: Unit root tests. 
Panel A: Variables in levels 
Test Eq. Includes Test Statistic P-Value 
Reserves None -1.2 0.21 
Trade (Imports plus Exports) None -1.4 0.16 
GDP per capita Constant & Trend -3.4 0.07 
M2 Constant -1.7 0.43 
Portfolio Liabilities Constant & Trend -1.9 0.64 
Short-Tenn Debt Constant -1.8 0.38 
Panel B: Variables in first differences 
Test Eq. Includes Test Statistic P-Value 
Reserves None -3.0 0.00 
Trade (Imports plus Exports) None 
-3.4 0.00 
GDP per capita None 
-0.0 0.67 
M2 Constant -3.9 0.00 
Portfolio Liabilities None -3.8 0.00 
Short-Term Debt None -3.4 0.00 
Notes: This table reports the ADF-test statistic under the null hypothesis that 
the series is nonstationary. Sample period: 199'8Q4-2011Q4. 
tor. The DOLS-versions of the equations are of the following form: 
S=l1 
Zn(reserves/GDP)t =~mist+ f'Xt + L r~~Xt+s + Et, 
S= - Z2 
(3.10) 
where mist refers to RER misalignment and vector Xt contains the other re-
gressors. The DOLS regression also includes 11 leads and Z2 lags of the first-
differenced Xt variables. 
3.4.2 Results 
I initially estimate the "traditional" reserve demand model that, in addition 
to RER misalignment, includes total trade and the scale variable, GDP per 
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Table 3.3: Reserve demand. 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
I::, GDP per capita 2.97 (6.86) 
Trade 2.99 (0.59)*** 0.13 (0.15) 
M2 1.58 (0.19)*** 1.61 (0.14)*** 1.62 (0.14)**~ 1.64 (0.16) *** 
Portfolio Equity Liabilities 0.38 (0.03)*** 0.38 (0.02)*** 0.38 (0.02)*** 0.38 (0.02) *** 
Short-Term Debt -0.02 (0.05) 
RER Misalignn1ent 6.87 (1.26)*** -0.46 (0.30) -0.31 (0.24) 
RER Undervaluation 
-0.33 (0.24) 
RER Overvaluation 0.25 (0.22) 
Cumulative Undervaluation 0.00 (0.002) 
Observations 53 53 53 ,..,., :)..) 53 
(leads, lags] ~ [2, OJ (1, 2] [2, 2) [2, 2] [2, 2] 
otes: The dep endent variable is the log of the reserves to GDP ratio. ***, ** , * denote the level of statistical 
significance a t 1, 5, and 10 percen t. Standard errors in parentheses. GDP per capita is expressed in logs. The other 
variables are measured in logs as a ratio of GDP (excep t RER misalignment) . 
capita. The result for this specification is reported in. Table 3.3 Column 1. The 
expected positive long-run relationship between trade and reserves seems to 
hold. The coefficient on RER misalignment is positive and significant, which 
suggests that China accumulates international reserves at times of real over-
valuation. As discussed, this estimation result was not expected. Hovvever1 
the results for the 11traditional11 reserve demand do not control for precaution-
ary capital account variables and m ay therefore generate-Spurious results. 
The reserve demand equation after adding M2, portfolio equity lia-
bilities/ and short-term debt is reported in Table 3.3 Column ? . Since GDP 
per capita does not form a long-run relationship vvith reserve holdings, it is 
dropped from the model. Once precautionary capital account variables are 
controlled for, the long-run relationship between reserves and RER misalign-
ment turns insignificantly negative1 suggesting that there is, at best, weak 
evidence of distortions in the RER affecting reserve accumulation in China. 
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Additionally, the coefficient on trade substantially shrinks in size and loses its 
statistical significance. The stocks of broad money and portfolio equity liabil-
ities seem to be the sole variables that form a statistically significant long-run 
relationship with reserve holdings. Finally, consistent with the discussion in 
Section 3.3, short-tern1 debt does not seem to 1natter for reserve accumulation 
in China. In fact the negative, albeit insignificant point estimate of short-term 
debt suggests that if anything, there is a weak pattern of declining reserves 
as the stock of short-tenn debt increases. 
The estimates reported in Column 3 help in checking whether the lack 
of association between RER misalignment and reserves is a result of too much 
noise stemming from the other insignificant variables in the regression. Con-
sequently, trade ai1.d short-term debt are dropped from the reserve demand 
equation. However, RER misalignment remains an insignificant determinant 
of reserve demand. Column 4 explores the possibility that reserve hoarding 
is asymmetric in real over- and undervaluation. To this end, I use the same 
approach as in Chapter 2 and split RER misalignment into two variables. The 
first takes the negative values of -mist when the RER is undervalued, and 
zero otherwise. The other equals mist for positive values, and zero during 
exchange rate undervaluation. This procedure does not significantly change 
the results. While both RER over-and undervaluation enter -the regression 
with the expected signs, they are not significai1.t drivers of long-run reserve 
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accumulation. 
The estimation results discussed so far may have failed to pick up 
the relationship between real undervaluation and reserve holdings due to 
misspecification. The issue is that the dependent variable is the stock of inter-
national reserves (as a ratio of GDP). While precautionary demand of reserves 
is linked to the holding of a particular stock, RER misalignment only affects 
reser, e accumulation in a given period and hence refers to the flow rather 
than the stock. Ghosh et al. (2012) also recognize this point. To address this 
issue, I follow their approach and construct the variable CUMUVAL, which 
takes the value of the cumulative number of quarters that the RER is under-
valued.20 The logic behind using CUMUVAL is to better capture the gradual 
impact of RER misalignment on the stock of international reserves. Column 
5 therefore includes CUMUV AL as a regressor, but there is no significant as-
sociation between reserve holdings and the duration of real undervaluation 
episodes. 
A fundamental vveakness of CUMUV AL is that it leaves out important 
information relating to the degree of undervaluation. Unfortunately there are 
no better alternatives under the ''stock setup". Therefore, in \vhat follows, 
I re-specify the reserve demand model into a "flow equation'1 by using first 
differences of the dependent and explanatory variables, except RER over-
200nce a real undervaluation episode ends, CUMUVAL is reset to zero. 
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and undervaluation.21 As a starting exercise, I employ OLS to estimate the 
trivariate relationship between reserves, real overvaluation, and real under-
valuation. The first Column of Table 3.4 reports the result. The magnitude 
of the coefficient attached to RER undervaluation (-0.22) suggests that every 
percentage point of RER undervaluation leads to a 0.22 percent increase in the 
reserve to GDP ratio. RER overvaluation on the other hand seems to signifi-
cantly slow down the pace of reserve accumulation. The relevant coefficient 
is -0.81, which suggests that a five percentage point increase in overvalua-
tion reduces the reserve to GDP ratio by about four percent. In Column 2 
I add first differenced M2 to the regression as this variable was previously 
found to be one of the most important deternunants of reserve demand ( cf. 
Table 3.3). Doing so, however, does not substantially change the magnitude 
of the coefficient attached to RER undervaluation (-0.23). 
An issue with the OLS estimates-is that they do not take into account 
reverse causality. Reserve accumulation also directly affects RER undervalua-
tion, as suggested by the theory of ERER determination.22 Moreover, reserve 
accumulation may lead to growth in the monetary base (MO) under imperfect 
sterilization, in which case the direction of causation between reserves and 
M2 would be reversed (Obstfeld et al., 2010). However, in China's instance 
this is not a concern since MO ( as a ratio of GDP) has been falling steadily 
21Since the variables are expressed as ratios of GDP and nleasured in (natural) logarithms, 
first differences represent growth rates in the GDP ratios. 
22See the discussions in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.3. 
Independent variable 
~M2 
RER Undervaluation 
RER Overvaluation 
Observations 
R2 
Sargan (p-value) 
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Table 3.4: Reserve de1nand (flow). 
(1) 
OLS 
-0.21 (0.09) ** 
-0.81 (0.26) *** 
52 
0.36 
(2) 
OLS 
0.55 (0.20) *** 
-0.23 (0.09)** 
-1.02 (0.26)*** 
52 
0.46 
(3) 
2SLS 
-0.24 (0.10) ** 
-0.30 (0.51) 
51 
0.36 
0.55 
(4) 
2SLS 
0.46 (0.22)** 
-0.22 (0.09) ** 
-0.70 (0.52) 
51 
0.42 
0.55 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in reserve holdings. *** , **, * denote the level of statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
during the 2000s, despite the rapid reserve build-up. Therefore, I instrument 
real over-, and undervaluation using their first two lagged values, whereas I 
treat M2 as exogenous.23 
Column 3 in Table 3.4 reports the two stage least-squares (2SLS) re-
sults for the trivariate specification. Compared to the OLS results, the point 
estimates of both RER over- and undervaluation change considerably. In 
the case of real overvaluation, the magnitude of the coefficient shrinks to 
about one third of its previous size (from -0.81 to -0.30). The change in the 
point estimate of real undervaluation is less pronounced, but still a nontrivial 
14 percent increase (in absolute value). My preferred specification reported 
in Column 4 additionally controls for first differenced M2, which leaves the 
point estimate of RER undervaluation virtually unchanged (-0.22). The size 
of the coefficient attached to RER overvaluation increases substantially, but 
loses its significance.24 . Finally, notice that the validity of the instruments 
23 Assuming that M2 is exogenous does not significantly affect the results. 
24I have also experimented with including the other potential determinants of reserve de-
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used in Columns 3 and 4 cannot be rejected on the basis of a Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. 
3.4.3 Reserve accumulation due to mercantilism 
This section computes the cumulative contribution of mercantilism to China's 
reserve build-up on the basis of the consistent 2SLS point estimate of RER un-
dervaluation, as reported in Column 4 of Table 3.4. The task is to calculate the 
amount of additional reserves accumulated in each quarter during the RER 
tmdervaluation episode in which reserves are judged excessive according to 
the RAI. I consider the same cut-off points of reserve excessiveness as for the 
back-of-the-envelope calculations: Q4 in 2002 and Ql in 2005. 
The results of these calculations are reported in Table 3.5. The Table 
comprises two panels: Panel A with 2005Ql and Panel B with 2002Q4 as 
the starting date. The first two Column.s list actual RAI reserve holdings 
(in US$ billions) and the RAI. Columns 3 and 4 report the hypothetical RAI 
(HYPRAI) and stock of international reserves (HYPRES) had there been no 
RER undervaluation. The fifth Column shows the amount of accu1nulated 
reserves (CONTRUVAL) that is due to real undervaluation in a given quarter, 
mand in the flow equation. Whlle other potential specifications exist the point estimate of 
real 1utdervaluation remains virtually unchan.ged c01npared to Column 4. The only excep-
tion is when I include the first difference of portfolio equity liabilities, ,vhich causes all other 
variables to lose their explanatory power. The results of those alternative specifications are 
available upon request. 
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with the cumulative sum reported at the bottom of the panel. 
Table 3.5: Reserves without mercantilis1n. 
Panel A: St:art 2005QJ 
Actual Actual HYPRAI HYPRES CONTRUVAL - 2 s .d . - 2.s.d . CONTRUVAL + 2.s.d. +2 s .d . CONTRUVAL 
RAI (bn) (% GDP) (bn) (bn) RAI (bn) -2 s.d. RAI (bn) +2.s .d 
2005Q1 155.8 663.3 145.2 618.2 23.0 153.0 651.3 4.5 137.7 586.0 40.5 
2005Q2 157.4 715.2 142.7 648.3 21.7 153.7 698.7 4.4 132.2 600.7 37.1 
2005Q3 159.2 772.4 141.8 688.2 17.4 155.1 752.3 3.6 129.6 628.8 29.2 
2005Q4 160.9 821.5 141.5 722.6 14.6 156.4 798.3 3.1 128.0 653.7 24.2 
2006Ql 166.6 877.7 144.5 761.3 17.5 161.5 850.8 3.7 129.3 681.2 28.7 
2006Q2 167.8 943.8 143.3 805.6 21.8 162.2 912.2 4.7 126.6 712.1 35.2 
2006Q3 166.6 990.5 139.5 829.6 22.7 160.4 953.9 5.0 121.5 722.5 36.3 
2006Q4 168.9 1068.0 140.2 887.0 20.1 162.4 1027.0 4.5 121 .5 768.4 31 .6 
2007Ql 181.3 1203.9 151.2 1004.0 18.9 174.5 1158.6 4.2 131.7 874.7 29.6 
2007Q2 186.7 1334.9 155.8 1114.3 20.6 179.7 1285.0 4.6 136.1 973.2 32.5 
2007Q3 187.5 1436.0 156.4 1198.0 17.4 180.4 1382.2 3.9 136.7 1046.8 27.5 
2007Q4 192.5 1530.0 159.8 1270.5 21.6 185.1 1471.5 4.8 139.2 1106.8 34.1 
2008Ql 204.9 1684.1 171.7 1411.9 12.6 197.4 1622.7 2.8 151 .0 1241.0 19.9 
2008Q2 206.l 1810.9 174.2 1530.4 8.3 198.9 1747.7 1.8 154.2 1354.7 13.l 
2011Q4 184.6 3203.0 167.6 2908.3 0.0 180.8 3136.7 0.0 157.0 2723.3 0.0 
I: 258.2 55.7 419.3 
Notes: RAI refers to the reserve adequacy index, which is based on the IMF's (2011) measure. HYPRAI and HYPRES is the hypothetical RAI 
and stock of international reserves in the absence of RER undervaluation episode, respectively. CONTRUVAL indicates the amount of accumulated 
reserves that is due to real undervaluation in a given quarter. The last six columns show 1-IYPRAI, HYPRES, and CONTRUVAL when 2 standard 
errors are added or subracted to the point estimate of RER undervaluation (colunrn 4 of Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.5: Reserves without mercantilism (ctd.). 
Panel B: Start 2003QJ 
Actual Actual HYPRAI HYPRES CONTRUVAL - 2 s.d. - 2.s.d. CONTRUVAL + 2.s.d. +2 s.d. CONTRUVAL 
RAI (bn) (% GDP) (bn) (bn) RAI (bn) -2 s.d . RAI (bn) +2.s.d 
2002Q4 103.3 291.1 100.7 283.7 3.7 102.8 289.6 0.7 98.6 277.8 6.6 
2003Ql 109.3 321.0 104.8 308.0 5.6 108.4 318.4 1.1 101.4 297.8 9.9 I cm 2003Q2 111.4 351.5 104.9 331.2 7.2 110.1 347.4 1.4 100.0 315.6 12.6 \..)..) 2003Q3 116.5 389.0 108.1 360.8 8.0 114.8 383.3 1.6 101.7 339.4 13.8 -+:>,. 
2003Q4 116.5 408.2 105.5 369.6 10.4 114.3 400.4 2.1 97.4 341.0 17.6 tJ 2004Ql 123.7 444.4 109.5 393.6 12.2 120.8 434.1 2.5 99.3 356.9 20.3 ~ 
2004Q2 125.0 475.2 108.9 413.9 10.4 121.7 462.6 2.2 97.5 370.6 t'-1-17.1 ~ 
..... 
2004Q3 131.3 519.1 113.2 447.3 10.6 127.6 504.2 2.3 100.6 397.4 17.1 ~ ~ 2004Q4 147.4 614.5 126.4 527.0 15.7 143.0 596.2 3.4 112.2 467.6 25.2 
~· ~ 2005Ql 155.8 663.3 130.5 555.4 20.4 150.5 640.6 4.5 113.6 483.7 32.8 ~ 
2005Q2 157.4 715.2 129.3 587.8 19.5 151.4 688.1 4.3 111.1 504.9 30.7 ~ t'-1-
2005Q3 159.2 772.4 · 129.7 629.2 15.8 152.9 741.7 3.6 110.8 537.6 24.5 CJ) 
2005Q4 160.9 821.5 130.2 664.9 13.4 154.3 787.8 3.0 110.9 566.1 20.7 ~ 
2006Ql 166.6 877.7 133.8 705.0 16.1 159.5 840.3 3.7 113.4 597.4 24.8 ~ ~ 
2006Q2 167.8 943.8 133.5 750.9 20.2 160.3 901.7 4.6 112.5 632.6 30.9 CJ) ~ 
2006Q3 166.6 990.5 130.6 776.5 21.2 158.7 943.6 4.9 108.8 647.1 32.2 ..... ~ ~ 2006Q4 168.9 1068.0 132.0 835.2 18.8 160.7 1016.6 4.4 110.1 696.3 28.3 ~ 
2007Ql 181.3 1203.9 143.6 953.2 17.8 173.0 1148.3 4.2 121.3 805.4 26.8 ~ ~ 
2007Q2 186.7 1334.9 148.9 1064.6 19.6 178.3 1274.8 4.6 126.8 906.5 29.9 ~ 
2007Q3 187.5 1436.0 150.0 1149.1 16.6 179.1 1372.0 3.8 128.2 981.9 25.6 ~ ~ 2007Q4 192.5 1530.0 153.8 1222.4 20.7 183.8 1461.3 4.8 131.3 1044.0 32.0 ~ 
2008Ql 204.9 1684.1 166.0 1364.1:l 12.2 196.1 1612.6 2.8 143.5 1179.4 18.8 
2008Q2 206.1 1810.9 168.8 1483.2 8.0 197.8 1737.5 1.8 147.3 1293.7 12.5 
2011Q4 184.6 3203.0 164.9 2861.4 0.0 180.2 3126.6 0.0 153.5 2663.1 0.0 
I: 324.0 72.6 510.5 
Notes: RAI refers to the reserve adequacy index, which is based on the IMF's (2011) measure. HYPRAI and HYPRES is the hypothelical RAI 
and stock of international reserves in the absence of RER undervaluation episode, respectively. CONTRUVAL indicates the amow1t of accumulated 
reserves that is due to real undervaluation in a given quarter. The last six colwnns show HYPRAI, HYPRES, and CONTRUVAL when 2 standard 
errors are added or subracted to the point estimate of RER Lmdervaluation (column 4 of Table 3.4). 
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1.24 Mercantilism and China/s hunger for international reserves 
The estimated cumulative contribution of mercantilism over the pe-
riod 2005Ql to 2008Q2 is about US$ 260 billion or 8 percent of the total 
stock of international reserves. In 2008Q2/ a hypothetical reduction of US$ 
260 billion in foreign exchange means that the stock of reserves would have 
amounted to US$ 1.53 trillion instead of the actual US$ 1.8 trillion. The RAI 
would have declined from 206 percent to 17 4 percent. So reserves would 
still be considered excessive according to the RAI, which suggests that mer-
cantilist and precautionary motives alone cannot explain China's hoarding of 
foreign exchange reserves. 
To provide a "confidence interval" for the impact of mercantilism, I 
add and subtract, respectively, 2 standard errors to the point estimate of RER 
tu1dervaluation and repeat the above calculations. The last six Columns of 
Table 3.5 report the results. The 11upper confidence bound" of mercantilism' s 
contribution is US$ 420 billion. HYPRAI would stand at 154 percent, still 
slightly above the 150 percent benchmark. In other words, the null hypoth-
esis that mercantilisrµ explains China's excessive reserve hoarding would be 
rejected at the 5 percent level. 
Panel B reports reserve hoarding due to mercantilism when reserves 
are deemed excessive from 2002Q4 onwards. Since in this case all quarters 
of real undervaluation count towards the mercantilist motive, the resulting 
numbers are somewhat larger. The cumulative sum of CONTRUVAL is US$ 
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324 billion (10 percent of actual reserve holdings). At the end of the underval-
uation episode in 2008Q2, the hypothetical RAI in the absence of mercantilist 
motives would still be at 169 percent, which is well above the 150 percent 
threshold. The observation thus still stands that mercantilism alone cannot 
explain China's excessive reserve hoarding. The absolute upper bound es-
timate of mercantilism that results from adding two standard errors to the 
point estimate of RER undervaluation is about US$ 500 billion. But even 
then the HYPRAI would still be near, albeit marginally belo,,v, 150 percent in 
2008Q2. 
Overall, these numbers are strikingly similar to the ones obtained 
from the back-of-the-envelope calculations in Section 3.3.4, further corrobo-
rating the inJerence that mercantilism has contributed substantially, but not 
totally, to the exorbitant reserve build-up in China. In addition, the estimates 
of the contribution to China's build-up in foreign exchange reserves in this 
study range beh,veen US$ 240 and US$ 500 billion, which trartslates into 3-7 
percent of GDP (or about 10 percent of total reserve accumulation). Ghosh 
et al. (2014) provide a similar estimate at 4.5 percent of GDP. Their approach 
is to define arty reserve accumulation associated with RER undervaluation 
as mercantilist. This comparal?ility in estimation results thus underlines the 
earlier formulated view that the results are not sensitive to which particu-
lar method of measuring mercantilism'-s intportance is chosen in the case of 
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China. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to test empirically whether the prevalent 
vie,,v holds that China engages in distortionary exchange rate policies which 
aim at maintaining an undervalued real exchange rate to support export-led 
growth. If this were so, these mercantilist policies would explain much of 
China's foreign exchange reserves stock, which is above of US$ 3 trillion as 
of 2011. This paper's goal has been to quantify how much precautionary and 
mercantilist motives have contributed to the reserve build-up in China.- The 
study has highlighted how theory is consistent ,,vith employing two vastly 
differing approaches with respect to defining and estimating the role of mer-
cantilism, either of which could generate misleading results. The study has, 
however, shown that the latter is not a concern in China's particular case since 
both approaches yield similar results. 
The main results of this paper suggest that while the period rap.id of 
the reserve build-up does coincide with a prolonged episode of RER under-
valuation, distortionary foreign exchange market interventions during that 
time have only contributed between US$ 200-300 billion (less than 10 percent 
of total reserve accumulation). Indeed, even in the absence of mercantilist 
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motives, reserves would still be considered to be in excess of what is needed 
for precautionary purposes based on the RAI. This paper's results thus cast 
doubt on the ,tVidely-held view that mercantilism is an important factor in 
explaining China's unprecedented reserve hoarding, and more generally on 
the Bretton Woods II-view as formulated by Dooley et al. (2004). 
The question then is: which factors beyond precautionary and mer-
cantilist motives can account for China's extraordinary reserve demand? One 
possibility is that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves includes the 
precautionary savings of the private sector as ,vell. According to Caballero 
et al. (2008) and Mendoza et al. (2009) for example, agents in emerging coun-
tries such as China demand assets to insure themselves against idiosyncratic 
ii1con1e shocks, ho,"rever, fu1ancial market underdevelopment ii1 emerging 
economies inhibits the supply of quality assets that allg,,v hedging against 
those shocks. This supply-demand mismatch induces residents of emerging 
economies to acquire assets in countries with advanced financial 1narkets, 
typically the US, to fill the void in insurance. In the particular case of China, 
the absence of adequate social insurance (Carroll and Jeanne, 2009; Chamon 
et al., 2013) may additionally explain an exceptionally high precautionary 
saving motive. Morea er, Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that the gro,tVing gen-
der imbalances in China incentivize parents to raise their savings to increase 
their son's attractiveness in the marriage market. These studies offer plausi-
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ble explanations as to why China operates under current account surpluses 
and accumulates foreign assets. However, as pointed out by Gourinchas and 
Jeanne (2013), specifically accounting for the hoarding of international re-
serves requires the additional assumption that the government accumulates 
the latter on behalf of the private sector. 
Another plausible explanation for the surge in reserves that deserves 
more attention is China's joining of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2002. Athukorala (2009a) argues that this event significantly reduced China's 
perceived country risk, vvhich triggered substantial inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in export-linked industries. China's integration into global 
production networks was thus a significant contributor to the record trade 
surpluses, which might have been, by and large, independent of the RER. 
China has become the premier assembly center within global production net-
works within vertically integrated dynamic industries, in particular electron-
ics and electrical goods (Athukorala, 2009b ). There is evidence that the RER 
is only one among the many other variables which determine Chain's at-
tractiveness as a final assembly center (Cline and Williamson, 2007; Schnatz, 
2011; Thorbecke, 2013; Xing, 2012). These other variables include: low labor 
cost relative to that in the US and other home countries of multinational en-
terprises (MNEs) involved in these industries25; ample availability of labor 
25The labor cost in China has increased significantly over the past decade or so, but still, the 
average hourly wage of a factory worker amounts to less than 5 percent of the US equivalent 
in 2009 (Banister, 2013). 
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(including supervisory manpower) required for mass assembly operations 
(Rawskt 2011); high-quality trade-related infrastructure; and political stabil-
ity. These factors are perhaps far more important for the expansion of these 
ind us tries than the exchange rate. 
China's emergence as an assembly center has therefore resulted in a 
surge in exports, which generated extra savings. The extraordinary demand 
for foreign exchange reserves may be explained that inefficiencies in the Chi-
nese capital market and banking system (Riedel et al., 2007) make it rational 
for savers to temporarily 11park" their funds abroad until the domestic invest-
ment climate improves (Carden, 2007, 2009). 
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Appendix 
Figure 3A.l: Traditional measures of reserve adequacy, 1998Q4-2011Q4. 
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Chapter 4 
Valuation effects, risk sharing, and 
consumption smoothing 
Summary 
This chapter studies the macroeconomic impact of valuation effects (changes in net 
external assets of a country arising from movements in exchange rates or asset rehrrns) . In 
theory, valuation effects are an important channel of international risk sharing as they facil-
itate external adjustment. However, the effects can_ also be economically destabilizing in_ the 
presence of frictions in the international financial system. Despite the grow-ing significance 
of valuation effects in an era of financial globalization, the nature and extent of their 1nacroe-
conomic effect has not yet been systematically examined, especially in relation to emerging 
market economies (EMEs). The study examines the macroeconomic impact of valuation ef-
fects for 53 countries from 1980-2010. Valuation effects seem to operate as a risk sharing 
channel in high income countries. For EMEs the results depend on how valuation effects cor-
relate with domestic consumption growth. There is weak evidence that valuation effects act 
as a ris~ sharing channel only if the correlation is negative, and are destabilizing otherwise. 
In the latter case, the welfare los~ may well exceed one percent of permanent consumption. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The net foreign asset position lin1its the present value of future current ac-
count deficits. The current account is often used as an approximate measure 
of periodic changes in net external assets. However, a number of recent stud-
ies show that "valuation effects" resulting from changes in asset prices or ex-
change rates act as a separate impetus driving the net foreign asset position 
(Tille, 2003; Obstfeld, 2004; Blanchard et al., 2005; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2007; Gourinchas and Rey, 2007; Gourinchas, 2008). The magnitude of valua-
tion effects is proportional to gross asset and liability positions. The prolifera-
tion in asset trade over the past two decades has therefore led to a significant 
increase in the size of valuation adjustments. 
Economic theory suggests that the valuation channel plays an in1por-
tant role in international consumption risk sharing. The h,vo-country model 
of Devereux and Sutherland • (2010) illustrates this point. If the home and 
foreign country are symmetric and choose their international portfolios op-
timally so that risk sharing is complete, they equally share a unit negative 
endowment shock in the home country in the sense that consumption in both 
countries declines by half a unit. The latter represents home's (foreign's) 
current account deficit (surplus). Provided the shock fully dissipates after 
the period, home (foreign) at the same time experiences an "unpredictable" 
valuation gain (loss) that exactly offsets the current account balance, leaving 
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the net foreign asset position unchanged.1 The crucial role of the valuation 
channel is thus to bring about external adjustn1ent. 
However, there are reasons to suspect that the valuation channel is 
economically destabilizing, especially for emerging n1arket economies (EMEs). 
This is the case if valuation adjustments occur in a pro-cyclical fashion, thereby 
amplifying the propagation of shocks. The most prominent example for 
pro-cyclicality is the case when countries are unable to borrow in their own 
currencies. Gourinchas (2008) discusses this point using a portfolio balance 
model featuring 11dollarized 11 net debt. The model predicts that a currency 
depreciation, triggered for example by a negative de1nand shock, increases 
net liabilities valued in local currency. The valuation component captures 
this capital loss. In this model, the valuation channel is destabilizing because, 
despite the shock, the equilibrium value of external net debt does not change 
and this requires trade balance surpluses to reduce international indebted-
ness to its long-run value. Pro-cyclical valuation effects due to "original sin" 
(the inability to borrow in domestic currency) are ,vell known to be a prob-
lem for EMEs since Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Eichengreen et al. 
(2003). 
There ~re only a few studies that investigate valuation effects in the 
1The current account balance and the valuation channel need not necessarily exactly offset 
each other. For instance, if shocks are persistent, the valuation channel exceeds the current 
account balance in absolute value so as to ensure an optimal sharing of shocks across the hvo 
countries. See Devereux and Sutherland (2010) ·for more details. 
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context of consumption risk sharing. For instance, Balli et al. (2012) show 
that valuation effects have indeed become an empirically ilnportant chan-
nel through which countries that are part of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), EU, or the OECD share their risks. The only study that empirically 
examines the risk sharil1g properties of valuation effects in EMEs is that of 
Bracke and Schmitz (2011). However, they restrict their analysis to portfolio 
equity, which represents only a small share of a typical emerging country's 
international portfolio. Interestingly, they conclude that the valuation effects 
that emanate from portfolio equity do not satisfy the necessary risk sharing 
characteristics in EMEs. 
Therefore, despite the growing significance of valuation effects in an 
era of financial globalization, the nature and extent of their macroeconomic ef-
fect has not yet been systematically examil1ed, especially in relation to EMEs. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether valuation ef-
fects are destabilizing, or are one of the operative · channels of risk sharing. 
My analysis mostly focuses on EMEs but includes high income countries as 
well. The period covered is 1980-2010 and the country sample consists of 18 
high income countries and 35 EMEs. 
I first examine whether the valuation channel is part of the interna-
tional risk sharing mechanism. Acknowledging that international risk sharing 
is far from perfect allows me to test this i11directly: if valuation effects repre-
§4.1 Introduction 1J5 
sent flow payments related to risk sharing, then an increase in the size of the 
valuation channel (measured as the standard deviation of valuation effects) 
driven by financial integration should be associated with improved risk shar-
ing outcomes across countries (Gourinchas, 2008). My econometric results 
suggest that this association holds for the group of high income countries. 
But there is no significant evidence that the same relationship holds for the 
group of EMEs. The latter result is thus in line with Kose et al. (2009), Bai 
and Zhang (2012), and others who find that financial integration has not had 
a material impact on the EMEs' ability to offload their income risk to the rest 
of the world. 
I then subdivide EMEs into two groups: one for countries where 
the correlation between valuation effects and domestic consumption growth 
is negative (NC), and another for which it is positive (~C). I argue that the 
sign of this correlation contains information about the nature of the valuation 
chaiu1el in EMEs. In particular, the n1odel of Devereux and Sutherlai1d (2010) 
implies that the covariance between consumption growth and valuation ad-
justments, when measured over longer time horizons, should be negative in 
economies that are more frequently subjected to shocks relative to the rest of 
the world. Assuming that ma~roeconomic volatility measures the frequency 
of shocks, the covariance between consumption growth and valuation effects 
should therefore be negative in EMEs-. Pro-cyclical or destabilizing valua-
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tion effects, on the other hand, imply a positive correlation in these countries. 
Overall, however, there is only weak evidence of a functioning valuation chan-
nel in EMEs. The correlation coefficients are negative in only 21 out of 35 
EMEs and rarely statistically different from zero. On the other hand, there 
has been a slight ilnprovement in the degree of risk sharing for the set of NC-
economies during the era of financial globalization. For PC-economies, the 
findings are much clearer: the greater the size of valuation effects, the worse 
the extent of risk sharing becomes. For this group, the extent of risk shari11g 
has substantially deteriorated over the last 15 years and is almost non-existent 
in 2010. 
Motivated by the above findings, I proceed to test explicitly whether 
and to what extent valuation effects inflict ,iVelfare costs through volatility 
in consumption in PC-economies. I also examine whether some inefficien-
cies in the valuation channel .remain in high income and NC-countries. For 
the PC-group, my results suggest that for every doubling of the size of the 
valuation channet consumption volatility increases by about 10 percent. For 
NC-countries on the other hand, there is no evidence of an adverse impact 
of valuation effects on consumption smoothing. If anythil1g, an increase in 
the size of the valuation channel is associated with slightly more stable con-
sumption paths. I also find this to be the case for high income countries. 
Fi11ally, I conduct a welfare analysis in the spirit of Lucas (1987t Obstfeld 
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(1994b ), and Pallage and Robe (2003) by calculating for a representative con-
sun1er the welfare loss in a PC-econon1y that is due to additional fluctuations 
in consumption brought about by increased valuation-effect volatility. Using 
various model economies, the cost estimates point to a substantial welfare 
loss in the sense that the equivalent variation may exceed 1 percent of per-
manent consumption. For some countries, however, the welfare cost can be 
multiples higher. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follo,,vs. Section 4.2 defines 
and provides stylized facts of valuation effects. Section 4.3 examines the link 
between risk sharing and valuation effects. Section 4.4 analyzes the impact of 
the valuation channel and consumption smoothing. Section 4.5 conducts the 
welfare analysis. The final section concludes. 
4.2 Definition and stylized facts of valuation ef-
fects 
This section defines and provides some stylized facts about valuation ef-
fects. As discussed, the current account is traditionally viewed to n1easure 
the change in a country's net foreign asset position. In reality, however, there 
are two reasons why the current account is an imprecise estimate of the evo-
lution of net external assets. The first is ·capital transfers ( debt relief programs 
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or migrants' transfers) and discrepancies between the current account and the 
financial account, conunonly called errors and omissions. Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) refer to positive (negative) values of errors and omissions as 
unrecorded capital inflows (outflows), but they note that errors and omis-
sions could also reflect mismeasured trade flows (or a mixture). Therefore, to 
the extent that data on stocks do not capture errors and omissions (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2007), the period change in net foreign assets equals the sum 
of the current account balance (CA), the capital account balance (CAP), and 
errors and omissions (EOM): 
~NFAt = CAt + CAPt + EOMt. (4.1) 
The second reason is that valuation effects arising from asset price or 
exchange rate changes are an important driver of net foreign assets, as docu-
mented by a number of studies (Tille, 2003; Obstfeld, 2004; Blanchard et al., 
2005; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Gourinchas and Rey, 2007). To illustrate, 
consider the following accumulation equation as discussed by Gourinchas 
(2008). Define NFAt+l as the economy's net foreign asset position at the end 
of period t. That is, the difference between gross assets (At+i) and gross 
liabilities (Lt+ 1). The period change in net foreign assets is given by: 
At+l - Lt+l = NFAt+l = R t NFAt + NXt + CAPt + EOMt, (4.2) 
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where the terms Rt and NXt refer to the gross net portfolio return and the 
balance on goods, services, and net transfers, respectively. Adding and sub-
tracting the net investment income balance N It, we have 
NFAt+l - NFAt = (Rt - l)NFAt - Nlt + NXt + Nit +CAPt + EOMt 
'-, ,.I 
'V' 
CAt 
= [(Rt - l)NFAt - Nit] +CAt + CAPt + EOMt 
"-----.,-----
VA Lt 
= VALt + CAt + CAPt + EOMt. (4.3) 
The change in the NFA is equivalent to the sum of the current account bal-
ance, capital transfers, errors and omissions, and a valuation component. 
Here, the last is equal to the total net return on the net foreign asset port-
folio minus income, dividends, and earnings distributed.--
Eq. 4.4 can be used to co1npute· valuation terms indirectly: 
VALt = 11NFAt - CAt - CAPt - EOMt. (4.4) 
Data on net foreign asset positjons come from the External Wealth of Nations 
Mark _II (EWN II) database developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Ob-
servations on the current account, capital accow1t, ·and errors and omissions 
140 Valuation effects/ risk sharing, and consuniption snioothing 
are sourced from the IMF1s Balance of Payments Statistics. Each variable is 
scaled by GDP. My analysis includes 1nost countries for which it is possi-
ble to obtain at least 20 observations.2 My final sample then comprises 53 
economies, which I classify into 18 high income countries and 35 EMEs.3 
Since the EWNII database starts in 1970, valuation effects can be calculated at 
annual frequency over the period 1971-2010. 
We can now have a closer look at trends and patterns of valuation 
effects. Although previous studies have done this extensively, their focus is 
constrained to industrialized countries. Table 4.1 reports a number of char-
acteristics of valuation effects for each of the 53 countries in the sample, ex-
tending the analysis of Devereux and Sutherland (2010) to EMEs. Defining 
VR == var (VAL)/var(NFA) as the share of the variation in net foreign assets 
explained by valuation effects1 it turns out that this fraction is rarely below 
80 percent for most countries and often close to 100 percent. This means that 
the current account only accounts for a small fraction of the total variation 
in international portfolios. Devereux and Sutherland (2010) find that valua-
tion effects are not serially correlated in OECD countries. AR(l) regressions 
show that this pattern holds for most countries. The coefficients on lagged 
VA Lt are statistically indistinguishable from zero.4 Finally, valuation -terms 
2In this study I do not consider Sub-Saharan African countries (except Botswan at other 
lmv incom e cow1tries such as Papua New Guinea and major oil producers (Iran). These 
co1.u1tries are n ot integrated w ith world financial markets. I also exclude from the sample 
small countries w ith population size of below 1 million. 
3See Table 4A.1 in the Appendix for a complete list of countries. 
4The AR(l ) regression specification is VALt = f3o + /3 1 VALt- 1 + £t, 
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tend to be centered on zero in most countries, although there are a number 
of exceptions, especially a1nong EMEs. 
Overall, the stylized facts of valuation effects for high income coun-
tries seem thus to carry over to EMEs. Devereux and Sutherland (2010) refer 
to these stylized facts as "first order" in nature, whereas Gourinchas (2008) 
calls these "unpredictable" (transitory) valuation effects. The unpredictable 
component of valuation effects is of first order and reflects the flo,,v payment 
associated with the sharing of output risk across countries. However, a num-
ber of studies such as Gourinchas et al. (2010) and Forbes (2010) show that 
the US benefits from substantial excess returns of gross assets over gross lia-
bilities, which implies the existence of "predictable" valuation effects as well. 
The predictable component arises from the excess return of a country's in-
ternational portfolio due to differences in country risk premiun1s, which, in 
theory, allows a "safe haven-country" to operate under -a persistent current 
account deficit. Indeed, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) find that a predictable 
excess return on the US's net foreign asset portfolio contributes 27 percent to 
the cyclical external adjustment. While significant for the US, the predictable 
component of ·valuation effects is of second order and typically 11very small" 
compared to the unpredictable element in dynamic stochastic equilibrium 
model? (Devereux and Sutherland, 2010). In the following, therefore, I will 
not distinguish between predictable and unpredictable valuation effects.5 
5In any case, note that it is not r:iecessary to ·differentiate between unpredictable and pre-
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Table 4.1: Properties of valuation effects. 
p(VAL, CA) p(VAL, 6 y) p(VAL, 6 c) Mean(VAL) sd(VAL) VR AR(l) 
Argentina 0.40** -0.16 -0.26 0.02 0.09 0.81 -0.33* 
Australia 0.10 -0.15 -0.11 0.00 0.06 0.88 -0.04 
Austria -0.13 -0.09 0.29* 0.00 0.03 0.84 0.12 
Bangladesh -0.27 -0.27 -0.14 -0.01 0.02 0.66 -0.18 
Bolivia 0.07 0.38** 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.45 0.36* 
Botswana -0.12 -0.16 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 1.13 -0.18 
Brazil -0.28 -0.20 -0.23 0.00 0.06 1.07 -0.14 
Canada -0.09 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.75 0.13 
Chile -0.17 -0.25 -0.26 0.01 0.06 0.90 -0.14 
China -0.03 -0.20 -0.15 0.00 0.02 0.33 -0.18 
Colombia 0.12 -0.30* -0.29* 0.00 0.02 0.42 0.20 
Denmark 0.36** -0.24 -0.31 0.00 0.05 0.71 0.17 
Egypt 0.54 -0.35** -0.10 -0.02 0.06 0.48 0.11 
Finland 0.06 -0.20 -0.10 -0.01 0.21 1.05 0.29 
France 0.07 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.05 0.87 -0.19 
Germany -0.42*** -0.04 0.15 -0.01 0.03 0.76 0.20 
Guatemala 0.00 -0.28 -0.26 0.03 0.03 0.69 0.05 
Honduras 0.09 0.15 0.28* 0.00 0.04 0.47 -0.10 
Hungary 0.29 -0.07 -0.23 -0.01 0.08 0.66 0.24 
India -0.16 -0.47 -0.22 0.00 0.04 1.12 -0.38 
Indonesia -0.14 0.25 0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.65 -0.03 
Israel 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.42 -0.17 
Italy -0.21 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.03 1.09 0.20 
Jamaica -0.01 -0.08 -0.28 0.02 0.10 0.88 -0.16 
Japan 0.07 -0.18 -0.20 0.00 0.03 0.73 -0.23 
Jordan 0.05 -0.23 -0.16 -0.02 0.16 0.89 -0.08 
Korea -0.35** 0.12 0.19 -0.02 0.06 1.04 -0.23 
Malaysia -0.40*** 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.07 0.69 0.25 
Mexico -0.43*** -0.11 -0.08 0.00 0.04 1.34 .:0.12 
Morocco -0.43*** 
-0.03 -0.14 0.00 0.06 0.95 0.52*** 
Netherlands -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.92 -0.31* 
New Zealand -0.16 -0.08 -0.13 -0.01 0.11 1.00 0.19 
Non"1ay -0.12 -0.16 -0.19 0.00 0.06 0.45 -0.14 
Pakistan -0.35** -0.13 0.26 0.00 0.03 0.72 0.17 
Paraguay 0.00 0.26 0.28 -0.02 0.25 1.06 -0.12*** 
Peru -0.18 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.67 0.04 
Philippines -0.34** 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.87 0.13 
Poland -0.23 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.87 -0.04 
Portugal 0.03 0.07 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.75 0.04 
Singapore 0.02 ~0.34** -0.49*** 0.04 0.21 0.74 -0.04 
Sou th Africa -0.22 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.03 -0.27** 
Spain. 0.16 -0.11 -0.13 -0.01 0.06 0.81 -0.04 
Sri Lanka -0.39 -0.09 -0.16 0.00 0.04 0.90 0.24 
Sweden -0.22 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.93 0.17 
Sv.ritzerland -0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.13 1.17 -0.03 
Syrian Arab Republic -0.21 0.11 0.23 -0.01 0.13 1.20 0.11 
Thailand -0.27 0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.06 0.77 -0.07 
Tunisia 0.18 0.18 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.81 -0.07 
Turkey -0.24 -0.08 -0.13 -0.01 0.06 1.08 -0.42* 
United Kingdom 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.85 -0.25 
United States -0.35** -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.03 0.87 -0.06 
Uruguay -0.02 -0.53*** -0.46*** 0.01 0.04 1.57 -0.04 
Venezuela 0.06 0.12 0.15 -0.01 0.05 0.49 0.03 
Totes: p(VAL, CA ) refers to the correlation between valuation effects and the current account. p(VAL, 6 y) is the 
correlation between valuation effects and real GDP grmvth. p(VAL, 6 c) denotes the correlation between domestic 
consumption gi·owth and valuation adjustments. Mean(VAL) is the average valuation effect over the sample period. 
The standard deviation of valuation effects is d enoted by sd(VAL). VR is the ratio of the variance of the valuation 
term over the variance of the change in the net foreign asset position. Column "AR(l)" reports the AR(l) coefficient 
of the regression VALt = f3o + fh VALt-1 + € 1. *** , **, * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percent. 
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Figure 4.1 reports the yearly valuation adjustment and the current ac-
count balance relative to GDP for China, Malaysia, and the US. The common 
pattern for these three countries is that valuation effects have been of negli-
gible size until the mid 1980s. Since then their magnitude has been steadily 
increasing. As the example of Malaysia illustrates, wealth transfers via the 
valuation channel can be large. For instance, following the Asian Financial 
Crisis, Malaysia experienced a valuation loss that amounted to 20 percent of 
GDP. This valuation loss was the result of a large nominal exchange rate de-
valuation (in excess of 30 percent) coupled with substantial foreign currency 
denominated net debt holdings. As predicted by the portfolio balance model, 
Malaysia subsequently needed to run a current surplus in order to repay the 
additional debt incurred through this valuation loss. In Malaysia's case we 
can observe this pattern in the data. The described example showcases how 
valuation effects can be destabilizing. 
The China-US story comes closer to the scenario of valuation effects 
being ~ channel of international risk sharing, as described in Devereux and 
Sutherland (2010). China's net foreign asset portfolio is long in US dollars 
and short il1. domestic equity, whereas the US' s international portfolio is long 
in foreign (Chinese) equity and short in US dollars· (Gourinchas, 2008; Lane 
and MHesi-Ferretti, 2007; Lane and Shambaugh, 2010). Therefore, the combi-
dictable valuation effects is not necessary for the purpose of examining the nature and extent 
of the macroeconomic effect of the valuation channel. 
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Figure 4.1: Current account and valuation component for selected countries, 
1980-2010. 
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nation of a depreciating dollar from 2002 onwards and an excess return on 
foreign equity has led to substantial valuation gai11s for the US on the one 
hand, and valuation losses for China on the other. As is apparent from Fig-
ure 4.1, those valuation adjustments have, at least in part, offset the current 
account balar1ces. During this period, China experienced an. unprecedented 
economic expansion, which was shared with foreign investors, including the 
US.6 From the discussion so far we can thus deduce that the theorized sign 
of the correlation between the current account and the valuation co1nponent 
is negative, regardless of whether valuation effects are stabilizing or destabi-
lizing. Empirically, the negative correlation between valuation effects and the 
current account seems to hold not only in high income countries, but also in 
the vast majority of EMEs (see Table 4.1). 
In addition, it is particularly worth emphasizing how the amplitude 
of valuation effects and the index of financial integration, defined as the sum 
of gross assets and liabilities over GDP, n1.ove in the same direction. To il-
lustrate this point, I measure valuation-term volatility as the rolling standard 
deviation of valuation effects using a window of 10 years .7 Figure 4.2 reports 
yearly cross-sectional averages of valuation-term volatility and the index of fi-
nancial integration for the full sample and for samples of high income coun-
6 As mentioned/ the US is "special" so a significant p roportion of these valuation gains 
would have been attributable to the predictable component. 
7Thls means that the estimated standard deviation in period t is the standard deviation 
computed over the years t - 9 to t . 
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tries and EMEs. These plots clearly show the co-movement betvveen gross 
asset positions and volatility of valuation adjustments, irrespective of the 
sample under consideration. The reason is that when a country holds large 
stocks of assets and liabilities relative to output, even moderate exchange rate 
movements or asset price changes have a substantial effect on the net exter-
nal position. As a result of financial globalization, in high income and EMEs 
alike, the size of the valuation channel in 2010 is at least three times lager 
relative to 1980. 
4.3 Valuation effects and risk sharing 
This section investigates whether valuation effects satisfy the properties nec-
essary to conclude that the valuation channel facilitates external adjustment 
in a risk sharing context. The stylized facts discussed in the last section are 
useful in giving us so1ne idea about the general characteristics and behavior 
of valuation adjustments, but not the risk sharing properties. There are two 
ways of examining the functioning of the valuation channel: a direct and an 
indirect test. 
To motivate the direct approach, consider again the example described 
in the introduction in which the home country experiences an unexpected 
valuation gain so as to facilitate external adjustn1ent follo\t\Ting a negative en-
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Figure 4.2: Valuation-effect volatility and index of financial integration, 1980-
2010. 
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dowment shock. This suggests that the valuation adjustment is negatively 
correlated with consumption gro,,vth in the country that is subjected to the 
shock, and positively in the one that is not. Unless shocks always occur in 
the same country, the sign of this correlation measured over a longer time 
horizon is thus ambiguous. Intuitively, however, the correlation should be 
negative (positive) in the country that it is more (less) frequently subjected to 
shocks. Let us make the simplifying assumption that macroeconomic (out-
put) volatility (approxilnately) measures the frequency of shocks in practice. 
Since this metric is very similar across high income countries the ambiguity 
remains. However, this approach allows us to make clear statements about 
the sign of the correlation and its 1neaning in the case of EMEs, given the 
fact that aggregate instability is significantly higher in these countries rela-
tive to their high income counterparts. Therefore, in EMEs, the covariance 
between valuation effects and consu1nption growth should be negative if val-
uation adjustments reflect the _flow payments associated with risk sharing. In 
addition, the model of Devereux and Sutherland (2010) implies that the corre-
lation coefficient should be increasing (in absolute value) in the frequency of 
shocks. On the other hand, if valuation effects are pro-cyclical and therefore 
destabilizing, the covariance is positive. 
Table 4.1 reports the correlations of valuation adjustments with con-
sumption growth [p(VAL, Li c)] for the 53 countries in the sample.8 The cor-
8I obtain data on consumption growth rates from Penn World Tables 7.1. 
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relation is negative in some high income countries and positive in others. As 
argued, this was expected and we ca1u1ot infer much from this. More inter-
estingly though, p(VAL, ~ c) is of the expected negative sign in only slightly 
more than half of the non-high income countries (21 out of 35). Further-
more, the correlation coefficients for most cow1tries are often close to zero 
and statistically insignificant at the individual country level, save for a few 
exceptions (Colombia, Singapore, and Uruguay). In the other 14 EMEs, the 
positive correlations suggest that instead of facilitating external adjustment, 
valuation effects are of a destabilizing nature in these countries. I split the 
sample of EMEs based on the sign of p(VAL, ~ c) into two groups, one for 
which the correlation is negative (NC) (21 countries) and the other for which 
it is positive (PC) (14 countries). This yields correlation coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level, but remain on the small side 
(-0.17 and 0.14, respectively). In summary, the results of the direct approach 
only provide ,veak evidence of a functioning valuation channel in EMEs and 
are best supplemented with the indirect testing method discussed below. 
_As theory suggests, the indirect approach we can derive by interpret-
ing valuation effects as the outcome of consumption risk sharing while also 
taking into account that risk sharing is far from perfect in practice. This im-
plies that, all else equal, an increase in the size of the valuation channel should 
be associated with improved _risk sharing outcon1es across countries (Gour-
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inchas, 2008). The magnitude of the valuation channel refers to the standard 
deviation of valuation effects, vvhich Devereux and Sutherland (2010) show 
to be a function of the follo,I\Ting variables: 
cr(VAL) = F A+L GD p I CT y I cpy I 
(+) (+ ) (+) 
(4.5) 
where (A+ L) / GDP denotes the index of financial integration, ,I\Thile cry and 
</Jy represent the size and persistence of output shocks, respectively. 
Assuming that the persistence of shocks has been unchanged over 
time and taking into accom1_t that the size of shocks has been decreasing 
due to the Great Moderation, it follows that the observed increase in the 
size of the valuation channel ·( cf. Figure 4.2) must have been driven by the 
proliferation in asset trade over the last few decades. This means that if there 
is an association between an increase in cr(VAL) and better risk sharing, then 
there is also one with the latter and financial globalization. Based on the 
results of previous studies such as Kose et al. (2009) and the results of the 
above direct testing method for the functioning of the valuation channeL we 
would expect this to be the case for high income countries and the set of 
NC-economies, but not PC-com1tries. 
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4.3.1 Empirical model 
The framework I use for conducting the indirect approach is similar to pre-
vious empirical studies of international risk sharing (Lewis, 1996; Kose et al., 
2009). In particular, markets are complete and there are J countries, where 
country j is populated by e1 identical and infinitely lived agents with a con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function over consumption (cjt ), 
Country j's expected utility function is: 
(4.6) 
I assume that the coefficient of risk aversion ( ,,-) and discount factors (/3) are 
equal across countries. To find the optimal allocation of cross-country con-
sumption, let us solve the social planner problem of maximizing utility over 
the J countries subject to the world resource constraint: 
J J L e1 c1t < L e1 YJt = f ('t) , (4.7) j=l j=l 
where output, YJt, is stochastic and governed by a vector of country-specific 
endowment shocks, [t (Baxter, 2012). The first-order condition with respect 
to con~umptiori for the j-th country at time t is: 
/3 t - ,, _ 0 1 . Kj Cjt -· j 1\-t, (4.8) 
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where Kj is the weight the planner designates on country j. Taking the ratio 
of the first order conditions at time t to t - l for cow1tries j and i yields the 
following expression: 
/3 -ry /3 - ry c .t 
cit At J· 
- ry - ry At- 1 
. 
cj,t - 1 Ci t- 1 
I 
(4.9) 
This equation says that discounted marginal utility growth rates are equalized 
across countries. This implies that consumption growth in a specific coun-
try should not differ from the ,,vorld consumption growth rate. In addition, 
individual-country consumption growth should be unrelated to idiosyncratic 
risk (Obstfeld, 1994a; Lewis, 1996). The regression framework for empirically 
testing this hypothesis takes the following form: 
w ( w) fl Zn cit - fl Zn Ct = £X + /3 fl ln Yit - fl ln Yt + €it, (4.10) 
where rx is a constant and cw and yw refer to world consu1nption and output 
per capita, respectively. The second term on the right-hand side represents 
the measure for country-specific risk: domestic GDP per capita growth de-
meaned by aggregate ,,vorld output per capita growth under the assumption 
that the latter captures uninsurable common shocks (Lewis, 1996). Country 
idiosyncratic risk is assumed to be exogenous. The stationary mean zero error 
tenn, €it, captures 1neasurement errors in consumption. 
The null hypothesis of complete risk sharing is /3 0. But this 
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hypothesis is typically rejected. In this case, estimates of /3 > 0 have the 
natural interpretation of 1neasuring the proportion of uninsured country id-
iosyncratic risk. As the extent of international risk sharing improves, this 
proportion should become smaller. Consequently, the lower the estimate of 
/3, the higher the degree of international risk sharing. A simple n1easure for 
the degree of risk sharing is thus (1-/3), where a value of 1 indicates perfect 
risk sharing, and O no risk sharing (S0rensen et al., 2007; Kose et al., 2009). 
I use the above concept to indirectly test whether valuation effects 
are the outcome of risk sharing. If so, the observed increase in the size of the 
valuation channel should be associated with better risk sharing. To investigate 
this formally, I use a similar approach to S0rensen et al. (2007) and estimate 
the fallowing panel regression: 
w ( w) ~ ln cit - ~ ln Ct = rx + /3o ~ ln Yit - ~ In Yt 
(4.11) 
where VOLVAL is the.valuation-effect volatility, which serves as the n1easure 
for the size of the valuation ch~nnel. I define volatility as the rolling standard 
deviation over 10-year windows. In this setting, the estimate of (l-/30) indi-
cates the average degree of risk sharing of the group of cow1tries included 
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over the time period under study1 whereas (l-/30-/31 x VOLVALjt) measures 
country j's extent of risk sharing at time t (S0rensen et al., 2007; Kose et al., 
2009). Consequently, larger fluctuations in valuation effects ,vould be associ-
ated with better risk sharing outcomes when /31 is negative. I do not include 
country fixed effects because these 1night partially pick up · differences be-
tween a specific country's consumption growth rate and the ,vorld growth 
rate (Flood et al., 2012). I also do not control for year-specific effects since 
common fluctuations are already controlled for. Either way, these decisions 
do not affect my results. 
4.3.2 Data 
Section 4.2 has described the procedure and data sources used to calculate 
valuation effects. Since I define volatility as the rolling standard deviation 
using 10-year windows1 the estimated standard deviation in period t is the 
standard deviation computed over the years t - 9 to t . The sample period 
covers the years 1980-2010. I obtain the time series on real consumption and 
real GDP from Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.1. The PWT-data is balanced for 
the 53 cow1tries under study so that computing "world'' consumption and 
output growth rates is straightfor,vard.9 
9Here, the "world" comprises the sample of 53 countries. 
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4.3.3 Results 
As a starting exercise, I estimate Eq. 4.10 for the full sample of countries and 
then separately both for the set of high income countries and the EMEs. This 
allows us to gauge the average degree of risk sharing over the sample period 
for the group of countries in question. Table 4.2, Panel A, Columns 1-3 reports 
the results. As expected, the null hypothesis of complete risk sharing (/3 = 0) 
is rejected for every country group. In addition, the estimated extent of risk 
sharing, (1-/3), is limited across the board - 0.37 for the set of high income 
countries (Column 2) and 0.20 for the group of EMEs. To specifically test 
whether there is a link between the magnitude of the valuation channel and 
risk sharing, I estimate Eq. 4.11 for the same country-groups. Table 4.2 Panel 
B, Columns 1-3 presents the results. The point estimate of the interaction is 
negative and statistically significant only for the set of high income countries 
(Column 2). In particular, the magnitude of the coefficient attached to the 
interaction term (-0.02) suggests that every percentage point increase in the 
standard deviation of valuation effects (measured in terms of GDP) would 
be associated with an improvement in the extent of risk sharing of 0.02. For 
the group of EMEs the coefficient attached to the interaction term is close to 
zero and fails to achieve statistical significance, suggesting that there is no 
link between the size of the valuation channel and risk sharing (Column 3). 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, these results were expected. 
Table 4.2: Main results - Valuation effects and risk sharing. 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Full High Income E1nerging Emerging, E1nerging, 
p(VAL,~cit) < 0 p(VAL, ~ cit) > 0 
Pan.el A: Ouf:pul: 
~ l n y it: - ~ l n ytw 0.79 (0.04) *** 0.63 (0.04) *** 0.80 (0.05) *** 0.80 (0.07)** * 0.80 (0.05) *** 
Observations 1445 521 924 546 378 
N 53 18 35 21 14 
R2 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.55 
Panel B: Output: and inf:eracf:ion 
~ l n y it - ~ l n ytw 0.83 (0.06) *** 0.76 (0.04) *** 0.83 (0.07)*** 0.93 (0.06)*** 0.74 (0.06) *** 
~ ln Yu - ~ ln ytw x Valuation-Effect Volatility -0.01 (0.01) -0.02(0.004) *** -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.008)** 0.01 (0.002) *** 
Observations 1445 521 924 546 378 
N 53 18 35 21 14 
R2 0.56 0.60 0.56 0.58 0.55 
Panel C: Robustness to outliers 
~ l n Yit- - ~ l n y1w 0.83 (0.06)*** 0.76 (0.04)*** 0.82 (0.06)*** 0.92 (0.08)*** 0.74 (0.06) *** 
~ ln Yit- - !J. ln ytw x Valuation-Effect Volatility -0.01 (0.01) -0.02(0.004) *** 0.00 (0.01) -0.016 (0.016) 0.01 (0.002)*** 
Observations 1445 521 894 516 378 
N 53 18 34 20 14 
R2 0.56 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.55 
Notes: The dependent vairable is I::. In cu - 6 l n Cf!. ***, **, * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
Each regression includes a constant. Valuation-effect volatility is defined as the rolli\1.g standard deviation over 10-year windows. Colunms 5 and 7 include emerging and 
developing ecopomies only. Columns 7 and 8 restric t the sample to high income countries . Sample period: 1980-2010. 
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In the following I test whether the lack of association between the 
degree of risk sharing and valuation-effect fluctuations in EMEs can be ex-
plained by the observation that valuation effects in some of these countries 
do not possess the necessary properties in the sense of risk sharing. Specif-
ically, recall that I argue at the beginnirlg of this section that for valuation 
effects to reflect flow payments related to risk sharing, they should be neg-
atively correlated with domestic consumption growth in EMEs. I therefore 
split the sample of EMEs based on the sign of p(VAL, ~ c). I then separately 
re-estimate Eq. 4.11 for the countries for which the correlation is positive (PC) 
(21 countries) and negative (NC) (14 countries). Panel B Columns 4 and 5 
report the results. For the set of NC-economies, the estimation result changes 
significantly. The point estimate of the interaction term is now negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (Column 5). This suggests that 
for the NC-group an increase in valuation-effect fluctuations is associated 
with better risk sharing. However, the degree of risk sharing for this group 
remains limited. The average during the sample period is 0.07 and, based 
on the magnitude of the coefficient on the interac~ion term, improves by 0.02 
for every perc~ntage point increase in the rolling standard deviation of val-
uation effects. The estimation result in Column 4 thus seems to corroborate 
the earlier formulated hypothesis that valuation effects need to be negatively 
. . 
correlated with consumption growth in EMEs in order to facilitate external 
adjustment. For the sample of PC-economies on the other hand, the coeffi-
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cient attached to the interaction term is significantly positive, meaning that 
an increase in the size of the valuation channel is associated with worse risk 
sharing outcomes. The latter is akin to saying that financial globalization 
worsens risk sharing, since the magnitude of the valuation channel is propor-
tional to gross asset and liability positions ( the common de facto measure for 
financial globalization). 
A concern related to the above estin1ates is that outliers might drive 
the . results for the NC-group. This could be the case for Singapore which 
is not representative of the average NC- country characteristics since it is a 
finan.cial hub and one of the only countries displaying a strong and statisti-
cally significant correlation between valuation adjustments and consumption 
growth. I therefore re-estimate Eq. 4.11 for the set of NC countries, but with 
Singapore excluded. Panel C, Column 4 reports the result. The coefficient on 
the interaction term is still negative, but drops by about one quarter in ab-
solute value and fails to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. 
This result is thus more in line with those of the direct approach in the sense 
that there is, at best, weak evidence that valuation effects satisfying the risk 
sharing properties. Therefore, Singapore as an outlier was indeed driving the 
previous result for the NC-group. 
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4.3.4 Evolution of the degree of risk sharing 
In light of last the section's findings, it is interesting to explicitly estimate the 
evolution of the degree of risk sharing for the sets of high income, NC, and 
PC-countries. The model in Eq. 4.11 allows the extent of risk sharing to vary 
only through the size of the valuation channel. I follow Kose et al. (2009) and 
estimate Eq. 4.10 over 10-year rolling panels over the period 1971-2010.10 
Figure 4.3 plots the evolution of (1-~) of the panel-estimates over the 
period 1980-2010. The graphs show that risk sharing has declined for all 
three country groups up until 1990. Since then the extent of risk sharing has 
greatly improved in high income countries (from 0.2 to about 0.6), which is 
not surprising given the results of the previous section. The NC-group has 
also experienced an increase in the degree of risk sharing after the turning 
point of 1990. However, this improvement is small in comparison to the high-
income group. Also, the extent of risk sharing in 2010 is no better than it was 
in the 1980s. Nonetheless, this finding provides some evidence that risk shar-
ing has improved during the era of financial globalization for some EMEs; 
the finding is consistent with the earlier results that there is some weak ev-
idence of a functioning valuation channel in NC-economies. For the set of 
PC-economies the situation is _the opposite. The extent of risk sharing has 
10 Another approach would be to estimate Eq. 4.10 year-by-year and then smooth out the f3s 
by computing rolling means over 10-year windows. The results of this approach are similar 
to those obtained by using rolling panels. The latter method is, hm.vever, the preferable one 
since the cross-sections of the various country groups are very small in this study. 
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further deteriorated after 1990 and is only slightly above 0.1 in 2010. 
However, one issue with the approach used in this section is that 
changes in the variance of(~ ln Yit - ~ ln Yt"r) over time might dilute the esti-
mates of f3 (Kose et al., 2009; Flood et al., 2012).11 Indeed, in all three country 
groups, fluctuations in the country-specific output component have been on 
a steady decline since the 1980s (graph not shown). This development bi-
ases the estimates of f3 upward, which puts the results for the PC-group into 
perspective, but strengthens further the finding that risk sharing improved in 
high income and NC-economies. 
4.4 Valuation effects and consumption smoothing 
The results of the previous section suggest that an increase in the magnitude 
of the valuation chaiu1el is associated with worse risk sharing in those EMEs 
where the covariance between consumption growth and valuation effects is 
positive. Throughout this section I operate under the simplifying assumption 
that improved risk sharing leads to consumption smoothing. This implies 
that the valuation channel may inflict welfare costs through volatility in con-
sumption for risk-averse agents in PC-countries. Whether valuation effects 
are destabilizing in NC-econon1ies is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, 
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the degree of risk sharing, 1980-2010. 
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the previous section's analysis generated some weak evidence in favor of the 
view that the valuation channel operates in those cow1tries. On the other, 
based on the latter evidence alone, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
valuation effects are destabilizing even in NC-countries. The purpose of this 
section is to probe the above e1npirically. For completeness, I also include 
high income countries in this section's analysis. 
I adopt the following specification to test whether valuation effects are desta-
bilizing for the set of PC-cow1tries: 
LVOLCit = ~l LVOLVALit + ~2 LVOLGit + ryXit + ai +et+ Ai t + ult, (4.12) 
where the dependent variable LVOLC is a measure of consumption volatility, 
LOVOLVAL is the magnitude of the valuation channel, LVOLG is fluctua-
tions in the growth rate of real GDP, and Xit contains a set of other control 
variables, including a constant. My model also includes fixed effects (ai) , 
country-specific linear time trends (Ai t), and year dummies to capture com-
mon shocks (0t). Fi11.ally, ult is the idiosyncratic error ter1n that is assume~ to 
be indepdendent across countries. 
Under the simplifying assumption that improved risk sharing leads 
§4.4 Valuation effects and consumption smoothing 
to consumption smoothing, the above model can also be used to indirectly 
test for the functionirtg of the valuation channel. The latter would be the 
case if an increase in the size of the valuation channel is associated with 
more stable consumption paths, that is, /3 1 turning out to be negative and 
significant. A positively and significantly estimated coefficient attached to 
LVOLVAL would, on the other hand, suggest that valuation effects are desta-
bilizing. 
To ensure the validity of these interpretations, the model needs to 
control for any effect of valuation effects on consumption volatility that oc-
cur through risk sharing. In particular, this is the case for the size of shocks. 
To see why, for simplicity assume that we live in a world of market com-
pleteness, optilnally-chosen country portfolios and therefore perfect risk shar-
ing across countries. If, for instance, the home economy is subjected to 
larger shocks than before, individual-country consumption necessarily be-
comes more volatile, even if risk sharil1g is complete. As a result larger 
wealth transfers through the valuation channel are required to bring about 
externa~ adjustment which in turn ensures that consumption growth rates re-
mai11 equalized across countries. The described mechanism is at work, even if 
international consumption risk. sharing is far from complete, and it becomes 
more relevant as the degree of risk sharing improves. Therefore, to properly 
channel out the impact of valuation effects on consumption volatility, I in-
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elude the volatility of real GDP growth in the model to control for the size of 
shocks. 
Nonetheless, there is one important caveat inherent in the above spec-
ification. The assumption that improved risk sharing in1plies consumption 
smoothing may not always hold in practice. For example, a country with 
a low volatility in its endowment stream may start sharing risk with an-
other country that is subject to higher endovvment volatility. In this case, 
the relationship between valuation-effect and consumption volatility would 
be positive, but it would be wrong to conclude that the valuation channel is 
destabilizing. In practice, however, this scenario is unlikely to be relevant for 
EMEs. First, there is little evidence of improved risk sharing outcomes for 
the emerging country group. Second, even if there was, the average emerg-
ing cow1try would share its income risk with high inco1ne countries, which, 
as empirical regularity tells us, are less subject to macroeconomic instability. 
For high income countries, the stated concern may well be valid. Therefore, 
/3 1 is perhaps best interpreted as the upper bound estimate of the impact of 
valuation effect volatility on consumption uncertainty. 
As for the other control variables, the volatility of inflation is used 
to capture the uncertainty that consumers face with respect to their future 
real income. Moreover, the model adds nominal exchange rate volatility as 
a control variable. Higher nonunal exchange rate volatility inherently mag-
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nifies the valuation channel. However, fluctuations in the nominal exchange 
rate may independently affect consumption patterns, for example through 
facilitating the adjustment process following external shock (Ed,vards and 
Levy Yeyati, 2005). Finally, I control for trade openness, which is motivated 
by the finding of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) that the removal of trade 
restrictions has a positive and economically significant impact on aggregate 
volatility. I proxy trade openness, (as is standard in the empirical literature), 
through the ratio of total exports plus hnports to GDP, under the assump-
tion that removing trade restrictions leads to higher trade volumes, all else 
equal. Table 4A.2 in the Appendix summarizes the details on data sources 
and definitions. 
4.4.2 Method 
As a first step, I examine the time series properties of the variables. If the 
individual time series are cross-sectionally dependent, first generation panel 
unit root tests such as Maddala and Wu (1999) or Im et al. (2003) can lead 
to invalid inferences. Performing the cross-section dependence (CD) test of 
Pesaran (2004) reveals that the null hypothesis of cross-section independence 
is rejected at the 1 percent level (results not reported). Pesaran (2007) shows 
that an augmentation of standard individual-specific ADF regressions with 
cross-section averages of lagged.levels and first differences of the data series 
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under consideration can deal with this problem. This procedure results in 
cross-sectionally augmented ADF statistics (CADF) for each panel individual. 
Averaging of the group-specific CADF-statistics allows a modified version of 
the t-bar statistic in Im et al. (2003) to be constructed. Pesaran (2007) tabulates 
asynlptotic critical values under the unit root null. Importantly, the CADF test 
has satisfactory small sample properties, even for T as small as 10 (Pesaran, 
2007). Table 4.3 reports the test results for different lag lengths.12 The null 
of nonstationarity cannot be rejected for each of the variables. The next steps 
involve estimating the long-run relationship between the variables and testing 
for cointegration. The method adopted in this section is the panel dynamic 
OLS (DOLS) estilnator developed by Mark and Sul (2003). The DOLS method 
adds leads and lags of first differenced independent variables to the OLS 
regression. Asymptotically, the DOLS estimates are robust to measurement 
error and sin1ultaneity and onutted variable bias (Phillips and Durlauf, 1986). 
In addition, DOLS outperforms other panel cointegration estimators such as 
fully modified OLS (FMOLS) (Kao and Chiang, 2000; Wagner and Hlouskova, 
2009). 
The DOLS specification of the model ,vith 111 leads and lags of first 
12 All CADF regressions include heterogeneous time trends. 
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Table 4.3: Unit root tests: Pesaran (2007). 
Panel A : Variables in levels 
lags LVOLC LVOLVAL LVOLG LVOLINFL LVOLXR OPEN 
0 1.6 1.9 4.0 6.1 3.7 2.2 
1 -0.3 0.3 1.6 3.5 -0.9 2.4 
2 -0.2 2.3 4.1 5 .1 0.4 3.4 
3 -1.1 4.4 3.5 4.6 -2.4*** 4.6 
Panel B: Variables in _first differences 
lags LVOLC LVOLVAL LVOLG LVOLINFL LVOLXR OPEN 
0 -26.7*** -17.8*** -17.0*** -12.2*** -7.3*** -19.5*** 
1 -16.1 *** -10.5*** -8.7*** -6.3*** -4.4*** -10.5*** 
2 -7.5*** -4.S*** -3.2*** -1.9** -0.7 -3.8*** 
Notes: This table reports the Zt-bar statistic under the null hypothesis that 
all series are nonstationary. *** , **, * denote the level of statistical signif-
icance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. All ADF regressions for variables in levels 
include a constant and a trend. ADF regressions for variales in first differ-
ences include a constant. 
differenced regressors takes the fallowing form: 
m 
Uft = Lb: ~Xi,t+m + Uit, 
- m 
(4.13) 
where Xit includes the control variables and [1, -/3'] is the cointegrating vector 
between LVOLC and the independent variables.13 In Mark and Sul's (2003) 
version of panel DOLS, the C(?integrating vector is homogenous across in-
divi9uals, while country fix·ed effects (ai), group-specific linear time trends 
(Ai t), and individual-specific short-run dynamics (b; ~xi,t+m) account for group-
13 All my empirical results use.m=l as suggested by Mark and Sul (2003). 
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specific heterogeneity.14 Common time fixed effects (0t) allow for some de-
gree of cross-section dependence, but ult is assumed to be independent across 
countries. To ensure that this assumption holds, I resort to Pesaran' s (2004) 
CD test. The idiosyncratic error term is denoted by Ui t · 
Finally, cointegration requires that the residuals are stationary. To 
examine this property, I employ the Ztbar (IPS) test of Im et al. (2003). 
I first estimate the model as specified in Eq. 4.12 for the sample of EMEs. Ta-
ble 4.4, Column 1 presents the estimation result.15,16 The coefficient attached 
to valuation-effect volatility is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per-
cent level. The magnitude of the coefficient (0.06) suggests that a doubling of 
the size of the valuation channel increases volatility in consumption paths by 
about 6 percent. This result thus seems to confirm the concern that valuation 
effects inflict welfare costs in EMEs. 
1-±Heterogeneous deterministic trends may also capture the effect of determinants of 
macroeconomic volatility for which reliable data are not available, especially at annual fre-
quencies (e.g. institutional quality) . 
15 All specifications include time fixed effects initially but they turned out to be statistically 
insignificant. The final model thus contains fixed effects and country-specific time trends. 
Including the latter reduces the information criteria significantly. 
16For all specifications, diagnostic testing on the residuals using Pesaran's (2004) CD test 
suggests that the hypothesis of cross-section independence in the residuals cannot be rejected 
at the 10 percent level (results not reported) . Furthermore, the null of no cointegration can 
be rejected at the 1 percent level based on the IPS test. In the following, no further reference 
to this will be made unless the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected. 
Table 4.4: Valuation effects and consumption smoothing. 
Independent variable 
Valuation Effect-Volatility 
Real GDP Growth-Volatility 
Inflation Volatility 
N01ninal Exchange Rate-Volatility 
Trade Openness 
p(VAC ~ Ci1:) < 0 x Valuation-Effect Volatility 
Observations 
N 
IPS (p-value) 
(1) 
Emerging 
0.06 (0.02) ** 
0.93 (0.03) *** 
0.12 (0.01) *** 
-0.06 (0.01) *** 
0.35 (0.07) *** 
735 
34 
0.00 
(2) 
Emerging 
0.09 (0.04)*** 
0.94 (0.03)*** 
0.12 (0.02)*** 
-0.06 (0.01) *** 
0.36 (0.07)*** 
-0.09 (0.05)* 
735 
34 
0.00 
(3) (4) 
Emerging, Emerging, 
p(VAL, ~ Cit ) < 0 p(VAL, ~ cit) > 0 
0.01 (0.04) 0.12 (0.05) *** 
0.93 (0.05) *** 0.86 (0.05)*** 
0.14 (0.02) *** 
-0.07 (0.02) *** -0.03 (0.02) ** 
0.63 (0.11)*** 
438 322 
20 14 
0.04 0.00 
(5) 
High Income 
0.06 (0.06) 
0.78 (0.07)*** 
0.11 (0.05)*** 
-0.10 (0.04)*** 
429 
18 
0.00 
Notes: The dependent variable is consumption growth volatility. *** , ** , * denote the level of statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. IPS refers to the Im et al. (2003) w1it root test performed on the residuals w1der the unit root null. Singapore is excluded from the sample of EMEs. 
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It is sensible to believe, however, that the EMEs are not a homage-
nous group in terms of how consumption uncertainty is affected by valuation 
effects. In particular, we vvould expect valuation effects to be considerably 
more destabilizing in PC-countries than in NC-economies because they are 
pro-cyclical in the former and countercyclical in the latter. To incorporate 
these possible differences in the modet in the follo,tVing I include as an ad-
ditional regressor a dummy variable for NC-countries, which is interacted 
with valuation effect fluctuations. Column 2 reports the result for this new 
specification. This result suggests that the impact of valuation effects on con-
sumption uncertainty is indeed heterogenous across EMEs. The magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient attached to the size of the valuation channel is 0.09 
and significant at the 1 percent level; this suggests that a htVofold increase 
in valuation effect fluctuations magnifies consumption volatility by about 9 
percent in PC-countries. Conversely, valuation effects do not seem to have a 
material effect on consumption volatility in NC-countries: the point estimate 
of the interaction term is -0.09 and significant at the 10 percent level. For 
comparison, I estimate the baseline model (Eq. 4.12) separately for the NC 
and PC groups. The estimation result changes very little compared to the 
previous one in the sense that valuation effects seem to be destabilizing only 
in PC but not NC econonues (Columns 3 and 4).17 
171 only report the most parsimonious specification, meaning that if a regressor other than 
valuation effect-volatility turns out to be statistically insignificant,, it is dropped. 
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Finally/ it is worth,,vhile investigating how an increase in the size of 
the valuation chaimel affects consumption volatility in high incon1e countries. 
I thus re-estimate the baseline modet restricting the sample to high income 
countries. Column 5 shocv s the :result.. The point estimate of valuation effect 
fluctuations is positive but statistically 111distinguishahle fron1 zero. D:oes this 
result contradict the finding of the last section that an increase in the mag-
nitude of the valuation channel is associated , ith better risk sharing? The 
ail!.Swer is no. \Nhile V\Te , ould ha e expected valuation effect volatility to 
b e negatively associated with consumption fluctuations/ as mentioned at the 
beginning of this section)' this needs not necessaril be the case/ e.g. \/\Then the 
average high n1,come oounhy enters risk sharing arrangements 1., ith countries 
that are subjected to larger shocks than itself. For this reason/ the framework 
used m Section 4,.3 . .1 to test for the functioning of the ~a1uation channel is 
preferable to the one of this section" as the latter cann_Qit ineorpo:rate the see-
nario just described. 
In the following] probe the sensiti , · ty of the above results to d efinmg 
· olatili 1 , as th :rolling tandard deviation over 10- ear \ mdo, s . To this end 
I use 5- and -year wmdo,, for calculatin,g rolling standard deviations . I fust 
re-do the anal,, sis fior the sample of EMEs using 7- . ear v-.rmduv,. s and the sp.ec-
ificaii n that includes the mte:raction term £or_ -c-eoonomies (cl. Table 4 .. 4,, 
Column?). The n)lling standard de,riations are calculated Ofler . _,, ear wm-
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dows. Table 4.5, Column 1 reports the result. The point estimate of valuation 
effect volatility is significant at the 1 percent level and suggests that a twofold 
increase in the size of valuation effects amplifies consumption grovvth volatil-
ity by about 13 percent, which is very similar to the previously estimated 9 
percent. Another slight difference is that for NC-economies an increase in the 
magnitude of the valuation channel seems to be associated with more stable 
consumption paths. But based on the magnitude of the coefficient attached 
to the interaction term (-0.18, significant at the 1 percent level), this effect is 
rather small: consumption volatility decreases by 5 percent as fluctuations in 
valuation effects double. This result can again be seen as weak evidence of 
a functioning valuation channel in NC-countries. However, the latter find-
ing does not carry over to using 5-year vvindows for calculating the rolling 
standard deviations (Table 4.5, Column 3). The coefficient on the interaction 
ter1n is smaller in magnitude than the one attached to valuation effect volatil-
ity. This corroborates the previous findings in this paper that the evidence 
regarding the operation of the valuation channel in NC-economies is at best 
weak. As for the PC-group, Colu1m1 3 adds further support to the notion that 
valuation effects are destabilizing in these countries. The estimated valuation 
effect-volatility elasticity is again 0.13 and signifi~ant at the 1 percent level. 
Another interesting difference compared to the main results is that a 
larger valuation channel is related to more stable consumption paths in high 
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Table 4.5: Robustness: Alternative window lengths. 
Independent variable 
Valuation Effect-Vola tility 
Real GDP Growth-Volatility 
Inflation Volatility 
Nominal Exchange Rate-Volatility 
Trade Openness 
p(VAL, ~ cit ) < 0 x Valuation-Effect Vola tility 
Observations 
N 
IPS (p-value) 
(1) 
Emerging 
0.13 (0 .03) *** 
0.64 (0.05)*** 
0.06 (0.02)*** 
0.39 (0.17)** 
-0.18 (0.06)*** 
840 
34 
0.07 
(2) (3) 
High Income Emerging 
-0.13 (0.05)*** 0.13 (0 .06)** 
0.72 (0.03)*** 0.56 (0.06)**'" 
0.09 (0.03)*** 
-0.06 (0.01)*** 
-0.99 (0.33)*** 0.73 (0.22)*** 
-0.10 (0.08) 
464 914 
18 34 
0.04 0.03 
1 73 
(4) 
High Income 
-0.10 (0.05)** 
0.54 (0.06)*** 
0.10 (0.05)** 
-1.38 (0.33)*** 
507 
18 
0.00 
Notes: The dependent variable is consumption growth vola tility. ***, ** , * denote the level of statistical significance at 
l, 5, and 10 percent. Standard errors are in parentheses. IPS refers to the Im et al. (2003) unit root test performed on the 
residuals under the unit root null. In Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4), volatility is defined as the rolling standard deviation 
over 7- (5-) year windows. Singap ore is excluded from the sample of EMEs. 
income countries (Columns 2 and 4) . Regardless of window length, the coef-
ficient on valuation effect-volatility is estimated negatively and significant at 
least at the 5 percent level. These results thus further strengthen the earlier 
finding that the valuation chartnel operates effectively in high income coun-
tries. 
4.5 Welfare analysis 
The previous section estimated the valuation-effect volatility elasticity of con-
sumption variability at around 0.1 in PC-countries. While this number indi-
cates that even a mere doubling of valuation-effect variability substantially 
incr~ases consumption uncertainty in a ceteris paribus sense, it leaves open the 
question of how much the associated welfare loss amounts to for risk-averse 
consumers in PC-countries. The study of Pallage and Robe (2003) suggests 
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that this cost is far from trivial. They assess how much a representative agent 
would gain if all fluctuations in consumption were to be eliminated in devel-
oping countries. Due to the large menu of available modeling choices they are 
tmable to pin down this welfare gain to a definite number. However, the com-
mon feature emerging across all of their specifications is that the welfare gain 
is always at least 10 times larger in developing countries compared to the US 
They also find that in many developing countries a representative consumer 
would, if given the choice, strictly prefer seeing all consumption w1certainty 
eliminated relative to being awarded an additional percentage point increase 
in consumption forever. 
To provide a more d·efinite quantity of the welfare cost stemming 
from valuation effects, I conduct a welfare analysis on the basis of last sec-
tion's elasticity estimates. I use as the benchmark the NC-group, for which, 
based on the main results of the previous section, valuation effect-volatility 
has no impact on consumption uncertainty. Moreover, to ensure that my cost 
estimates are not driven by particular assumptions, in what follows, I con-
sider two different model economies. They build heavily on Lucas (1987t 
Obstfeld (1994bt and Pallage and Robe (2003). 
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4.5.1. The model economies 
Individuals are assumed to be identical and population sizes are normalized 
to one infinitely lived agent. The consumer in the first economy has constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences over consumption streams (the level 
of real per capita consumption) {Ct} f O : 
{ 
00 Cl- 1' 1 } 
Uo = JEo L 1 f_ - 1 - ' 
t=O f r 
(4.14) 
where /3 E (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and the parameter , (,> 0) 
refers to the constant coefficient of risk aversion. 
In both economies, consumption is assumed to follow a random w alk 
as in Obstfeld (19946): 
(4.15) 
Here, g refers to the trend growth rate of consumption, {Vt } is a stationary 
process given by Vt rv N (O, o}) , and JE [e (vt-½o-i) ] = 1. Letting lower case 
letters denote natural logarithms and using the approximation ln(l + x) = x, 
the process in Eq. 4.15 can be rewritten as: 
· where . Vt rv N(O,CT;) . (4.16) 
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Assuming this process means that shocks are cumulative over time and the 
conditional variance is time varying. This in1plies greater uncertainty with 
respect to consumption for consumers compared to a process in which con-
sumption randomly fluctuates around a deterministic trend (Obstfeld, 1994b). 
In the second economy, consumption also follows a random walk. 
However, to incorporate in the consumers' preferences their willingness to 
substitute over time, follo,,ving Obstfeld (1994b) and Pallage and Robe (2003), 
I also consider the Epstein and Zin (1989) recursion as formulated by Weil 
(1990): 
( (1- /3)d1 - e) + /3 [1 + (1- /3 ) (1- -y)lE1(U1+1)](1- e)/ (l -1) ) (1-1)/ (H ) -1 
(1- ,6)(1- 1') ' 
(4.17) 
where the inverse of 0 refers to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 
meaning the higher the value of 0, the less agents are willing to substitute 
consumption over time and vice versa. Under the restriction that 1' = e, the 
preferences in Eq. 4.17 reduce to: 
Ut = t - l + IBt(Ut+1)-{ c
1
-r } 
l - 1 1-1' (4.18) 
This is the recursive expression of CRRA preferences used in the first econ-
omy. Therefore, the preferences in Eq. 4.17 relax the restrictive assumption 
that the parameter of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution be the same 
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as the inverse of the risk aversion coefficient. 
4.5.2 Calculating welfare costs 
One way to evaluate the welfare cost of additional consumption fluctuations 
is to rely on the equivalent variation, defined as the uniform percentage in-
crease of consumption across all states and dates that renders the consumer 
as well off after a shift from (g, CT2) to (g1,CT12 ). More formally, the equiva-
lent variation denoted by A is expressed as U [ ( 1 + A) Co, g, CT2] = U [Co, g', CT12 ] . 
The consumption process as assumed in Eqs. 4.15 and 4.16 makes it pos-
sible to derive closed-form solutions for A. This can--be done through the 
direct calculation of lifetime expected utility followed by using the definition 
of the equivalence variation. 18 In the first economy, the equivalent variation, 
(4.19) 
·[ e (g1-g)-½ (0-::--o-?)] f3/l - f3 - l for 1 = l. 
18Obstfeld (1994b) derives these measures. 
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In the second economy, the fraction A2 ( ·) of initial consumption that needs to 
be increased to make the consu1ner as well off as before is: 
for 8 -/- 1. 
(4.20) 
These equivalent variation measures highlight the link between uncertainty in 
consumption and risk aversion. When consumption follows a random walk, 
the cumulative nature of shocks results in the trend growth rate of becoming 
downward adjusted (g - ryrri /2) (Obstfeld, 1994b). This adjustment is linear 
in both the risk aversion parameter and the variability of random shocks.19 
A comparison of Eqs. 4.19 and 4.20 demonstrates the role of intertemporal 
substitutability. As before, !' determines the extent to which consumption 
variability adjusts the trend growth rate downwards. The role of e is to as-
sess the in1pact of changes in the risk-adjusted growth rate on ,,velfare. In 
particular, a low elasticity of substitution (high 0) means that an increase in 
trend growth accompanied by an increase in the interest rate leads to a rela-
tively low rise in the consun1ption growth rate (Obstfeld, 1994b). The welfare 
gain is then relatively small, due to the fact that a higher e implies relatively 
quickly declining intertemporal marginal utilities. In Eq. 4.19, by assumption 
!' = 81 thus the risk aversion parameter also governs the welfare impact of 
this effect. 
19Note that the ,velfare impact of the variability is nonlinear. See Obstfeld (1994b) for 
details. 
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Another way to assess the welfare change due to increased fluctua-
tions is to ask by how much the trend growth rate has to rise perpetually to 
leave the consumer indifferent between a shift from (g, o2 ) to (g' 1 cr'2). The 
necessary change in the trend growth rate, ti g = g' - g, can be computed 
using the expression U[Co,g,cr2] = U[Co,g',cr'2] and is given by: 
(4.21) 
The required increase in trend growth depends, in a linear fashion, on the 
change in uncertainty and the degree of risk aversion. This cost measure is 
independent of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution because it equates 
the risk-adjusted trend growth rates (g - rycr~ / 2) and (g' - rycr? /2) by con-
struction1 thus leaving no room for e to enter the picture. However1 there 
is a sinular cost measure that also incorporates the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution: this is done by comparing the equivalent variation to the 
cost a representative consumer faces with Epstein-Zin preferences after being 
stripped of a certain percentage of trend growth ii1 consumption. 
4.5. 3 Calibration 
The next step in evaluating the welfare cost associated with higher consump-
tion uncertainty involves parameterizing the model econonues to obtain nu-
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merical solutions for the equivalent variations A1 and A2 . I report results for 
each of the 14 countries that belong to the sample of PC-economies. 
For the consumption process, the sample variance of the growth rate 
of consu1nption serves as the point estimate of cri .20 Point estimates for the 
trend growth rate g come from the addition of the sample mean of consump-
tion growth and ½crt,.21 
For the parameterization of the change in consumption uncertainty 
due to valuation-effect volatility (cr'2t I use the underlying elasticity estimates 
of the previous section, under the assumption that valuation-effect variability 
has doubled in each country.22 In light of the estimation results, I set er; 10 
percent higher compared to CTi , (see Table 4.4, Column 2; Table 4.5, Columns 
1 and 3). 
As for the other para1neters, I follow Pallage and Robe (2003) and 
assume that the subjective discount factor f3 equals 0.96. Other plausible 
/3-values do not change the results much. Based on previous studies, the 
ran.ge of the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion is recognized to be 
anywhere in the interval , E [l , 10]. I therefore consider the following set 
of ,-values: , E {1,2,4, 7, 10}. Ogaki et al. (1996) estimate elasticities of 
20It is readily verified that vvhen consump tion follm-vs the process Ct = g + Ct- 1 - ½~~ + Vt, 
then JE [(ct - Ct _ 1 ) - FJ2 = o-;, where Fis the exp ected value of consumption growth. 
21Similarly, this follows from the fact that JE [ ( Ct - Ct- 1)] = g - ½at 
22This setting should be viewed as the lower bound since for many countries such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand variability in valuation effects has, in fact, quadrupled 
since the early 1980s. Also, see Figure 4.2 
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intertemporal substitution for a large group of developing countries. Their 
results suggest that the upper and lower bound of 0 is 0.8 and close to zero, 
respectively. To cover that interval, I use the values 0 E { 1.25, 2, 4, 7, 10}. 
First economy Table 4.6 shows the welfare loss, A1, associated with a dou-
bling of valuation-effect volatility for the sample of PC-countries. The table 
reports these estimates for various values of the risk aversion parameter 'Y· 
As an additional cost estimate for comparison, I report the amount of addi-
tional trend growth that would be required to exactly offset A1 (cf. Eq. 4.21). 
Since the welfare loss of increased fluctuations depends on the risk-adjusted 
growth rate in this economy (cf. Eq. 4.19), the cumulative nature of random 
shocks results in significantly higher cost estimates compared to when con-
sumption only fluctuates around the trend line, such as in Lucas (1987). The 
general pattern is that, other things being equal, the welfare cost of additional 
consumption uncertainty is higher in countries ,vith an already high volatility 
of consumption growth, and lower for countries with a relatively high trend 
growth rate. 
This means that the cost estimate rarely exceeds 1 percent of perma-
nent consumption · for countries with an trend growth rate above 3 percent. 
For instance, Korea's consumption growth volatility and trend growth rate 
is 3.9 and 5.1 percent, r~spectively. The cost estimates are always close to 
0.3 percent of permanent consumption, independent of the value of the risk 
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Table 4.6: Cost of valuation-effect volatility (CRRA preferences) - PC-countries. 
Cost of Valuation-Effect Volatility Additional Tren d Growth Requ ired to 
(in Percent) Compensate For Volatility Increase 
' ' Country CTv g 1 2 4 7 10 1 2 4 7 10 
Bolivia 2.86 0.57 0.21 0.37 0.64 1.04 1.62 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 
H onduras 3.97 1.28 0.40 0.62 0.93 1.37 2.05 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.17 
Indonesia 4.20 4.56 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.19 
Israel 3.70 2.15 0.34 0.46 0.57 0.68 0.79 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.14 
Korea 3.88 5.09 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.16 
Malaysia 5.70 4.26 0.82 0.82 0.86 0.96 1.13 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.24 0.34 
Pakistan 3.84 2.14 0.37 0.49 0.62 0.74 0.88 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.15 
Philipp ines 1.66 1.49 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Poland 5.03 2.52 0.63 0.81 1.01 1.30 1.73 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.27 
Paraguay 4 .96 1.94 0.62 0.87 1.19 1.71 2.64 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.26 
Syria 10.24 2.07 2.61 4.21 12.33 0.11 0.22 0.44 0.77 1.10 
Thailand 3.77 3.70 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.15 
Venezuela 7.19 1.83 1.30 L 96 3.37 12.02 0.05 0.11 0.22 0.38 0.54 
Sou th Africa ? ,.. ? __ ::,_ 1.33 0.16 0.24 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 
Notes: o;, refers to the stand ard deviation of the consumption growth rate. g is the trend grow th rate in 
consumption . 1 denotes the paramter of constant relative risk aversion. 
aversion parameter, ry. The welfare-loss estimates for Indonesia and Thailand 
are very similar to the ones for Korea, because these countries share almost 
the same characteristics in terms of the trend growth rate and volatility in 
consumption. For Malaysia, the cost estimates -are slightly higher, which is 
the result of consumption paths being considerably more uncertain than, for 
example, in Korea. For a representative agent with a risk aversion parameter 
of ry = 10, an additional 1.1 percent in permanent consumption would be 
needed to offset the 10 percent increase in O-v that emanates from valuation 
effects. Nonetheless, notice that in son1e of the aforementioned countries, the 
size of the valuation channel has quadrupled over the last few decades. This 
means that the welfare cost may exceed 1 percent of permanent consumption, 
even in a cotmtry such as Korea. 
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There are some countries for which the cost estimates are extraor-
dinarily high. For instance, for Syria or Venezuela where consumption un-
certainty is high and growth relatively low, a representative consumer who 
is relatively risk-averse ( r > 7) would require an additional 0.5 percentage 
points of consumption grovvth forever in order to be compensated for the 
increase in consumption fluctuations caused by valuation-effect volatility. 
Second economy I report the welfare cost estimate A2 and the cost asso-
ciated with a 0.5 percent forgone trend growth rate for all members of the 
PC-group in Table 4.7. Since in this economy the representative consumer's 
preferences separate risk aversion from the elasticity of interten1.poral substi-
tution, Table 4.7 provides the cost estimates for different values of, and 0 in 
matrix form for each country. This means that diagonal entries represent the 
welfare loss in the CRRA case (for,, 0 > 2). 
~ 
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~ 
I Table 4.7: Cost of valuation-effect volatility (Epstein-Zin preferences) - PC-Countries. 
Cost of Valuation-Effect Volatility Cost of Foregone 0.5% Trend Growth Cost of Valuation-Effect Volatility ~ (in Percent) (in Percent) exceeding Cost of Foregone Trend growth? ,,.__. 
e e 0 ~ ~ 
t-1--
~· Cotmtry CT11 g 1' 1.25 2 4 7 10 1.25 2 4 7 10 1.25 2 4 7 10 I 0 ;:::! 
Bolivia 2.80 0.71 1.00 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.08 11.04 10.30 8.76 7.18 6.09 No No No No No ~ ('1:) \) 2.00 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.20 0.16 11.06 10.38 8.96 7.45 6.40 No No No No No ...,.. r.t) 
4.00 0.76 0.70 0.56 0.43 0.35 11.11 10.56 9.37 8.07 7.11 No No No No No .._ 
~ 7.00 1.34 1.25 1.06 0.85 0.72 11.19 10.85 10.08 9.21 8.55 No No No No No ~· r.t) 
10.00 1.93 1.84 1.63 1.39 1.21 11 .26 11.14 10.90 10.72 10.74 No No No No No ~ 
Honduras 3.93 1.10 1.00 0.36 0.31 0.22 0.15 . 0.11 10.81 9.56 7.31 5.38 4.24 No No No No No r.t) ;:::.-
2.00 0.73 0.63 0.45 0.32 0.24 10.86 9.71 7.58 5.69 4.54 No No No No No ~ 
..... 
' 4.00 1.47 1.30 0.98 0.71 0.56 10.96 10.03 8.19 6.43 5.29 No No No No No ~· 
7.00 2.60 2.38 1.95 1.52 1.25 11.10 10.54 9.32 7.98 7.01 No No No No No ~ 
.._ 
10.00 3.75 3.59 3.22 2.78 2.45 11.25 11.10 10.79 10.50 10.39 No No No No No ~ Indonesia 4.04 4.50 1.00 0.32 0.19 0.09 . 0.05 0.03 9.07 5.65 2.74 1.47 0.97 No No No No No ;:::! 
2.00 0.65 0.39 0.18 0.10 0.06 9.11 5.71 2.78 1.50 0.99 No No No No No ~ 
\) 4.00 1.30 0.80 0.38 0.20 0.13 9.18 5.82 · 2.87 1.56 1.03 No No No No No a 
7.00 2.29 1.44 0.71 0.38 0.25 9.29 6.01 3.02 1.66 1.11 No No No No No ;:::! r.t) 
10.00 3.31 2.13 1.07 . 0.59 0.39 9.40 6.21 3.18 1.77 1.19 No No No No No ~ ~ Israel 3.57 2.10 1.00 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.05 10.23 7.95 4.94 3.10 2.23 No No No No No ,:-:. 
-c::s 2.00 0.57 0.43 . 0.26 0.16 0.11 10.27 8.03 5.05 3.19 2.30 No No No No No t-1--
~· 4.00 1.15 0.88 0.53 0.33 0.24 10.34 8.21 5.27 3.38 2.46 No No No No No 0 
7.00 2.02 1.59 1.00 0.64 0.46 10.45 8.50 5.64 3.71 2.73 No No No No No ;:::! 
r.t) 10.00 2.91 2.35 1.54 1.01 0.74 10.56 8.80 6.07 4.10 3.07 No No No No No ~ Korea 3.85 4.84 1.00 0.29 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.03 8.92 5.42 2.56 1.36 0.88 No No No No No 0 
0 2.00 0.57 0.34 0.16 0.08 0.05 8.95 5.46 2.60 1.38 0.90 No No No No No ...,.. ~ 4.00 1.16 0.69 0.32 0.17 0.11 9.02 5.56 2.67 1.43 0.93 No No No No No ...... 
;:::! 7.00 2.04 1.24 0.59 0.31 0.21 9.11 5.71 2.79 1.50 0.99 No No No No No Oq 
10.00 2.93 1.82 0.88 0.48 0.31 9.21 5.88 2.91 1.59 1.05 No No No No No 
Notes: cr1, refers to the standard deviation of the consumption growth rate. g is the trend growth rate in consumption. 'Y denotes the pararnter of constant relative 
risk aversion. The intertermporal elasticity of substition is given by 1/8. 
Table 4.7: Cost of valuation-effect volatility (Epstein-Zin preferences) - PC-Countries (ctd.). 
Cost of Valuation-Effect Vola tility Cost of Foregone 0.5% Trend Growth Cost of Valuation-Effect Volatility 
(in Percent) (i.n Percent) exceeding Cos t of Foregone Trend growth? 
0 0 0 
Country 0'11 g 'Y 1.25 2 4 7 10 1.25 2 4 7 10 1.25 2 4 7 10 
Malaysia 5.55 4.20 1.00 0.62 0.38 0.18 0.10 0.07 9.24 5.92 2.95 1.61 1.07 No No No N o No 
2.00 1.24 0.78 0.38 0.21 0.14 9.31 6.04 3.04 1.68 1.12 No No No No No 
4.00 2.51 1.62 0.82 0.45 0.30 9.45 6.29 3.26 1.82 1.23 No No No No No 
7.00 4.46 3.03 1.60 0.91 0.62 9.67 6.71 3.63 2.09 1.43 No No No No No cm 
...j:::.. 10.00 6.49 4.64 · 2.60 1.53 1.06 9.90 7.19 4.10 2.43 1.69 No No No N o No . V, 
Pakistan 3.94 2.18 1.00 0.34 0.26 0.15 0.09 0.06 10.20 7.86 4.83 3.01 2.16 No No No No No 
2.00 0.69 0.52 0.31 0.19 0.13 10.24 7.96 4.96 3.12 2.24 No No No No No ~ 4.00 1.39 1.06 0.65 0.40 0.28 10.32 8.18 5.22 3.34 2.42 No No No N o No 
7.00 2.46 1.94 1.23 0.78 0.57 10.46 8.52 5.67 3.74 2.76 No No No N o No '-5:: ~ 10.00 3.54 2.89 1.92 1.27 0.94 10.59 8.89 6.21 4.24 3.19 No No No N o No ~ ~ Philippines 1.60 1.47 1.00 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 10.56 8.80 6.07 4.10 3.08 No No No No No ~ 
2.00 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.03 10.56 8.82 6.10 4.13 3.10 No No No No No ~ 
4.00 0.24 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.06 10.58 8.86 6.16 4.19 3.15 No No No No No ~ ~ ~ 7.00 0.41 0.33 0.22 0.14 0.10 10.60 8.92 6.26 4.29 3.23 No No No No No V} 
~-10.00 0.59 0.48 0.32 0.21 0.15 10.62 8.99 6.35 4.38 3.32 No No No No No V} 
Poland 4.87 2.62 1.00 0.51 0.37 0.20 0.12 0.08 9.98 7.37 4.28 2.57 1.80 No No No N o No 
2.00 1.03 0.74 0.42 0.25 0.17 10.04 7.50 4.43 2.69 1.90 No No No No No 
4.00 2.09 1.55 0.91 0.55 0.38 10.17 7.80 4.76 2.96 2.11 No No No No No 
' 7.00 3.70 2.88 1.79 I 1.13 0.81 10.37 8.29 5.36 3.46 2.52 No No No N o No 
10.00 5.36 4.39 2.94 1.94 1.44 10.57 8.83 6.12 4.16 3.12 No No No No No 
Paraguay 5.26 2.18 1.00 0.62 0.46 0.27 0.16 0.12 10.23 7.94 4.92 3.09 2.22 No No No No No 
2.00 1.24 0.94 0.57 0.35 0.25 10.30 8.12 5.16 3.28 2.38 No No No No No 
4.00 2.51 1.98 1.26 0.80 0.58 10.46 8.53 5.69 3.75 2.77 No No No No No 
7.00 4.47 3.75 2.61 1.78 1.34 10.70 9.22 6.72 4.75 3.65 No No No No No 
10.00 6.49 5.83 4.58 3.45 2.76 10.96 10.03 8.19 6.43 5.29 No No No N o No 
Notes: 0-11 refers to the standard deviation of the consumption growth ra te. g is the trend growth rate in consumption. 'Y denotes the para:mter of constant relative 
risk aversion. The intertermporal elas ti city of substition is given by 1 / (-J. 
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Table 4.7: Cost of valuation-effect volatility (Epstein-Zin preferences) - PC-Countries (ctd.). 
Cost of Valuation-Effect Volatility Cost of Foregone 0.5% Trend Growth Cost of Valuation-Effect Volatility 
(in Percent) (in Percent) exceeding Cost of Foregone Trend growth? 
e e e 
Country CTv g 'Y 1.25 2 4 7 10 1.25 2 4 7 10 1.25 2 4 7 10 
Syria 9.88 1.91 1.00 2.24 1.81 1.19 0.78 0.57 10.58 8.85 6.15 4.18 3.14 No No No No No 
2.00 4.56 3.98 . 2.96 2.13 1.65 10.87 9.74 7.62 5.74 4.59 No No No No No 
4.00 9.50 9.95 11.44 15.37 36.82 11.50 12.14 14.42 21.96 No No No No 
7.00 17.69 27.51 12.60 19.17 Yes Yes 
10.00 26.94 91.55 13.93 44.57 Yes Yes 
Thailand 3.71 3.55 1.00 0.28 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.03 9.49 6.38 3.33 1.87 1.26 No No No No No 
2.00 0.57 0.37 0.19 0.10 0.07 9.53 6.44 3.38 1.91 1.29 No No No No . No 
4.00 1.15 0.76 0.39 . 0.22 0.15 9.59 6.56 3.49 1.99 1.35 No No No No No 
7.00 2.02 1.36 0.72 0.41 0.28 9.69 6.76 3.68 2.12 1.45 No No No No No 
10.00 2.91 2.01 1.08 0.62 0.42 9.80 6.97 3.88 2.27 1.56 No No No No No 
Venezuela 7.05 1.67 1.00 1.15 0.92 0.60 0.39 0.29 10.58 8.86 6.16 4.20 3.16 No No No No No 
2.00 2.31 1.94 1.34 0.91 0.68 10.73 9.29 6.84 4.88 3.77 No No No No No 
4.00 4.72 4.29 3.45 2.65 2.15 11.03 10.29 8.75 7.16 6.07 No No No No No 
7.00 8.53 8.95 . 10.36 14.03 29.54 11.53 12.25 14.89 24.81 No No No No 
10.00 12.57 15.77 66.18 12.07 15.11 56.99 Yes Yes Yes 
South Africa 2.59 1.25 1.00 · 0.16 0. 13 0.09 0.06 0.04 10.70 9.21 6.71 4.74 3.64 No No No No No 
2.00 0.31 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.09 10.72 9.27 6.81 4.84 3.74 No No No No No 
4.00 0.63 0.53 0.37 0.25 0.19 10.76 9.40 7.01 5.06 3.94 No No No No No 
7.00 1.11 0.94 0.67 0.47 0.36 10.82 9.59 7.35 5.43 4.29 No No No No No 
10.00 1.59 1.38 1.01 0.72 0.55 10.88 9.78 7.71 5.85 4.70 No No No No No 
Notes: CTv refers to the stand,::U"d deviation of the consump tion growth rate. g is the trend growth rate in consumption. 'Y denotes the parmnter of constant relative risk 
aversion. The interterrnporal elasticity of substition is given by 1/8. No estimates are reported when the welfare cost explodes. 
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§4.5 Welfare analysis 
Overall, the cost estimates increase with the representative consumer's 
degree of risk aversion and willingness to substitute over thne. Howeve1~ this 
relationship holds only for countries where the risk-adjusted trend gro,,vth 
rate is positive. When it is negative, the welfare loss increases as the as the 
agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution (the higher 8) decreases. The 
intuitive reason behind this is that the marginal utility rises more rapidly over 
time for consumers who are less willing to substitute over time because an 
agent with the prospect of negative consumption growth and high e does 
not wish to shift his consumption forward as much in the face of greater 
consumption growth uncertainty (Obstfeld, 1994b; Pallage and Robe, 2003). 
Apart from slight differences due to the separation of ry from 81 com-
pared to the CRRA economy, the cost estimates are qualitatively very simi-
lar in the sense that valuation-effect volatility imposes--a welfare loss that is 
rarely above 1 percent of permanent consumption for countries with a ro-
bust consumption trend growth rate such as Indonesia, Korea, or Thailand. 
For Venezuela and Syria on the other hand, the cost of rising valuation-effect 
volatility again clearly exceeds 1 percent of permanent consumption. If agents 
are sufficiently risk-averse in these countries, a representative consu1ner may 
even strictly ·prefer being stripped of 0.5 percentage points of consumption 
growth forever, rather thqn to incur the increase in consumption fluctuations 
brought about by valuation. effects. 
1-88 Val-uation effects, risk sharing, and consunzption snioothing 
To summarize, the exercise in this section has shown that the increase 
in valuation-effect volatility, as witnessed over the past two decades, may 
inflict substantial welfare costs in PC-countries. For a more risk-averse repre-
sentative agent in countries with already high consumption uncertainty, this 
cost may be high enough for her to strictly prefer foregoing 0.5 percentage 
points consumption growth forever, rather than see consumption volatility 
rising due to valuation effects. This seems, however, to be the exception. 
In most PC-countries the welfare cost associated with a doubling of valua-
tion effect volatility rarely exceeds 1 percent of permanent consumption. The 
reason is that either the consumption trend growth rate is robust, or con-
sumption paths are relatively stable for the majority of PC-countries in the 
sample. Nonetheless, the cost estimates in this section should be viewed as 
the lower bound since valuation effect volatility in many countries has in fact 
quadrupled since the 1980s. This 1neans that the welfare cost due to valuation 
effect may in fact be well above 1 percent of permanent consumption, even in 
countries such as Indonesia or Korea. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study has empirically examined the link between the observed increase 
in the size of "valuation effects" and risk sharing. Recent models of portfo-
lio choice, such as the one of Devereux and Sutherland (2010t suggest that 
§4.6 Conclusion 
valuation effects are an important channel of the risk sharing mechanism in 
that they help bring about external adjustn1ent. The indirect approach to test 
this is by examining whether an increase in the size of the valuation chan-
nel is associated with improved risk sharing. My econometric results suggest 
that this relationship indeed holds for high incon1e countries. For emerging 
and developing countries the results are mixed. Theory implies that the rela-
tionship between valuation adjustments and risk sharing for these countries 
depends on the sign of the correlation between domestic consumption growth 
and valuation effects. For the set of EMEs where this correlation is negative, 
I find some, albeit weak, evidence that risk sharing improves as the scope of 
the valuation channels increases. However, the opposite seems to be the case 
in economies for which consumption growth and valuation effects co-vary 
positively: the greater the size of valuation adjustments, the worse the extent 
of risk sharing becomes. Consequently, the degree of-.risk sharing in those 
countries has deteriorated sharply over the last two decades. 
Motivated by these findings, this paper has also estimated the extent 
to which the valuation channel amplifies consumption volatility in EMEs, 
where valuation effects are pro-cyclical with respect to domestic consumption 
grow:th (PC-economies). The· econometric results suggest that for every dou-
bling of the size of the valuation channel, consumption volatility increases by 
about 10 percent in PC-countries. The resulting '"'elfare loss may be substan-
190 Valuation effects, risk sharing, and consuniption snwothing 
tial. Depending on specific country characteristics, the welfare cost may be 
well in excess of one percent of permanent consumption. Future work could 
address the question of which factors are driving the differences between NC 
and PC countries. 
§Appendix 
Appendix 
Table 4A.1: Country list. 
High income countries (18) 
Australia Netherlands 
Austria New Zealand 
Canada Norway 
Denmark Portugal 
Finland Spain 
France Sweden 
Germany Switzerland 
Italy United Kingdom 
Japan United States 
Emerging market economies (EMEs) (35) 
Argentina Honduras Morocco Thailand 
Bangladesh Hungary Pakistan Tunisia 
Bolivia India Paraguay Turkey 
Botswana Indonesia Peru Uruguay 
Brazil Israel Philippines Venezuela 
Chile Jamaica Poland 
China Jordan Singapore 
Colombia Korea South Africa 
Egypt Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Guatemala Mexico Syria 
Table.4A.2: Data Appendix Table Data sources and definitions. 
Variable 
Consum.ption Growth Volatility 
Valuation-Effect Volatility 
GDP per capita growth volatility 
Inflation Volatility 
Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility 
Trade Openness 
Description 
Ten-year rolling standard deviation of the growth rate of real private 
consump tion per capita. Calculated as the product of PPP converted GDP per 
capita consumption share times real PPP converted GDP per capita. 
Ten-year rolling standard deviation of valuation terms scaled by GDP. 
Valuation effects are calculated indirectly using Eq. 4.4. 
Ten-year rolling standard deviation of real PPP converted GDP per capita. 
Ten-year rolling standard deviation of the inflation rate measured as the 
annual percentage growth ra te of the ratio of GDP in local current currency 
Ten-year rolling standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate 
(domestic currency per US dollar). 
Constructed as the ratio of the sum of the total value of exports (X) 
plus the total value of imports (M) relative to GDP (at constant prices). 
Source 
PWT 7.1 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
and IMF BOP Statistics 
PvVT 7.1 
WDI 
PWT 7.1 
PWT 7.1 
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